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

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Beyond Chaos

A Policy for the West

Zbigniew Brzezinski

FIRST, a prediction: If Central Europe falters economically and slides politically into violent nationalist passions, the probability is overwhelming that the Soviet Union—itself the volcano of nations—will explode violently before eventually smoldering into some noxious form of Great Russian nationalist dictatorship. But if Central Europe moves successfully, despite some unavoidable initial stumbles, towards democracy and prosperity, the chances grow that the painful processes of change within the Soviet Union will eventually also work themselves out in a largely constructive way.

This is the grand historic stake involved in how the West manages the dissolution of the external Soviet empire and the transformation of the internal Soviet empire. And it calls for nothing less than a sweeping concept of trans-oceanic and trans-continental cooperation, a vision capable of igniting the historic imagination of the peoples now engaged in divesting themselves of stifling ideological and imperial bonds. Like the building of a cathedral in the Middle Ages, it is an objective to be pursued patiently over decades, yet also an idea capable of seizing the mind and of mobilizing political support.

The external Soviet empire lasted forty-five years. It is now shattered, beyond redemption or repair. The Soviet Union, suffering from a bad case of imperial fatigue, is itself struggling for survival, attempting to enforce the Brezhnev Doctrine within its own realm even though Moscow has concluded that the doctrine is no longer enforceable within the former empire. Moreover, it is now clear that the internal Soviet crisis will be of long duration. It is simultaneously an ethnic, an economic, and a political crisis. Attempts at solution of one tend to compound the gravity of another, thereby condemning the Soviet Union to a protracted internal malaise. As a consequence, even the survival of the Soviet Union in its present form is now quite unlikely. Indeed, the existing USSR is doomed.

In the meantime, a new geopolitical reality in the very heart of Europe is emerging. Today, Eastern Europe is again Central Europe—which it has always been historically, culturally, and philosophically. The correct geographic designation of the area involved is also Central Europe—even though for almost half a century it was misleadingly labelled as Eastern Europe. Yet the said "Eastern Europe" encompassed Prague as one of its capitals, a city located considerably to the west of Vienna which was normally described as

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located in "Western Europe." The fact is that the terms "Eastern Europe" and "Western Europe," as employed over the last several decades, were not geographic but geopolitical designations. They reflected the post-Yalta political division of Europe. Today, it is the Soviet Union that is again Europe's true geographic and geopolitical East.

The reemergence of Central Europe poses, however, a special problem, dangerous to the stability of Europe as a whole. This postcommunist region is threatened by chaos and instability even as it yearns for a Western European style of life and for Western-type institutional arrangements. It is fragmented and weak. The economies of Central Europe are in a shambles. Their political systems have to be rebuilt from scratch. Their political cultures are imbued with intense nationalism that has been intensified by the communist experience. The threat of national and territorial conflicts overhangs the internal difficulties that every Central European regime will have to overcome on the way to the stable democracy which all profess to seek.

The year 1989 was the year of hope but the year 1990 is likely to be the year of decision. It will determine whether the Cold War can be stably terminated through reunification of Germany; whether Poland can successfully blaze the way to an unprecedented transition from communism to a free market democracy; and whether the Soviet Union can make the breakthrough to pluralism.

However, the first phase of largely peaceful change—of ecstatic emancipation—might well now be followed by the second phase—of explosive eruption, with socio-economic frustrations fueling political passions. Democratic reform could then give way to a lethal polarization, with Central European politics shifting from their previous left-wing communist totalitarianisms to nationalist right-wing authoritarianisms. This is especially likely to become the case if the ongoing economic reforms in Central Europe falter and fail, while the West watches like a benign spectator.

The Soviet-imposed communist experience was historically so catastrophic for the region that its current emancipation also creates a dangerous geopolitical power vacuum between the once mighty but now crisis-ridden Soviet Union—the real Eastern Europe—and the politically and economically self-confident and unifying European Economic Community—the real Western Europe. Since nature abhors a vacuum, the question inevitably arises, what will fill it?

This geopolitically pregnant issue is given special urgency by the reality of Germany's simultaneous reunification. Till now, the assumption generally had been that the eventual emancipation of "Eastern Europe" would precede, through a gradual process, the eventual—indeed, historically remote—resolution of the division of Germany. Yet, instead of being sequential, the two processes have become synchronous. The socio-political chaos of Central Europe is being paralleled by the massive accretion in the strength of Germany.

THE UNIFICATION of Germany—Moscow, Washington, or Paris to the contrary—is not an issue for the future. It is happening right now, by German fiat and not by formal international negotiations. Though the intra-German boundaries between the two halves of Germany still continue to exist on the map, they are disappearing on the ground. During his late 1989 visit to East Germany, Chancellor Kohl—hailed enthusiastically by the populace—was already acting like the chancellor of all of Germany, with East German Prime Minister Modrow at his side cast in the deferential role of a provincial administrator.

Germany is thus becoming the new key player of the Central European scene. Its economic power is inevitably generating political influence. Every Central European country is already cultivating German goodwill and seeking German credits and investments. A reunited Germany will have a GNP larger than all of the European members of the former Soviet bloc combined, and easily

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twice that of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary counted together.

This new geopolitical reality is bound to impact on the manner in which the Great Russians perceive and define their national interest. Beleaguered in their home Eastern European empire, beset by national conflicts, desperate for foreign economic aid, and increasingly fearful that Central Europe might simply gravitate to a Western Europe in which a reunited Germany will preponderate (and also in which the United States seems to be economically and politically reasonably well entrenched), before too long the Great Russian political elite will have to reexamine its policy toward Germany. In that context, the notion of special accommodation with Germany will inevitably resurface.

This may not happen all at once. In the short run, it is more than likely that the Kremlin will simply maneuver in order to avoid or postpone Germany's reunification. In doing so, it will play on the fears of some Central Europeans—notably the Poles and the Czechs—and on the national sensitivities of some Western Europeans—notably the French. In the case of both, Moscow will strive to exploit deeply rooted fears of German territorial expansionism, taking advantage of the clumsiness of some West German pronouncements casting doubt on the durability and legitimacy of the existing Polish-German frontier on the Oder-Neisse rivers. In effect, Moscow will seek to forge a de facto coalition of the Europeans on behalf of the German status quo. That is the import of Shevardnadze's recent and somewhat bizarre suggestion of an international referendum on German reunification. In seeking such a delaying coalition, Moscow will also hope for at least tacit American sympathy, and to cultivate it the Kremlin has already started to stress the desirability of continued American military presence in Europe.

However, once Moscow realizes that maintaining the division of Germany has become too costly—and at some point may even require the massive and direct application of Soviet military power—a fundamental revision in the Soviet Union's European policy will take place. The obvious gambit will be to sponsor the reunification of Germany, but on Soviet terms—thereby perhaps salvaging some of the Soviet Union's position in Central Europe, even if at the cost of sharing a portion of it with Germany, and achieving in return some disruption of Western unity. This is exactly why it is so important for the West that eventual but also inevitable unification of Germany should occur *not in spite* of the West's policy but in a context constructively shaped by an enlightened and historically timely Western policy.

To postulate the above is not to engage in self-fulfilling anti-German prophecies nor to promote Germanophobia. The last several decades have seen the emergence of a genuine German commitment to Western European cooperation and to democratic ideals. Most Germans are truly good Europeans and have no desire for a new Rappallo, not to speak of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Their predominant national desire is to be both a part of Europe and to be nationally united—and these, it must be stated unambiguously, are legitimate desires, worthy of serious Western support. The West must, therefore, fashion a policy which promotes legitimate German national aspirations without diverting the Germans from the grand goal of genuine European unity.

WITH THE above in mind, Western policy toward the postcommunist Central Europe and toward the still-communist Soviet Union must take three broad considerations into account. The first is the historically grounded fear of Germany's neighbors that a reunited Germany would be too strong for their security and even territorial integrity. Such fears can only have the effect of driving the Czechs and the Poles into the hands of Moscow, for reasons not of ideology but of national interest, while at the same time fracturing the highly desirable Franco-German reconciliation.

The second is the growing and already

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mentioned concern of the Russians that Central Europe's dynamic transformation will eventually lead to intensely nationalistic and anti-Russian governments while the region's external weakness will result in the area's absorption by a Western Europe led by Germany and backed by the United States. Historical prudence and strategic wisdom dictate that the Russians, as they accustom themselves to the reality of an independent Central Europe and of a reunifying Germany, must be given a better option than either a new Russo-German deal or a neighboring region dominated by hostile passions.

Finally, Western policy must be sensitive to the connection between change in Central Europe and the internal Soviet crisis. Peaceful and constructive renewal in Central Europe, one that demonstrates that postcommunism leads eventually to democracy and prosperity, will inevitably have an infectious impact on the various nations of the Soviet Union. It will encourage the more politically-developed ones to pursue evolutionary avenues of change and also to foster closer contacts with the widening circles of all-European cooperation. Conversely, failure in Central Europe will mean that postcommunism unleashes nationalist passions and leads to parochial dictatorships as well as chaos. That lesson would not be lost on the various nations of the Soviet Union, reinforcing tendencies among the increasingly desperate Great Russians in favor of a Great Russian nationalist garrison state.

The 145 million Great Russians are today acutely conscious of the growing hostility toward Moscow's rule among the other 145 million non-Russian Soviet citizens. Complicating the picture is the demographic fact that about 65 million Soviet citizens live outside their ethnic homelands—and they are likely to be the first targets of any hostile outbreaks. Although not all the non-Russian nations at this stage desire to secede, the nationalist wave is gaining in strength throughout the Soviet Union. What has been happening in the Baltic republics is the more visible and by far the most pacific manifestation of a massive surge in ethnic passions and political aspirations that is engulfing all of the non-Russian parts of the Soviet Union.

Neither Moscow's concessions nor its repressions are likely to reverse this trend, given the historical dynamism of the nationalist phenomenon, especially in the early phases of intoxicating national emancipation. Moreover, it is not the Baltic region but the Caucasus that provides the best glimpse of the Soviet Union's future. The struggle between the Shiite Azeris and the Christian Armenians has already started to turn into a struggle between the "Red" Russians and the "Green" Moslems, with other Central Asian Moslems gradually becoming aroused. For example, Tadjikistan has already experienced cases of anti-Soviet guerrilla actions, and anti-Russian violence has also occurred in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

To make matters worse, in reaction to it, prominent Great Russian intellectuals are now increasingly articulating the view that it was the Great Russians—and not the non-Russians—who were the principal victims of Stalinism, that Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism was in fact a foreign yoke (Jewish and Georgian) imposed on them, that Russia's economic impoverishment is due to the sacrifices the Russians have shouldered on behalf of the non-Russians, and that in the post-communist phase it is the Russian Orthodox tradition that ought to inspire the Great Russians in the assertion of their special obligation to preserve Russia's special imperial mission. The makings of a tragic and debilitating collision are all here, with potentially adverse consequences not only for the Soviet Union but also for Europe's future serenity.

II

A POLICY that responds creatively to all these overlapping dilemmas will have to be comprehensive geographically, ambitious politically, and long-term historically. It must be capable both of harnessing Western popular support and of cap-

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tivating the political imagination not only of the Central Europeans but also of the many Soviet nations. It must build on the success of Western policy, not diluting but enhancing the processes of Western European integration while also seizing the moment in Central Europe to capitalize on that integration's ripple effects. Last but not least, it must leave doors ajar to that growing number of Russians and non-Russians who also yearn for an ending of the ideological separation between themselves and the European adventure.

Moreover, a conceptual vision that can provide a sense of historical direction at a time of confusing and demoralizing crisis is the best help the West can offer Gorbachev. And it has to be said quite brutally that Gorbachev needs such help, before he is either overthrown or assassinated or, equally bad, forced to reverse his course. The sad fact of this matter is that tangibly the West can do little for perestroika and its courageous leader. Unlike Central Europe, neither the Soviet political nor economic system has yet changed enough to make Western economic help constructively digestible. The scale of the internal Soviet crisis is also much greater, and so is the resistance of such entrenched institutions as the centralized bureaucracy, the nomenklatura, the army, and the KGB. Until their backs are broken, Western economic aid would at best be wasted and at worst would merely prolong the crisis that has been generating the pressures for change.

But the West can help a great deal to galvanize more support for the needed changes and to infuse greater optimism in the face of the deepening crisis by articulating a long-term concept of beneficial cooperation spanning the political legatees of Western civilization. Western statesmanship has so far been deplorably short on historic imagination in confronting the consequences of the terminal crisis of communism—much in contrast to the genuinely far-sighted and historically ambitious concept that the Western leaders did articulate in the face of the Stalinist challenge in the late 1940s.

Then, too, a comprehensive effort was needed, and the response to Stalin's threat not only shaped the historical agenda for the next several decades but eventually proved its prescience. The key point to bear in mind in this connection is that the response at the time involved both some short-term concrete actions and the articulation of a long-term vision. The notions of trans-European cooperation and of the Atlantic partnership seemed then to be remote goals, yet they shaped decisively the history of the subsequent decades.

And so, just as in the late 1940s, the West must today respond to the abrupt collapse of Soviet power in Central Europe and to the internal Soviet crisis with the grand concept of a Trans-European Commonwealth, with the European Community at its core, but embracing Central Europe and being open also to eventual association with what is still today the Soviet Union. Such a strategic vision for the future—focused on the historic goal of a wider Trans-European Commonwealth—should include the following seven more specific, yet still historically ambitious policy components:

1. Acceleration of (Western) European integration;
2. Enhancement of trans-Atlantic ties;
3. Consolidation of democratic reform in Central Europe;
4. Negotiation of a German confederation within an all-European security framework;
5. Facilitation of cross-cutting multilateral cooperation;
6. Promotion of Central European regional cooperation;
7. Encouragement of a new Soviet confederation.

The above, however, have to be viewed as a package, with the pursuit of one facilitating and necessary to the attainment of the others. The end result of the effort should be the emergence of a more stable, cooperative, and democratic all-European order as well as the termination of the American-Soviet rivalry over the fate of Europe. It is, admittedly, a daunting agenda, but anything less threatens

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to turn the hopeful events of the last years of the 1980s into lethal international and internal conflicts. The West's triumph over communism could thereby be transformed into an unexpected, though avoidable, postcommunist nightmare.

Accordingly, first, it will be critically important to the success of the entire agenda for the ongoing process of Western Europe's political integration to be accelerated further. Indeed, that integration must serve as the cornerstone of any eventually wider European Commonwealth and as an attractive—and badly needed—example for the Central and East Europeans (i.e., Russians) of successful multilateral cooperation. Without such integration, any attempts to promote the regional recovery of Central Europe will lack the necessary source of stability and support. An "inner" and integrated Europe is likely to be the magnetic core for an "outer" Europe that is thereby encouraged also to move beyond the age of narrow nationalism. Moreover, such integration would have the desirable effect of anchoring Germany firmly in the "inner Europe," thus not only diminishing anxieties over Germany's unification but also precipitating the emergence of a genuinely Western European political entity.

THE AMERICAN contribution to the advancement of such unity can only be indirect. The United States can reaffirm publicly—as it has already done more than once—its support for Europe's economic and political unification. More important still, Washington can convey its conviction that henceforth the special Anglo-American relationship is being supplanted by the special Euro-American relationship, thereby discouraging any British inclinations to delay or impede the political unification of Western Europe. Such inclinations could prove to be especially harmful since their effect could be to delay the anchoring of West Germany in an integrated community at a time when Germany is likely to be attaining its national unification.

As Europe integrates itself economically and moves politically towards greater unity, it is proper to expect that its excessive dependence on American protection will have to decline. Hence, before long it will be appropriate for the United States to register its intention to reduce that portion of its defense budget dedicated to the defense of Europe. Figures on this subject are quite startling: With a defense budget of almost $300 billion, the United States spends about $140 billion for the defense of Western Europe, while Western Europe (with a GNP comparable to that of the United States) spends a total of $106 billion on its own defense!

Second, American support for European integration is consistent with the fostering of even more intimate trans-Atlantic ties. It creates a favorable climate for an increased American economic and cultural presence in Europe, with the Atlantic serving as the source of linkage between American and European societies. Secretary of State Baker outlined in a speech delivered in Berlin in December 1989 several steps that should be taken to enhance such Atlantic cooperation, and they are pointed in the right direction. Closer institutional and consultative ties would give Europe the desirable sense of security while also helping to offset some of the unavoidable economic frictions as Europe's single market takes shape. Last but not least, firm linkage with the United States would make it easier, and safer, for the Europeans to try to foster a more genuinely cooperative relationship, beyond Central Europe, with the Soviet Union.

Continued—even if significantly diminished—American military presence in Europe is, therefore, desirable both from the standpoint of Europe's as well as America's self-interest. Such a presence would give Europeans the security and the confidence to seek a closer and more cooperative relationship with the East, offsetting the understandable fear that at some point a political upheaval in Moscow might produce a more aggressive Russian posture. A new Soviet confederation of the kind discussed could then be more safely included in the widening

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circles of inner and outer European cooperation. Moreover, any new all-European security arrangements, including special ones for a reunified Germany, would certainly be more viable with an enduring American component.

The third goal will require a major and immediate commitment of Western resources. In the first half of 1989 it appeared that only Poland—the spearhead and the historic catalyst for the collapse of the Soviet bloc—and Hungary would require Western assistance. It is now obvious that all of the Central European countries—soon to be joined by Yugoslavia, with Albania also queuing up before too long—will have to be aided in the extraordinarily difficult transformation of their economic and political systems. This will be a drawn-out process, but the next several years will be decisive. They will determine whether Central Europe becomes ready for wider European cooperation or whether it will be the source of European instability.

IN 1990, however, the West's immediate goal must be to make certain that Poland's unique effort at the simultaneous reform of both its political and economic systems succeeds. Poland is the only country to have committed itself to the complete and prompt adoption of the free market system. The failure of its experiment would provide a disastrous object lesson for the others, especially strengthening the conservatives in the Soviet Union itself.

The help of the West will have to be both financial and conceptual. There are no precedents for the peaceful transformation of communist systems. The West will have to help intellectually with the necessary planning, training, and institutionalizing. But it will also have to help materially. The initial Polish estimates of Poland's longer-range economic needs—beyond what, in the first instance, the Poles must do on their own in terms of systemic reforms—were roughly on the scale of $10 billion, and these figures were not vastly exaggerated. In fact, Western commitments to Poland in the very first year of Poland's self-emancipation have already reached about one half that once-derided estimate.

Poland has now been joined by Hungary, East Germany (though this area will be the special beneficiary of German bounty), Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania; and before long Yugoslavia and Albania will join them. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to postulate that the overall level of Western capital that will be needed to prevent the region's slide into political and economic chaos will be roughly on the order of $25-$30 billion. That, in all probability, is a low estimate.

Since even this figure may appear at first glance as appallingly large, it is useful to assess it with a sense of historical proportion. Between 1946 and 1955, the United States, then with a GNP roughly one third of what it is today, and with its military expenditures after 1950 steadily rising, contributed a total (in 1989 dollars) of $171 billion to the recovery of Western Europe. (Of this, France received $45 billion; Italy, $20 billion; Great Britain, $38 billion; and West Germany, $20 billion—I am indebted to my French colleague, Jean-Claude Casanova, for these figures.) That came to an average annual American contribution of $17 billion. The result was a historical triumph.

Today, America's GNP is three times larger and American defense outlays will be declining, especially the approximately $140 billion per year specifically dedicated for the defense of Western Europe. Last but not least, in the current circumstances, the economic response to the challenge of Central Europe need not be, and certainly should not be, America's burden alone. The GNP of the other NATO countries exceeds that of the United States. Nonaligned Western European countries likewise have a stake in Central Europe's stability. Japan, with a GNP more than half that of America, also can and should play a role. Europe could thus contribute a share larger than America, and Japan approximately half that of America.

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Furthermore, the American share could be explicitly deducted from on-going U.S. contributions to Europe's defense, since the democratic rehabilitation of Central Europe would manifestly decrease the security threat to Western Europe.

The real lack, therefore, is not in available money but in political will and historical vision. The commitment of approximately $30 billion is certainly within the West's financial reach, and it could be justified to the West's parsimonious electorates by appropriate cuts in defense spending. The case for action regarding Central Europe needs to be articulated boldly by Western leaders to their legislators and public opinions, and the Western leaders will also need to move energetically in establishing some joint machinery—based, as in the case of Poland, on the EEC—to administer and allocate the pooled resources. The French initiative to create the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Eastern Europe is a step in the right direction, although its capitalization is far too modest.

FOURTH, the peaceful transformation of Central Europe will require a stable security context, one that is reassuring to the West and the East alike, including the Soviet Union. For the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to the two existing alliances. Their dissolution would produce insecurities and also prompt sudden shifts in the European balance of power. The preferable solution would be for both to continue, but more as political and less as military organizations. The Warsaw Pact is already ceasing to be an instrument of ideological subordination, and this makes it more likely that Poland and Czechoslovakia will find it in their own national interest to remain members of it. Their continued membership, in turn, will be reassuring to the Soviet Union that the influence of NATO will not be suddenly projected to the river Bug on the Polish-Soviet frontier.

Moreover, the two existing alliances should become the two pillars of an all-European security framework, created through a formal treaty which would be an extension of the German Peace Treaty that will also have to be concluded as part of the resolution of the German issue. Such a joint security framework should contain specific provisions designed to enhance collective European security—such as special zones for force and weapons thin-outs, monitoring and confidence-building measures, perhaps even some mixed force deployments—as well as an explicit joint NATO-Warsaw Pact guarantee of the existing European national frontiers. The latter would help to eliminate territorial anxieties associated with Germany's eventual reunification.

Although such reunification in the meantime will be moving forward on its own momentum, progress along the above lines would create a much more congenial international setting for the final but much safer termination of Germany's division. That termination should not be, and probably cannot be, artificially delayed. Deliberate obstruction is neither good morality nor good politics. Western attempts to slow down the process will simply increase the Soviet temptation at some point to reverse course and to play the German card. Hence the better part of political wisdom is for the West to embrace honestly the cause of German reunification as its own while energetically seeking to create a context in which German self-determination does not generate fears among Germany's neighbors.

Thus the West, in embracing the cause of Germany's unification as its own as well, should move forward with a comprehensive plan for a German confederation and for special security arrangements to accompany it. Chancellor Kohl's truly constructive speech of November 28, 1989, outlining a very responsible process for Germany's unification, represented a positive initiative and it should have been met with greater Western enthusiasm. The German people are certainly entitled to full political and economic self-determination, a single citizenship, a common flag, and joint confederal institutions.

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At the same time, it is essential that there be no ambiguity as to the external frontiers of a German confederation. In keeping with the Helsinki Accords, these frontiers clearly correspond to the existing boundaries of both West and East Germanies, and any revisionism on this score should be precluded in the formal German peace treaty sanctioning the new confederal arrangement. Indeed, German acceptance of existing frontiers is the *sine qua non* of the international acceptance of the country's unification. Moreover, for an agreed transitional period of time, the treaty should provide that the two existing European alliances may retain some contingents in the respective two parts of Germany, thereby guaranteeing a secure transition to the new European order.

Fifth, members of the two political/military alliances should be free to choose their economic associations through cross-cutting memberships in multilateral organizations. To be more specific, the Central European states, as they move towards market economies, should be permitted and encouraged to seek some form of association with either the European Free Trade Association, or, eventually, the EEC—even while they remain members of the Warsaw Pact. As a practical matter, this enshrinement of the principle of free choice would apply in reality only to the current members of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The resulting "traffic," so to speak, would be only one-way—westward—though the point need not be directly stressed for the sake of Soviet sensitivities. Similarly, the Central European countries should be selectively invited to participate in such European activities as the Council of Europe and other cooperative institutions. The effect would be to create the beginnings of an "outer" Europe, alongside the European nucleus of the EEC countries.

SIXTH, it behooves the West to encourage the Central Europeans to develop new forms of regional cooperation among themselves. Their emergence from Soviet control should not be permitted to create a geopolitical vacuum between Russia and Germany nor to lead to renewed national conflicts. Central Europe badly needs new forms and institutions of regional cooperation, be it in ecology, or economics, or politics. Some of the countries could be encouraged to join in bilateral undertakings, modeled on the Steel and Coal Community of the early 1950s that linked France and Germany in initial cooperation. Poland and Czechoslovakia have good reasons for economic and ecological cooperation in the Silesian triangle, and they certainly also have good geopolitical reasons to cooperate more closely in the political realm. The Danubian basin likewise provides a host of reasons for regional collaboration between several Central European countries. The examples could be multiplied, but the general point has already been made: Central Europe is ripe for, and badly needs, regional cooperative arrangements of the type that Western Europe now takes for granted.

The West could also help here by providing conceptual assistance, institutional experience, and by including the Central Europeans in existing functional multilateral bodies, thereby generating the dynamic for regional institution-building. Western economic and ecological assistance could even be made conditional to some degree on the recipients' willingness to engage in multilateral cooperation. The Central Europeans, under Soviet rule condemned to a compartmentalized isolation, simply lack the necessary experience in institutionalized trans-national collaboration.

Seventh, and finally, the Soviet Union should be encouraged to evolve into a Soviet Confederation as the only viable and peaceful solution to its mounting internal national conflicts. Such a confederation—no longer based on force and no longer dominated by the Great Russian portion of the Soviet population—would be a more fitting and historically qualified member for wider trans-European cooperation. The option of beneficial participation in the expanding Eu-

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ropean adventure should be explicitly held open to such a new and genuinely pluralistic political formation in the event that Gorbachev's perestroika does lead to a fundamental reformation of the Soviet Union. This is especially so since any such genuine confederation would be by definition also a democratic one. The prospect of membership would certainly exert a real attraction on those Russians and non-Russians who realize that Russian despotism has been in many respects reinforced by the age-long separation of Russia from Europe's evolving political traditions.

However, it must be noted that it is also quite probable that not all of what is today the Soviet Union would qualify for truly institutionalized engagement with Europe. The transformation of the Soviet Union might well be accompanied by its fragmentation. Apart from the secession of some of the more nationally developed and assertive republics, with the Western ones—like the Baltics—ready for participation in wider European cooperation, some of the Central Asian states are also increasingly manifesting their dissatisfaction with Great Russian rule. A new confederation may not satisfy their national and cultural aspirations, which increasingly may point them toward both separatism and closer contacts with their south and southwest Asian counterparts. In brief, the area currently known as the Soviet Union may be on the eve of a geopolitical upheaval of truly historic dimensions.

Thus it is quite conceivable that not the entire Soviet Union will eventually become the new confederation. A necessary concomitant to any process of creating a genuinely voluntary confederation will be the right of secession, and some parts of today's Soviet Union may in fact choose to exercise that right. But such secession could become more palatable even to the Great Russians if it led to new forms of association between both the seceding states and the remainder of the current Soviet Union with an emerging trans-European commonwealth. The disruptive effects of secession—both politically and economically—would thus be mitigated and absorbed within the growing framework of all-European cooperation.

All of the foregoing considerations make it even more important that a viable trans-European option, stabilized by a secure connection with America, be made open not only to Central Europe but also to at least the European part of the Soviet Union, as well as perhaps its Siberian extension. To be sure, it is much too early to prejudge this matter in precisely defined geographical and political terms, but it is timely to note that the only alternative to Central and Eastern European chaos in the postcommunist phase is a larger and deliberately contrived framework of trans-European cooperation.

It is not too early for Europeans and Americans to start thinking about the implications of this epochal challenge. The Eurasian map, as much of this century has known it, is being shaken. The response to this geopolitical earthquake requires a concentrated effort at conceptualizing and shaping strategy, at coordination and commitment. It will necessitate the adaptation of some existing European institutions and the creation of new ones, so that Central and Eastern Europeans can join their Western European and American brothers in a common council. It will certainly call for a full-time trans-Atlantic and trans-European dialogue at the highest level, one infused with a sense of both history and vision. Given the accelerating velocity of history, it is indeed time to begin charting deliberately the next phase in its endless trajectory.

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The Ghost in the Pentagon

Rethinking America's Defense

Fred Charles Iklé

FROM BERLIN to Baku, popular revolutions are dissolving the world's last empire—the erstwhile evil one. Upheavals continue. The *annus mirabilis* of 1989 liberated political energy that is now beginning to affect every corner of the globe: hastening the demise of Beijing's outdated dynasty, eroding Fidel Castro's and Kim Il Sung's dictatorships, creating a new German nation, transforming the European Community, and perhaps draining the marrow out of NATO.

Routinely, Pentagon planners stake out their work each year with a description of The Threat. Now we see in astonishment that in every arena of confrontation The Threat is being turned upside down. Indeed, our arch-adversary's arch-alliance, the Warsaw Pact, remains strung together only by the thin filament of a vacuous treaty text, having lost its ideological glue and Stalinist discipline.

What, now, are the threats against which the Pentagon should prepare? How should America's strategy and military forces, indeed its overall foreign policy, be changed to take account of the transformed environment?

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This year, Congress will vote on the first defense budget since democratic revolution swept through Eastern Europe. The Bush administration sees this budget as beginning "the transition," in the President's words, "to a restructured military—a new strategy that is more flexible, more geared to contingencies outside of Europe. . . . " But as the defense budget winds its way through Congress, one must fear it will be treated like a big sugar loaf from which to shave off sweet slices: cut more army divisions here, lop off another aircraft carrier there, cancel the new strategic bomber, cut strategic defense by half, and so on—chop, chip, chop.

One can no more construct a new strategy from canceled defense programs than one can build a house from woodshavings. Alas, any sense of urgency in Washington that has now welled up about defense is aimed at budget cuts, not grand strategy. Stubborn fiscal pressures provide today's motive for changing our military programs and forces. As for America's overall strategy, influential voices in the administration and in Congress maintain that because of vast uncertainty in the world we should change warily. The United States would be rash, it is argued, if it sought to shape the ongoing transformation of the global strategic structure, a transformation that is not only unpredictable but, in any event, largely beyond our influence. A renovation of our security strategy, according to the

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conventional wisdom in Washington, will have to wait till the dust settles.

This complacency is mistaken. For we should care immensely just how "the dust settles."

To say that the United States can wait to address the fundamentals of our Western security strategy is both too complacent and too unambitious. It is too complacent about the potential losses, the utter disaster that the fragility of today's global transformation could bring. And it is too unambitious and too passive, given the potential gains, the promise for enduring and profound improvement in our security that these pregnant times hold. Both the complacency and the listless passivity stem from a poverty of imagination about the potential for change—indeed, about the impact of the changes that have already occurred. What constricts our imagination are old habits of the mind, an almost unwitting reliance on the strategic concepts that have shaped the ends and means of our defense policy for decades.

The Enduring Mindset

THE MOST influential of these concepts have to do with Europe, precisely the area that has now experienced the greatest change. For more than four decades, year after year, the threat of a massive Soviet invasion of Western Europe has determined the design and purpose of over half of America's resources for defense.

As pervasive as it is obsolete, this mindset took hold forty-three years ago. In 1947, just two years after the Second World War, planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff set down some views of a possible war with the Soviet Union. "The Soviet land armies and air forces are capable of overrunning most, if not all, of Western Europe in a short time," warned their memorandum. "The ability of the Allies to meet and retard the Soviet efforts would depend to a very large degree upon the length of the period of warning they receive and the use they made of it." Gloomily, the assessment listed what must be done "if the war is not to be lost." The principal requirement, it argued, is to prepare for "an offensive strategic air effort against vital Russian industrial complexes and against Russian population centers."[1]

All these concepts have survived to this day. The whole mindset is there: the Soviet military threat to the center of Europe, U.S. dependence on warning time, and—to compensate for Western weakness—U.S. strategic bombing of Russia. Like a sturdy genetic code, the mindset propagated itself through generations of technological revolutions in armaments; through the Korean and Vietnam Wars; through the Sino-Soviet split and the build-up of British, French, and Chinese nuclear arsenals; through the economic empowerment of Japan and the growing unity and economic expansion of Western Europe.

Let us defer to another day the question whether this concept of the dominant threat remained valid beyond the mid–1950s; that is to say, beyond the death of Stalin, the rebuilding of Western Europe's economies and military forces, the consolidation of NATO, and the massive expansion of U.S. nuclear might. But surely, during the last year a few more things have changed in the center of Europe—and indeed, in Moscow.

Nonetheless, Washington's national security establishment continues to see the world in terms of the 1947 mindset. By regarding the basic strategy as an unchanging core, it recognizes improvement only at the edges. It admits—grudgingly—that the Warsaw Pact's massive attack on Western Europe would be somewhat weaker now and preceded by additional warning time. Having figured out that the attack would be weaker, the Pentagon bureaucracy concluded it could still adhere to the same old

[1] *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950*, ed. Thomas Etzold and John Gaddis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 302–6.

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strategy, even if it sacrificed two army divisions and a few tactical fighter wings on the budget-cutting altar. Second, having discovered increased warning time, the Pentagon bureaucracy now accepts converting some of our forces intended for Europe from active status to the less costly reserve status. While the shift to reserves has merit, how the bureaucracy rationalizes it is preposterous. It totally misses the import of the revolution that has swept through Eastern Europe to conclude merely that we can trim our active forces a bit because our intelligence experts now promise, say, thirty-seven days of warning (instead of fourteen) in the event of the Second Coming of World War II. Since 1989, NATO's warning time is to be measured neither in fourteen days nor in thirty-seven days, but in years—the years it would take to re-Stalinize Eastern Europe.

Even while Moscow still controlled Eastern Europe, the concept of a fixed warning time measured by a given number of days was mistaken. Advance warning of an attack is almost always ambiguous, and a clever enemy will use every means of deception to deepen ambiguity. It is hard to believe that the United States and its European allies could ever agree, in response to such warning and before the first shot was fired, to the planned deployment of six additional U.S. divisions to Europe.[2]

By postulating that the hoary scenario of the Warsaw Pact onslaught comes packaged with an extra twenty-three days of "warning," the Washington establishment justifies cuts in the defense budget. By trimming the edges of our force posture—cut some divisions here, eliminate some bases there—it can accommodate some further budget cuts. Most of these cuts will be welcomed by most members of Congress—unless and until they hurt vociferous constituents. But the totality of this approach is too passive toward the recent, and still continuing, transformation of the Soviet empire. It fails to cultivate and to secure the hitherto unimagined gains for peace and democracy.

Stability Worship

NOT TO WORRY, say some U.S. officials, these gains will be secured through arms control agreements, particularly through the ongoing talks in Vienna on conventional force reductions in Europe. While a successful conclusion of these talks will undoubtedly bring security benefits, their most lasting impact might yet be to undermine some of the recent gains for Eastern European independence. The talks in Vienna are aimed at a treaty that will enshrine the concept of parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and impose the same limits on American forces in Western Europe as on Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. To be sure, President Bush's recent proposal to lower these limits and to move away from equality between American and Soviet forces would improve the outcome. Yet, most of the new governments in Eastern Europe are now seeking agreements with Moscow for the withdrawal of *all* Soviet forces from their countries. When these governments later sign the grand arms treaty in Vienna, they will in effect legitimize a Soviet occupation force in their countries that their new bilateral agreements with Moscow will have happily eliminated.

Why should the United States and its NATO allies labor in Vienna to give birth to a treaty that will help maintain the Warsaw Pact as a coequal to NATO? Why should the

[2]Well before the revolutions in Eastern Europe, senior U.S. defense officials recognized that it would be impossible to rely on a specific warning time. During his seven years as secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger repeatedly urged the Pentagon and NATO planners to prepare for ambiguous and variable warning periods. David Abshire, after serving as U.S. ambassador to NATO, explained compellingly that warning and response time vary greatly, depending on the contingency. See David M. Abshire, *Preventing World War III* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), pp. 105–8.

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Pentagon bureaucracy still allocate over half its resources to a conventional war in the center of Europe against a Warsaw Pact invasion with only thirty-four days (or whatever) of warning? The answer to both these questions is the same: our arms control policy and our arms policy are dominated by the same obsolete mindset.

The forty-year-old image of the Threat and our forty-year-old strategy constrict our capacity to grasp the immensity of the global change now unfolding before us. We have promoted a "stable balance" between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces for so long that quite a few Westerners have come to think Soviet forces in the center of Europe are needed for the sake of stability. One even hears whisperings in some mossy NATO circles that the Warsaw Pact ought to be preserved to maintain this treasured stability.

In London and Paris, moreover, some officials still pine for a permanent partitioning of Germany; not only to preserve the "stable" East-West balance, but also because they begrudge Germany its growing strength. They try to disguise this envy as legitimate, psychic trauma from both world wars. One wonders, though, if Paris must fear a new invasion by Hitler or the Kaiser, should Bonn fear a new Napoleonic war? Were it not for the democratic vigor of the people in the Eastern and Western part of Germany, these British and French stability worshippers might yet succeed in rebuilding the Berlin Wall. As Dr. Johnson might say today, "Stability is the last refuge of a reactionary."

Again, those who want to "stabilize" the military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact are, in one sense, too unambitious. Beholden to the old strategic mindset, they eschew improvements in our security that an up-to-date strategy could achieve. In another sense, more dangerously, they are too complacent in believing that NATO could protect itself against a "second Stalin" simply by manning its old fortresses again.

Prudently, our defense planners are worried by intelligence information showing that the Soviet Union, despite its acute economic and nationality crises, continues the mass production of a wide array of powerful armaments, including the most modern nuclear missiles. Our planners would be remiss if they failed to project these formidable military capabilities into a less benign political context than we enjoy today. We might wake up some morning to find a new aggressive dictatorship in Moscow, a ruthless tyrant who could order Russian forces to reconquer Eastern Europe and menace NATO more dangerously than Stalin ever did.

But what a fatal error to believe that, in the event of such a catastrophe, NATO could simply pick up where it left off in 1988! It is grossly unrealistic to assume that our Atlantic Alliance would proudly reassemble at the old ramparts, regenerate its military exercises in West Germany, deploy new short-range nuclear arms in Europe (as had been planned in 1988), and induce its member nations to increase their defense budgets again.

If the will of all the peoples in Eastern Europe had been crushed under Soviet tanks, if the democratic forces from Sofia to Warsaw had been drowned in rivers of blood, if the profound German aspirations for a unified nation were cruelly affronted by new mine fields and walls, if the expectations for a peaceful, open continent now animating all the nations of Europe were totally shattered—how could NATO then return to "business as usual"? Instead, the Atlantic Alliance would be rent by harsh recriminations. Its governments and its people would have lost confidence in the old strategy; they would recoil from the prospect of another forty years of military confrontation in the center of Europe. With so dark a future, the now ebullient spirit of the European community would falter. The fear of nuclear war would again weigh heavily on the public psyche, a fear the enemy could easily exploit to stir up disunity within the alliance.

The conventional arms agreement that is now being painstakingly negotiated in Vienna would offer scant protection in such a calamity. To be sure, thanks to the agreed reductions Russia would enter the new con-

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frontation without its former advantage in numbers of troops, tanks, and other equipment. But by violating the agreement while NATO debates what to do, Russia could get a head start. Moreover, once Russia began its reconquest of Eastern Europe, the Vienna conventional arms agreement would be washed away like a sandcastle by the tide.

Changing Priorities

AGAIN IT becomes apparent here that our old strategic mindset imposes mistaken priorities on the renovation of America's (and NATO's) defense effort and on the West's arms control policy. Among the top priorities of our defense policy today ought to be the protection and consolidation of the recent political gains in Eastern Europe, and the removal of temptations among Russian "hard-liners" and would-be Stalins to use military force for a new expansion of the empire—all the way into the center of Germany, to the Adriatic, into Afghanistan, and beyond.

This means we must help to hasten the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from countries where they are not welcome, even at the price of more drastically and more rapidly reducing U.S. troops deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany. On this point, the President's newest proposal moves in the right direction. Of course, we can hope and reasonably expect that a certain presence of American forces east of the Rhine will, for the foreseeable future, be welcomed by the German government and by a majority of the German people. This does not mean we should insist that a united Germany must, in its entirety, be a full-fledged member of NATO. But a residual, continuing U.S. troop presence in Germany would symbolize and give reality to a security link between the United States and Europe, thus complementing the enduring spiritual and cultural bonds of the Atlantic Alliance. To preserve a transatlantic security link is an imperative for the long-term benefit of the world.

We can best preserve the global benefits of the Atlantic Alliance by taking the initiative now, in concert with our allies, to shape a new security system for Europe. Instead of husbanding our military assets to "stabilize" the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in the center of Europe, we should shift more resources and effort to help stabilize democracy in Eastern Europe. It is a mistake to wait for the Vienna arms reduction talks to establish such a system. These talks will wind up preserving the Warsaw Pact like a toad in a bottle of formaldehyde.

Fortunately, with every passing month, democracy in Eastern Europe is becoming stronger. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that some new crisis might suddenly tempt Moscow to consider military intervention in Poland, East Germany, or Czechoslovakia, much as Brezhnev stumbled into the decision to invade Afghanistan. *To deter such a decision, under any and all circumstances, is a mission of our national security policy that deserves much higher priority today than the forty-year-old Pentagon mission of deterring the now exceedingly improbable Russian invasion of Western Europe.*

To this end, we must make clear to the leaders in Moscow, whoever they may be, that the West would never accept a new subjugation of Eastern European nations. This means breaking with some shameful past precedents of American indifference. For example, only a few weeks after Soviet tanks crushed the democratic uprising in Hungary in 1956, President Eisenhower stealthily signaled to Moscow that the United States wanted to return to business as usual, despite our vehement public denunciations of the Soviet actions in Budapest. Similarly, after Brezhnev's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, President Johnson's first priority in East-West relations was to resume the strategic arms talks. Prevented from doing so by the incoming Nixon administration, he felt great disappointment; by contrast, he had been much less troubled by Brezhnev's destruction of Czechoslovakia's democratic forces. We now know that this intervention

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set back democratization in Eastern Europe by twenty years.

Brezhnev's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 provoked a more coherent and, above all, a more persistent American response. The Carter administration started and the Reagan administration greatly expanded military support for the Afghan resistance. Nine years later, the tenacity of this resistance—and, thanks largely to our help, its effectiveness—compelled the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. Moscow learned a lesson that must have weighed heavily on its decision to abandon its imperial expansionism. If Moscow is not to forget this lesson, the West must continue to remember it as well.

A lesson within this lesson is particularly relevant for the Pentagon's current adjustment to the transformation of the Soviet empire. The Pentagon bureaucracy opposed the Reagan administration's efforts to provide more effective weapons to the Afghan resistance. It held no grudges against the Afghan freedom fighters, of course; it merely wanted to save its weaponry (even some of the oldest models) to meet The Threat it knew since 1947, with its anticipated huge tank and air battles in Germany.

Specifically, the U.S. army bureaucracy fiercely opposed giving the Afghan resistance Stinger missiles, the hand-held surface-to-air missiles with which the Afghans could shoot down Soviet aircraft. Only a minimal fraction of the U.S. army stocks of the oldest version of this missile was needed, and once made available, turned the fortunes of the war in Afghanistan decisively against the Soviet invader. While opposing this small contribution, the Pentagon was unstinting in shoring up the ramparts against a Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf. That there might be a connection between Soviet success or failure in subjugating Afghanistan and Moscow's appetite for invading Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia was not apparent to those who jealously guarded the hoard of thousands of old Stinger missiles.

Would it be unfair to see in this story a parable for today's need to set the right priorities between saving assets for World War III and helping to strengthen the forces for freedom now? Many members of Congress and private foreign policy experts are advocating larger and swifter funding for a whole panoply of reconstruction assistance to Eastern Europe—support for new private agriculture, management training for business and government. Clearly, if democracy can be firmly anchored in these countries the security of our European allies will be immensely improved. Efforts by the U.S. government to this end, hence, could reasonably be regarded as complementing or substituting for other U.S. efforts on behalf of NATO.

The Pentagon, however, tends to resist such a trade-off; and so might, when push comes to shove, various congressional committees. Despite the prudently chosen cuts that Defense Secretary Cheney proposed to Congress for the 1991 budget, about half our defense effort is essentially still devoted to fighting a massive conventional war in Europe. Before cutting our NATO-related forces further, the Bush administration wants a signed agreement to bring Soviet strength in Eastern Europe down to ours in Western Europe—clearly a vast improvement in terms of military force ratios. But if democracy should not survive in Eastern Europe, no piece of paper signed in Vienna would offer us worthwhile protection.

Third World Contingencies

OVER TIME, of course, the Pentagon will try to redesign its conventional forces for contingencies other than a war against a massive Warsaw Pact attack. The newly fashionable arena for our army, navy, and air force planners is the Third World. All types of armaments have suddenly become "vital" for dealing with Third World conflicts. Undoubtedly, each type has considerable military merit—whether it is the new C–17 transport plane that the air force wants, the new V–22 tilt-rotor plane desired by the marines, or the aircraft carriers treasured by the navy.

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Four points need to be kept in mind concerning this now fashionable focus on military contingencies in the Third World. First, for the Pentagon, the problem of Third World hostilities is not new at all. Every war in which the United States has been involved since World War II—either directly with its forces or indirectly by providing military aid—occurred in the so-called Third World. (Korea in 1950 was still a Third World country.) Since the war in Vietnam, American defense experts have conducted innumerable studies of the weaponry and tactics for use in Third World conflicts.[3]

A second point of importance is that the concept of "Third World military conflicts" covers many different contingencies with vastly different circumstances in terms of strategic geography, types of forces, and weaponry used. To be prepared for such disparate contingencies, the United States needs to be able to rely on a wide array of different armaments. The Pentagon's planning, hence, needs to address many different possible threats in Third World situations. Some types of equipment that our military services are wont to neglect may well be essential for some of them; for example, devices to clear land mines in insurgency warfare, ships equipped to clear sea mines, drones for intelligence collection, and other types of unmanned air vehicles.

A third significant factor is the dominant role of military assistance. Should the United States have a major stake in a future Third World conflict, chances are it would seek to rely on assisting its friends, rather than engage its own combat forces. This prospect renders all the more urgent the long overdue overhaul of the awkward patchwork of laws governing military assistance, a task that Congress is reluctant to take up.

A fourth point needs to be stressed, although it may not be welcome in the Pentagon. Only a fraction of the Pentagon budget—less than a third—can be justified in the foreseeable future by the need to prepare for possible U.S. involvements in Third World hostilities. Even though some of the Third World countries are heavily armed, their arsenals are still small compared to the Soviet threat to Western Europe against which we have been preparing all these years.

Yet, much as the "Second World"—the Soviet empire—has changed to a degree and with a rapidity that almost no one had foreseen, we must expect to see surprising changes and major geostrategic transformations in the rest of the world. This potential for revolutionary change confronts Pentagon planners with a tough challenge. The ratio of the speed of political and diplomatic transformations—revolutions, alliance shifts, imperial expansion, and disintegration—to the speed of weapons development and procurement is about ten to one or even thirty to one. To complete the research and development of a modern weapons system takes ten years or more, to build and deploy it another ten years, and once deployed the system may remain in our forces for another thirty years. Who can foresee our strategic requirements for half a century?

Nuclear Strategy

THIS EPOCHAL time span has particularly frightening implications for nuclear weaponry. Our nuclear strategy is still under the curse of Joseph Stalin. Few realize the extent to which the design and purpose of our nuclear armaments, doctrine, and war plans date from the same old mindset that since 1947 shaped and governed the bulk of our conventional forces.

In that Stalinist era we sought to deter the Red Army from marching to the English

[3]One of the more recent and comprehensive studies was sponsored by the bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, summarized in the commission's overall report, *Discriminate Deterrence* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988) and presented in greater detail in the follow-on report, *Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict* (Department of Defense, 1988).

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Channel by threatening to drop atomic bombs on Moscow and on Stalin's war industries. Once we had acquired a great many more nuclear weapons, and once the Soviet Union deployed nuclear bombers and missiles, the top priority for the U.S. Strategic Air Command became the destruction—the instant the Red Army crossed the West German border—of as many Soviet bombers and missiles on the ground as possible. Since then, the concept of such a prompt, all-out strike has become a dogma that warps the design of our strategic forces to this day, even though it had become impossible to disarm the Soviet nuclear forces with such a strike many years ago.

The obsolete dogma that our nuclear retaliation must be prompt is responsible for the Pentagon's insistence that we must maintain a large force of land-based missiles, with all the difficulty and expense this entails. More dangerously, it perpetuates a vulnerable and hence a hair-triggered deterrent of thousands of missiles, both American and Soviet, sitting there like a thousand Chernobyls—till something, someday, goes dreadfully wrong. The confrontation of these U.S. and Soviet missile forces has evoked a morbid fascination among many defense technicians. By a banal and unrealistically abstract calculation—the so-called "missile exchange"—these technicians pretend to measure the "stability" of deterrence.

The Stalinist threat to Western Europe created other evil legacies for our nuclear strategy and forces. To prolong the life, or reach, of our nuclear deterrent against the feared Warsaw Pact invasion, we deployed a great many shorter-range nuclear arms in Europe, especially in Germany. All these nuclear artillery pieces, missiles, and nuclear-armed aircraft eventually, like a Sorcerer's Apprentice, acquired a life of their own. They became "vital," had to be modernized, and gave birth to a totally incoherent doctrine—Flexible Response—which flatly contradicts the "stability" doctrine of the "missile exchange."

Given the contradictions and shortcomings of these strategic concepts, perhaps the time has come to pay some attention to Soviet criticism of our nuclear deterrence doctrine. Gorbachev called mutual deterrence a source of tension. As Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze put it, "nuclear deterrence inevitably perpetuates the totality of confrontational relations among states."

Defense Secretary Cheney has wisely requested increased funding from Congress for certain research and development projects—in particular, strategic defense—that will purchase us flexibility in terms of doctrine and enemies. What we now develop and build will have to serve our military strategy in the twenty-first century. For the foreseeable future, one must hope, America's nuclear strategy will continue to be an alliance strategy embracing and protecting a non-nuclear unified Germany as well as a non-nuclear Japan—but a strategy that can put behind us the "confrontational" bipolar relationship with the Soviet Union to which Shevardnadze referred.

Yet before we wax lyrical about the dawn of a new era, free of the danger of instant nuclear holocaust, we have to remember that Stalin's legacy is not so easily overcome. The laws of physics, to be sure, do not ordain that there must be two nuclear superpowers, dividing the world into "two sides" threatening each other indefinitely with mutual annihilation. It is habits of mind and bureaucratic inertia, in both Washington and in Moscow, that cling to the apocalyptic "two sides" confrontation Stalin inflicted on the world at the end of World War II.

Such inertia casts a dark shadow far into the next century. The Pentagon bureaucracy continues to disparage strategic defense, contrary to the policy of the President and Secretary Cheney; it keeps designing our nuclear forces to deter a Warsaw Pact onslaught—and thus favors nuclear weapons installed in the middle of Germany and hair-triggered missile forces. Stalin has been buried twice in Moscow, but his ghost lives on in the Pentagon.

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Gorbachev's Global Doughnut

The Empire with a Hole in the Middle

Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr.

THE ABANDONMENT of the Eastern European communist regimes by the USSR has astonished everyone. Less spectacular, but equally unexpected, has been the substantial continuity of the Soviet commitment to its many Third World communist clients: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua, the Salvadoran guerrillas.

With the striking exception of the Salvadoran guerrillas, it is true that Soviet policy has changed in each of the conflicts in which these clients are engaged, and in a direction more acceptable to the West. In Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola, as earlier in Ethiopia, the foreign troops that supported weak communist regimes have been or are being withdrawn. In Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, regional or internal negotiations have taken place that may hold out the promise of ending civil wars. While internal and U.S. domestic factors have played a role in some of these developments, their appearance in sequence is clearly linked to a shift of Soviet policy.

But the overall picture of Soviet policy in these "regional conflicts" shows a continuing commitment to shoring up the threatened communist regimes. According to U.S. government officials, Soviet security assistance to the Third World in general has been going down—but apparently not to Afghanistan, Cuba, Angola, Cambodia, Vietnam, and the FMLN in El Salvador. Soviet military assistance to the communist government in Afghanistan was increased to $200-$400 million a month, after U.S. aid to the *mujaheddin* was drastically cut. In Cambodia, the first nine months of 1989 saw an approximate doubling of Soviet arms deliveries over 1988 levels—an all-time record. Soviet assistance to Vietnam itself has remained the same or even increased. In Central America, Soviet-bloc military assistance to Nicaragua decreased only about 20 percent from the 1988 level, despite the fact that U.S. military support for the *contras* went down to nothing. A larger share of these munitions was evidently passed through to the FMLN in El Salvador—including the previously withheld SA-7 surface-to-air missiles—enabling them to mount a Tet-style offensive against the capital in late 1989.

The willingness to increase support for some Third World clients raises important questions in its own right. But the combination of this willingness and the withdrawal of support from the Eastern European communists presents an intriguing paradox. Gorbachev has abandoned his country's old servitors, the Honeckers and Husaks, at the

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same time that he continues to nurture communist client states in the Third World. This has overthrown all our expectations. Ever since the consolidation of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe after World War II, the predominant American view has been that Eastern Europe, and above all East Germany and Poland, constitutes a "vital interest" of the Soviet Union that could never be relinquished and, therefore, should never be threatened by the United States. This feeling underlay the inaction of the United States during the various crises in Eastern Europe. But at the same time we generally assumed that Soviet gains in the Third World could be reversed by some combination of American policy and local nationalism, and that the Soviet side would accept setbacks, including expulsion.

The opposite has turned out to be the case. Gorbachev has hastened the loss of his "vital" interests in Eastern Europe while clinging tenaciously to his vexing burdens in the Third World. Of course, this contradiction may turn out to be temporary. In a period when every week brings something that we never expected to see in our lifetimes, we could see Gorbachev renouncing his Third World outposts as well. But, as of now, the divergence in stance toward the two groups of clients represents a clear paradox, one worth thinking through.

The Logic of Ideological Empires

THIS PARADOX is not unprecedented in history. It has been the pattern of many ideological empires to rot at the core but remain vital at the periphery.

To give one example: During the long "ideological" struggle between the Fatimid (Shi'ite) Caliphate of Cairo and the Abbasid (Sunni) Caliphate of Baghdad from the tenth to the twelfth century, the Fatimid Caliphate collapsed at the center from the dead weight of arbitrary rule, but the Fatimids continued to make gains beyond the caliphate's frontiers, in what are now Iraq, Iran, Yemen, India, and Afghanistan. When, in 1059, Baghdad and the rest of Iraq was finally seized by local Shi'ites, the Fatimid Caliphate had lost all authority in its own capital, Cairo, disordered by famine, cannibalism, and civil war between rival army groups. The path of the Isma'ili Shi'i revolutionary movement through the Islamic world was thus from the west, from its original hearth in Algeria, toward the east, with its old centers abandoned or demoralized as new areas were converted or conquered. That is, its movement was like a fire, which burns outward leaving ashes in the center. If not for the existence of the Mediterranean and the Sahara, which channeled the shift of Fatimid zeal in a west-east direction, it would have assumed the shape of a ring or, better still, a doughnut. The doughnut shape is the one now being assumed by the Soviet bloc: it is falling in at the center, still fairly vigorous at the periphery in the Third World.

This shape is not altogether surprising. Revolutionary movements are given their early impetus by hatred of the existing reality, by the hope for an improvement that is rapid and decisive, by the desire to implement abstract formulae never tested against reality, and by personal desires to transform the world and one's position in it. All of these motives are most vivid at the beginning and in the presence of the enemy; but they are attenuated by having to run an established political order and by the passage of time. In addition, where they were victorious, both the Fatimid Caliphate and the Bolsheviks established repressive regimes, ones in which most of the people, while nominally co-participants in the loftiest of human undertakings, were actually excluded from any responsibility for governing themselves. As Tacitus was the first to argue, despotic power kills energy and ambition in the citizens; it nourishes apathy. Meanwhile the shining dreams that had originally motivated attachment to the new political order are stifled by the contrast with the prosaic reality, and by the artificiality with which they are propagandized.

The human costs of centralized power also affected Soviet foreign policy. Because

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all human activity in the USSR and in Eastern Europe was so tightly controlled, the Soviet Union was deprived of the influence exerted abroad on behalf of the West by independent business and journalism, and by the independent foreign policy activity of America's allies. (The activities of France in Africa and the Middle East and of Britain in the Persian Gulf are cases in point.)

The tendency of ideological empires to gradually assume a ring-like form has, in the postwar era, been increased by certain characteristics of the international system. In any period of history, conflicts that are likely to be very costly or risky for the participants are less likely simply to disappear than to be "displaced" to other areas where the stakes are not as high. In the nineteenth century, for example, the conflict between Britain and France that began in 1882 over Egypt was "fought out" not in Egypt but in confrontations in West Africa (Borgu, 1895–98), in the Southern Sudan (Fashoda, 1898), and even in Thailand (1893). The incentives for such "displacement" have been vastly increased by the arrival of nuclear weapons. Because nuclear war cannot be regarded as a way of resolving contested issues, and the specter of nuclear war discourages recourse to force in Europe, conflicts have been pushed into the Third World, where the risk of escalation is lower. This accounts in large part for the fact that, despite the acute tensions that have characterized the era of the Cold War, it has been simultaneously a time of almost unprecedented peace between the major powers, and one of continual terrorism, guerrilla struggles, proxy war, and superpower confrontations over Third World issues.

The Importance of Eastern Europe

IN THE postwar era, the Soviet client states in Eastern Europe and in the Third World were useful to the USSR in very different ways. The acquisition of Eastern Europe after World War II powerfully reinforced the central myth of communism, that it represented the future. Our failure to anticipate that communism could be displaced in Eastern Europe shows how successfully this myth was propagated even among noncommunists and anticommunists. Keeping the myth alive was the first useful function Eastern Europe served for the USSR.

The second was the military advantage conferred by geography. Eastern Europe, by providing strategic depth, assured that another war, to the extent it was a conventional one, would not be fought on Soviet soil. But Eastern Europe also created offensive superiority that had immense political weight. Stalin created the greatest concentration of military power in Europe since the time of Charlemagne. But the Soviet Union of the 1930s, which already had more soldiers, tanks, and aircraft than any nation in the world, was not a superpower; it was the location of vast military power in the very heart of Europe, in Germany, after 1945 that first made it one. Militarily, the blitzkrieg strategy taken over from the Nazis depended on a short war, on the ability to reach the English Channel quickly—that is, on a combination of military power and geography. Politically, it was the presence of military power (and of client states) in the center of Europe that settled the recurring issue of whether Russia is a European power (as under Alexander I and Nicholas II) or an Asiatic power essentially outside Europe (as under Nicholas I and between the world wars). By being a preponderant factor *in Europe* the USSR became a superpower.

The occupation of part of Germany and Austria was particularly crucial to the Soviet Union's security and political status. By splitting Germany, the USSR prevented a revival of the dangers it faced in 1917–18 and again in 1941–42. Because the German Question was left undecided, and could not be decided without the USSR, the USSR became not only a military but a diplomatic factor in Europe.

But these advantages of holding Eastern Europe did not come without major liabilities. To hold Eastern Europe against the will of the inhabitants required erecting an Iron

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Curtain. This prevented Eastern European governments and people from being active on behalf of the Soviet Union on a wider scale. The Iron Curtain was ambiguous: it was simultaneously the wall of a fortress and the wall of a prison. While Western culture and business freely ranged the globe, the Iron Curtain tended to keep its own architects cooped up in the center of Eurasia.

A second liability was that Eastern Europe was hard to hold. Yugoslavia and Albania broke away completely, Romania broke away diplomatically—events almost entirely overlooked by Western opinion in judging that Eastern Europe was a vital Soviet interest which could and would be held in spite of everything. As terror lifted and civil society revived in Eastern Europe, it became a more and more open fact that communism was unpopular there: part of the center of the Soviet empire had begun to weaken, and a more ring-like physiognomy was emerging in the empire. When rebellions were suppressed, it was at the cost of weakening communism's legitimacy both within Eastern Europe and internationally.

As time went on Eastern Europe became a small but persistent drain on Soviet resources, a drain that became more nagging as the Soviet economy began failing in the 1970s. The military and political advantages of holding a political base in the center of Europe were slowly depreciated by the emergence of strategic nuclear forces, which reduced the significance of geography. Detente made the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe less threatened politically, but more exposed to different threats, arising out of increased economic, cultural, and political contact with the West. As it became clearer that there was to be no revival of the German military threat, the value of a geographical position to cope with it diminished. Finally, the passage of time and the blurring of human memory worked their inevitable decay. Only new acquisitions, not old ones, could continue feeding the myth of communist momentum. The advantages conferred by the Eastern European client states were obvious to Stalin because they had been missing earlier. As time went on, the advantages of Eastern Europe began to be taken for granted by Soviet leaders, while it was the disadvantages that had novelty.

The Discovery of the Third World

AS THE Soviet Union became increasingly aware of Eastern Europe's limited usefulness for an activist foreign policy, the dismantling of Western empires offered growing temptations to increase Soviet global influence by an "indirect approach" through the Third World. The Soviet Union began to acquire non-Western clients, both states and insurgent movements. As instruments of Soviet foreign policy, these had uses and liabilities very different from those of the Eastern European clients.

One important difference was that the policies of the new Third World clients were usually less fully controlled by the USSR. We have tended to assume that Soviet clients are useful to the USSR to the extent that their activity is controlled or coordinated by Moscow, with the Eastern European satellites being the model. This assumption is plausible but wrong.

The policies pursued by the Soviet Union and its clients have frequently not coincided. To take only a few examples, the Soviet Union has guided Ethiopian efforts to crush the Eritrean insurgency, but Cuba, conscious of its old links to the Eritreans, has abstained even while it has protected the Ethiopian regime. In Grenada, there is evidence that the Soviet Union supported the conspiracy against Maurice Bishop, while Castro wrote to the New Jewel Movement that "Everything which happened was for us a surprise, and disagreeable." In North Yemen, the Soviet Union has armed the government generously, while the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) has conducted the insurgency against the government. In the Iran-Iraq War the Soviet Union armed mainly Iraq, while North Korea gave huge quantities of military aid to Iran.

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The partial independence of Soviet clients' activity enhances rather than diminishes their usefulness to the USSR, in several ways. When the Soviet Union and one or more of its clients are active in a country, it creates multiple channels of influence. It is also an insurance policy, a safeguard against the sudden expulsion of the Soviet presence, as happened earlier in Egypt and Ghana. In the Iran-Iraq War the Soviet Union would be connected with whichever side won, or with both if the war ended in a stalemate. In Yemen, whoever wins the internal struggle, the outcome will probably not be the ouster of Soviet bloc influence. This would not be the case if the client had been rigidly guided by the Soviet Union in its policy. Ethiopia—where the channels of Soviet-bloc influence included Cuban troops, Soviet arms (and arms debt), and the Communist party organization formed at Soviet insistence—provides another example. Independent but parallel activities by different pro-Soviet actors reinforce and support one another.

In addition to this, many clients have channels the Soviet Union and its Eastern European clients would never have. Libya and Syria have access to the Arab world because they are Arab and Moslem states, Cuba has access to Latin America because it is Spanish-speaking. Thus the existence of client states widely distributed around the globe and with varying cultural and religious backgrounds, increases the political resources available to the Soviets.

A third crucial fact which makes Soviet Third World clients more effective is that they are not understood to be Soviet clients by a large part of international opinion. Even Cuba has been able to head the Non-Aligned Movement, and a number of clients are seen as less implicated than Cuba in Soviet designs. Grenada provides a striking case. The cooperation of the New Jewel Movement with Cuba and the Soviet Union was extremely close across a great range of foreign policy issues, yet most interested international observers labeled Grenada as a Third World socialist country rather than communist. The somewhat disguised character that many Third World clients of the USSR have springs partly from the absence of tight control already mentioned, but also from the international climate of opinion about the Third World.

Because many client states are not understood to be acting on behalf of the Soviet Union, they can carry out actions against the United States and its friends that the Soviet Union itself could never attempt. It is difficult to imagine that there could be tens of thousands of Soviet troops in Angola and Ethiopia without provoking a strong reaction in the West and among other African countries. Yet the presence of such a number of Cuban troops in these countries did not have that impact. Again, Libya was able to bomb the capital of the Sudan during the decline of Nimeiri's authority without provoking any retaliation. The event would have been far more dramatic, and would have drawn a much more hostile reaction, if a Soviet airplane had bombed Khartoum.

We can draw the following general conclusion: *Third World clients have increased the reach of Soviet world power and reduced the risks of Soviet action.* They have enabled the Soviet Union to damage or threaten Western interests in ways that would not otherwise have been possible. This was not true of the clients in Eastern Europe. Indeed, at the very time that the uses of Third World clients were becoming clearer, the usefulness of the Eastern European clients was being diminished by time and changing circumstances.

One important consequence of the political independence of Third World clients is that they may engage in local initiatives drawing the USSR into attacks on Western interests which it would not otherwise undertake. As with other countries, the relationship between Soviet goals and Soviet instruments is a dynamic one: What the Soviet Union cannot find a way of doing, it ultimately gives up; what it finds itself able to do, it is tempted to undertake. If client initiatives develop in a successful way, opportunities may impel the Soviet Union to follow. Thus

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the existence of Third World clients with special interests, superior access, and greater immunity from international criticism tends to make the Soviet Union more activist, more adventurous.

This is not a merely theoretical conclusion. In Central America, the support of the Sandinistas was originally a Cuban initiative, which accorded with the historic Cuban preference for armed struggle in Latin America. Not until the Sandinistas overthrew Somoza in 1979 was the Soviet Union converted to a strategy of armed struggle. Those concerned about Soviet power have been accustomed to speak of "Soviet subversion" in places such as Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and Grenada. This is misleading in that it assumes one-way traffic. Perhaps we need also to speak, coining a deliberate paradox, of Cuban and Nicaraguan subversion in Moscow. Because of its greater vitality and zeal, the periphery of the Soviet empire has sometimes led the flagging center: again, a growing emergence of the ring-like structure latent in ideological empires.

Global Clients

THE EASTERN European clients of the Soviet Union were among the countries most shut off from the rest of the world. But two of the new Third World clients—Cuba and Libya—were (together with the superpowers, China, and France) among the six countries most active in the widest range of places around the globe.

Cuba was regarded by most Americans in 1959 as an obscure "banana republic," unimportant in the Latin America context and negligible in the world balance. Since then, Cuba has become a major problem for the United States; not merely a local problem, but a worldwide one. Cuba is playing a larger role in world politics than any Latin American country has played since 1492. To appreciate the magnitude of this transformation, consider the reception that would be given today to a prediction that, over the next two decades, Ecuador (a country with a population and GNP roughly similar to Cuba) is destined to become a significant global actor—that it will have stronger armed forces than any Latin American country other than Brazil; that it will be coordinating and supplying guerrilla movements throughout Latin America; that it will have over 60,000 troops on another continent as well as a significant presence in half a dozen other parts of the world. Such a prediction would simply be dismissed as mad. Yet this is precisely what has occurred in the case of Cuba over the last quarter century.

A similar transformation has occurred in the case of Libya, which (to give only a partial list) has been active against American interests in Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Lebanon, Iran, the Philippines, Western Sahara, Upper Volta, Mali, Chad, Central African Republic, Burundi, Uganda, Grenada, Nicaragua, St. Lucia, and Antigua.

The *global* roles of Cuba and Libya have made them quite different international actors from equally powerful countries that pursue merely regional roles. This global reach presents Soviet foreign policy with special opportunities and risks, and makes the problem they set for American foreign policy quite different. Some other Soviet clients show a tendency to emulate Cuba or Libya by becoming active on a global scale. Vietnam and Ethiopia still pursue predominantly local interests, but the Vietnamese have sent arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas and Ethiopia has been active in destabilizing the southern Sudan, an area traditionally outside Ethiopian imperial ambitions.

We have usually been more worried by the kind of local activity characteristic of Nicaragua and the PDRY in North Yemen than by the Cuban and Libyan type, fearing subversion in our "backyard" and a "domino effect" on nearby countries. This is probably an error, for there is a reason why the "domino effect" usually does not go very far. Local activity by Soviet clients tends to be self-limiting in that it creates and stiffens local opposition and causes the threatened states to seek stronger ties with the U.S. or some other

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protector. The Sandinista threat caused the United States to establish a quasi-institutionalized military presence in Central America. PDRY subversion deepened the intervention of Saudi Arabia in Yemeni affairs, and brought Iran into Oman. To avoid such developments, Soviet clients have an interest in showing restraint and not using all the power available to them. Nicaragua has reasons not to antagonize Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador. Ethiopia, thanks to massive Soviet military aid, has unquestioned military dominance in the Horn of Africa, but the knowledge that a more aggressive use of that power against Somalia would antagonize and activate other neighboring countries, such as Kenya and Saudi Arabia, has caused it to be utilized moderately. Thus the domino effect is countered by an intrinsic tendency back toward equilibrium in local conflicts. Brushfires have a tendency to put themselves out.

This local tendency toward equilibrium, however, does not operate against *global* client activity. Honduras can act effectively against Nicaragua, but not in the same way against Cuba. Somalia and the Sudan have cards to play against Ethiopia—weak ones, to be sure—but none against Cuba. The global activity of Cuba and Libya is a very powerful weapon in the hands of a revisionist power. By the time that Gorbachev was named general secretary in 1985, Cuba had shown itself to be an instrument many times more powerful on the Soviet side than any Eastern European country.

The Arrival of Gorbachev

THESE WERE the ways in which the two groups of Soviet clients had evolved when Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Politburo. As a member of the Communist party apparatus, Gorbachev was a member of a very specialized subculture, like the old Jesuit order or the clergy in Iran. Unlike Western politicians, the members of the nomenklatura spent their entire lives in this career, lived in different apartment buildings from other people, went to different stores and resorts. They were unusually *isolated* from the people they ruled. This group possessed a distinctive world view, comprising a distinctive idea of leadership and distinctive political tactics. The concept of leadership in the CPSU has not been one of managing problems but transforming society, as Lenin and Stalin did. The view of tactics, or "operational code," comprises a complex and sophisticated doctrine that can be summarized only briefly here.[1]

Politics, both domestic and foreign, is, in the traditional communist view, *always* a struggle. The outcome of this struggle depends on the correlation of forces, and success depends on the realistic estimation of that correlation. Because that correlation varies, success ebbs and flows. Consequently, as Lenin said in 1921, "Our strength will always be a capacity to take account of the real relationships and not to fear them, however disagreeable they may be."[2] Sometimes it is necessary to retreat even when pride rebels against it. Stalin elaborated: ". . . there are moments when one must. . . begin a planned retreat and give up, without fighting, whole cities and areas for the sake of winning time and collecting forces for new decisive battles in the future."[3] The classic example, taught to every Soviet schoolchild, is the 1918 Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany in which the Bolsheviks surrendered vast tracts of territory to survive. Lenin sometimes spoke of the possibility of retreating to the Urals, or even to Vladivostok.

In the traditional communist operational code, skill in attacking and skill in retreating are regarded as equally important. To deter-

[1]The description of the "operational code" that follows is drawn particularly from the work of the late Nathan Leites, beginning with *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951) and *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1953).

[2]*Sochineniya*, 3d edition (Moscow: Gospolitizdat', 1928–1937), vol. 27, p. 126.

[3]*Sochineniya* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat', 1948), vol. 5, pp. 167–8.

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mine the appropriate moment for maneuvering and for giving in is a key part of the Bolshevik's political training. In phases of retreat it is necessary to be flexible and to accept noncommunist allies such as the Left Social Revolutionaries, the NEP traders, and the Social Democrats in the Popular Fronts of the 1930s. Leninist tactics include a complex array of means by which temporary allies can be manipulated, as some peace movements, front organizations, and the Eastern European Popular Fronts of 1945–48 were manipulated. But retreat does not mean giving up. An important part of Gorbachev's training included mastering tactics for turning a forced retreat into an advance by different means.

Gorbachev, as I have argued elsewhere,[4] was given his political direction by the crisis of the communist system, by his own ambition which was stimulated by the magnitude of the challenge, and by the ingrained habits of the Bolshevik operational code. He felt increasingly pressed by a need to make drastic changes in the society, changes blocked by a divided Politburo and a bureaucracy that resisted change and eluded control. Thus consolidating his personal power was essential, even disregarding his own ambition. Gorbachev sought to do this by discrediting earlier rulers and institutions (through glasnost); by forcing structural changes in governing institutions in order to give himself a power base independent of the party apparatus; and above all by mobilizing forces outside normal politics (as Mao Zedong did in his Cultural Revolution).

One might consider this strategy cynical if it did not dovetail so neatly with the transformation of society Gorbachev wanted. Gorbachev felt that the Soviet public had become apolitical, bored with communism, apathetic, and lazy. By mobilizing the public, he hoped both to involve them in a new revolutionary struggle under the banner of communism and to reinvigorate the party by forcing it once again to compete for the people's allegiance. This was a project of noble daring, but not of prudence: it rested on large and untested assumptions about the motives of the Russians and their subject peoples. Gorbachev proclaimed that "perestroika is a revolution": he wanted to re-live the revolution within a civil order settled and petrified for seventy years. Such a possibility was inherent in the communist project, but by its very nature it threatened to shatter the existing order, the communist regime. During 1989, Gorbachev's cultural revolution went out of control. The popular forces mobilized by Gorbachev turned against the regime with demands for national self-determination and political freedom. Eastern Europe was the first part of the Soviet Empire to be shattered by the explosion Gorbachev had ignited.

The Loss of Eastern Europe

IN THE FIRST years of Gorbachev's reign, the news from Eastern Europe was such as to allow a certain overconfidence. Nowhere were there moves away from old political patterns that were not sponsored or regulated by the ruling Communist parties. The Eastern European countries remained isolated from each other and from the USSR. Their limited international usefulness made it easier to neglect them.

In Poland and in Hungary the ruling parties felt the need, in the tradition of Brest-Litovsk, to retreat in the face of looming economic disaster. In Hungary, Imre Poszgay tried, like Gorbachev, to bring noncommunist forces into politics and manipulate them. In Poland, such a strategy had been explicitly sketched by Jerzy Urban as early as 1981[5] and it guided the roundtable negotia-

[4]See "La revolution culturelle de Gorbatchev," Part I, *Commentaire* (Paris), no. 48 (Winter 1989–90); Part II forthcoming in no. 49. Originally published (in shorter form) as "Gorbachev's Cultural Revolution," *Commentary*, August 1989.

[5]Jerzy Urban, letter to the Polish first secretary, translated in the journal *Uncaptive Minds*, November-December 1988, pp. 2–7.

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tions with Solidarity and the June elections. The Polish Communists, with Soviet assent, bungled the elections and the negotiations before and after, so that these two events led to the wholly unexpected result of a Solidarity-led government.

During these early Gorbachev years Soviet officials wrestled with the issue of redefining their attitudes toward the Brezhnev Doctrine for a largely different audience. Gorbachev finally unambiguously disavowed the doctrine in a July 6, 1989 speech at Strasbourg to the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe. The communique of the Warsaw Pact immediately afterward was much vaguer, showing a continued nervousness about pulling out the ultimate prop of the Eastern European regimes. But of course, Gorbachev's words, uttered before there was an acute general crisis in Eastern Europe, could not easily be recalled. They conditioned everything that happened shortly afterwards.

The conflagration was triggered by the concatenation of events as small as the removal of the border wire between Hungary and Austria (May 2) and the Hungarian willingness to allow East Germans to leave through that border (August 22). From this point a chain reaction started, spread to enough countries to create a "critical mass," and then rapidly consumed the entire Warsaw Pact. The unpredictable nature of the process and Gorbachev's shocked reaction to the likelihood of German reunification after early November strongly suggest that he intended none of this. The military and psychological keystone of the Warsaw Pact was the German Democratic Republic. Once it had fallen, the other Eastern European peoples knew that the Soviets would not avert the fall of their own masters. The decisive event occurred at the beginning of October. In the conditions created by Gorbachev's July 6 repudiation of Soviet intervention, Honecker suddenly halted emigration again, goading the public to fury. At this perfect moment Gorbachev arrived on his scheduled visit, repeating the slogans about the need for change designed to achieve a different result in different circumstances. It was Gorbachev who precipitated the avalanche.

From the communist point of view, Gorbachev is a jinx, a hoodoo, a Jonah. His arrival anywhere presages disaster. Like Jaruzelski and Poszgay, he did not understand the people's deep weariness of communism, nor could he sense the people's mood at a particular crux. Perhaps Gorbachev's soaring ambition, his splendid vision of the future, and his courage are spoiled by his lifetime as a member of an isolated priestly caste, whose pride was its ability to manipulate people.

Gorbachev sensed, with Bolshevik lack of sentimentality, that the decomposition of the East German regime signalled the end. In this crisis he seems to have reverted to the ingrained example of Brest-Litovsk. He retreated to the next defensible position: the boundary of the USSR. The communists of Eastern Europe were simply abandoned, an act made easier by their diminished usefulness. The new strategy combined an attempt to contain by diplomacy the movement toward German reunification and an attempt to put himself at the head of the process, urging the Czech party not to use the iron fist and arranging a coup in Bulgaria (November 6–10). These efforts did not change the reality of a forced retreat. What Stalin and his successors had built up over decades with unceasing effort and the expenditure of vast resources, Gorbachev had lost in three months.

The Fate of the Periphery

AFTER GIVING up Eastern Europe, the Communist party of the Soviet Union is faced with the possibility of annihilation as a political entity. Most of the factors that produced the collapse in Eastern Europe are present, to a lesser degree, in the Soviet Union itself: the combination of rage against the rulers; new expectations; a demoralized and divided party apparatus; and Gorbachev's overconfidence in his ability to per-

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suade people to do what he wants rather than what they want. As it is subsiding and partly falling in, the Soviet empire is more and more assuming the doughnut form latent in ideological empires. As Radio Free Europe's Vladimir Kusin has argued, exaggerating only somewhat, "the geographical focus of communist rule thus shifted from Europe to the Third World."[6]

The seeming paradox of abandoning the Eastern European communists while continuing to shore up the Third World regimes emerged from the interaction between specific policy choices and the divergent paths of development experienced by the two groups of clients. The winter of 1989–90 displayed a vivid contrast in morale: in El Salvador, guerrillas spent their lives for communism in suicidal attacks; in Berlin and Prague, the leaders would not defend communism even to save themselves. The historical development had both sapped the vitality and reduced the usefulness of Eastern Europe in an active foreign policy strategy, while making the Third World the arena of active international conflict and the point of the West's greatest vulnerability.

The very different practical benefits offered by the two sets of clients may very well have been decisive in Gorbachev's mind when he made the specific policy choices to retreat in one place and not in the other. Certainly, as some Soviet clients in the Third World—Afghanistan, Ethiopia in 1989—have been under pressure as acute as the Eastern European clients were under in the fall of 1989, it is impossible to explain the different Soviet policies as a mere adaptation to circumstances.

The tactics suggested by the communist operational code may also have affected the different outcomes. In the Eastern European case the code held out the hope that communist leaders could manipulate public opinion during a retreat so as to avoid giving up the position altogether. This hope was a fatal delusion. Gorbachev is not tempted in the same way in the Third World: he will not go to the Panjsher Valley, as he did to East Berlin and to Lithuania, to try to persuade people to like what they don't like. The methods by which the Third World outposts are held are simpler—fighting, security assistance, diplomacy—and at this point the Soviet Union probably knows how to employ them more successfully.

We cannot predict Soviet conduct toward the periphery of its empire; we do not even know whether, in five years, the government framing policy will be communist, democratic, or fascist. We can only specify the conditions that will shape Soviet conduct. At the center of the empire, these will be a declining interest in foreign policy, and, to some extent, a concern to save money. Subsidies to Third World clients may be reduced, but these clients are not particularly

Faith at the Rim

Early in January the liberal Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA) played host to the first two Russian academics to visit South Africa in nearly 40 years. Professors Irena Filatova and Apollon Davidson of Moscow State University toured the country giving talks about Soviet foreign policy in Southern Africa and about the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. To their surprise, their account met with indignant resistance. At one gathering in a Transvaal township more than 100 local leaders and citizens sharply questioned the Russians about this rejection of socialism, and criticized IDASA for bringing them to South Africa.

Robert K. Massie, Jr.,
The New Republic
February 26, 1990

[6]Summarized in RFE/RL *Soviet/East European Report*, VII, no. 13, p. 1.

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expensive. They are in fact so cheap compared to the staggering outlay on Soviet military forces that they are not the first place from which funds are likely to be taken to shore up the economy, if a communist oligarchy survives in Russia. On the other hand, a system in which public opinion and elected deputies shaped policy more significantly would be much less attracted to the defense of Third World clients; they are unpopular with the Soviet public.

On the outer periphery of the ring, in the Third World, communism will have continued vitality and appeal, as Peru and the Philippines currently demonstrate. It was an important insight of the Western Left that people in the Third World are not attracted to communism and to the Soviet Union for Soviet reasons, but for their own, local reasons. The crisis of faith in the center is therefore likely to affect the periphery only slowly.

Third World clients will hold a continuing interest as long as the USSR wants to show the continuing vitality of its foreign policy. Beyond the usefulness they displayed in earlier years, they hold out some opportunities specific to the present moment. Because many Soviet clients are clients in disguise, they are compatible with the "New Thinking" in foreign policy. At the Malta summit, Gorbachev could deny Nicaraguan arms were his arms. The New Thinking, while fundamentally of Western origin, is close to the Third World's conceptual framework, as displayed in the international organizations in recent decades. If it fails to satisfy expectations as a general basis for Soviet foreign policy—as is very likely—Soviet clients will provide a bridge to the Third World as an arena of future Soviet leadership. The Soviet clients can, for example, help the USSR to refocus American foreign policy. As the Cold War appears to many to be over, the tendency is already evident to push the United States out of Europe. This has been a long-standing objective of Soviet policy and, after an interval during which the USSR may need the United States to create an appearance of stability, will probably be so again. To the extent that the United States faces concrete, difficult, and divisive problems in the Third World—like El Salvador—a pull is added to this push out of Europe.

Another motive for supporting Third World clients stems from the loss of Eastern Europe itself. The sense of the Soviet Union as a superpower rested heavily on the presence of vast armies on the Elbe, in the heart of Europe, with a firm base behind them. If the Soviet Union wants to retain the sense of being a powerful player in world politics in the absence of such a presence, its Third World outposts will be increasingly important as its image suffers and its status-anxieties increase.

Soviet commitment to Third World clients is likely to continue above all because, as argued above, the Soviet-client relationship is not one-way: the Soviet Union becomes active in response to invitations from friendly states and forces, as well as in pursuit of its own agenda. Once an opportunity is offered to the Soviet Union, the inherent advantages of working through clients make it difficult to refuse. This may become even more true when the Soviets want to stop their global retreat without endangering detente, for Third World clients provide them with an opportunity to stay in the game of world politics without having to take full responsibility for conflict, and thus without attracting too much hostility.

Directions for Western Policy

TODAY THE periphery of the Soviet empire is more of a problem for us than the center. But the damage done by the periphery is now limited by the quiet emanating from the center. Will this situation continue? It is probably best to think of the future in terms of two very different periods. In the present one we have a breathing space (perhaps a year, perhaps several years). In this phase there are enormous opportunities—if we have the imagination to seize

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them—to strengthen the Western position in both Eastern Europe and the Third World.

In the second phase we will be hit by the consequences of the instabilities now being created every day. The terminal crises of empires are *dangerous*. The collapse of the Old Regime in France led quickly to the conquest of Europe by revolutionary armies. The long decline of Austria-Hungary was marked by civil war, regional wars, the emergence of new ideological solutions (Hitler was a product of Linz and Vienna), and finally by the abrupt decision to attempt to check the growing threats to the system's existence through the ultimatum to Serbia in July 1914.

Various factions and ideologies will struggle to inherit the former Soviet empire, and the host of historic problems artificially "frozen" by communist order will come alive: Moldavia, Transylvania, the Dobruja, Macedonia, Turks in Bulgaria, Russian settlers and Muslim natives in Kirgizia and Kazakhstan, the relationship between Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan—this list is long. In this very complex, rapidly changing, and charged atmosphere, saturated with newly-awakened fears and hopes, the vast military power accumulated by Soviet rulers during the rigid and unchanging era of bipolarity will be available—to someone. It is unlikely that it will go unused.

In making this point one frequently encounters the cynical admission that there will, of course, be massacres right and left, but how will they affect us? This is a valid question, but one should not assume an answer that justifies complacency. A situation in which 25,000 nuclear warheads are up for grabs and a secular faith faces annihilation is intrinsically a dangerous one, even if we cannot foresee (as we could not in the 1920s) in what exact form the dangers may arrive.

Of course, these dangers will not simply be a continuation of those we face today. The Soviet capability to wage a general war without long mobilization is ebbing; financial stringencies and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe will accelerate this process. Any projection of the dangers we are likely to face in the second phase is hazardous; nevertheless, we need to begin thinking about them now. Low-intensity conflict (e.g., terrorism) is likely to become more important; it requires few resources, is deniable, and can be used to shape Western public attitudes on political issues. The Third World, of course, has been the basic arena of low-intensity conflict.

A second source of danger will be civil wars and other domestic conflicts that, together with irredentist ambitions, lead to military clashes. The likely source of many of these problems will be the periphery of the Soviet empire, but some of them will be "displaced" to the Third World, where the stakes are lower.

Iranian militants have already crossed into Azerbaijan, and Turkish public opinion is increasingly called to take sides in the bloody struggles unfolding across the border. The last struggles, in 1918, were decided when the Turkish army marched to Baku. The most readily available and the least risky way for the Soviet Union to prevent Turkish and Iranian involvement is through terrorism and the use of its client states—Syria, Afghanistan, to some extent Iraq—to make it clear to the Turks and Iranians that intervention would involve serious costs. More generally, we should anticipate that during the time of troubles in which it has now entered, the Soviet Union will attempt to use its Third World clients to create diversionary measures intended to keep the West preoccupied.

While the exact nature of these diversions is beyond our vision, we need to get ready for them. We need to do two things above all. The first is to maintain our military forces (although we can and should restructure them). The second is to change the nonmilitary correlation of forces in the world, to take advantage of the benign first phase of the current evolution, the breathing space, in order to strengthen the West's position in the coming era of instability.

If the reasoning above about the potential of Third World clients as instruments of Soviet strategy is even approximately correct,

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forcing Soviet client regimes from power—the objective of the Reagan doctrine—must be an important element in the needed shift in the nonmilitary correlation of forces. To displace Soviet clients is easier because they are not acknowledged to be such, and because of Gorbachev's peace offensive; such actions need not rupture our better relations with the USSR itself. They serve the purpose of denying the bridge to the Third World provided by Soviet clients; of depriving the Soviet Union of positions that may be used to put pressure on us in the next phase; and of controlling beforehand the tendency of radical Third World regimes to lead the Soviet Union into adventures it would not otherwise undertake.

While accumulated American blunders have made the Sandinistas largely immune for the time being, the repressive regimes in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Angola are as vulnerable as those in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The fall of communism in Eastern Europe has suggested that regimes such as Cuba's may already be more fragile than we had thought. It would be hard for anyone to deny that a world without communist rule in Afghanistan, in the Horn of Africa, in Southern Africa, and, if possible, in Central America and the Caribbean would be a better world for the people who live in those parts. It would also be a safer world for us.

Because of the breathing space we have in this phase, it is now easier and less risky for us to take the necessary measures; and because we are moving almost inexorably toward a more dangerous second phase, it is more urgent that we take them. Recent events in Eastern Europe have shown that communism will retreat under pressure, but only under pressure, as the communist operational code has always recommended. If that is true at the core, why don't we find out whether it also applies at the rim?

Robert W. Tucker, who retires this year as Christian A. Herter Professor and Director of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University, is stepping down as coeditor of *The National Interest* with this issue. He will continue his association with the magazine as consulting editor.

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German Fate and Allied Fears

Michael Lind

THE SPECTACULAR opening of East Germany's border with West Germany, the replacement of the Honecker regime by a caretaker communist government promising free East German elections—these developments have left Western policy-makers almost as baffled as the desperate communist elites in Eastern Europe. Not only the end of communist rule in the region but peaceful German reunification, an official goal of U.S. foreign policy for four decades, suddenly appears a realistic prospect.

Instead of celebrating the crumbling of the Berlin Wall as one of the great victories for Western ideals in the Cold War, however, the Bush administration initially adopted a low-key response. After the Malta summit meeting, the administration sent signals of opposition to what it considered to be an overly hasty, unilateral action by the Federal Republic: namely, West German chancellor Helmut Kohl's proposal for reunification. In a significant break with postwar U.S. and Allied policy, the Bush administration went on to propose NATO membership for Germany as a *precondition* for German unity, rather than as a free choice for the democratically-elected representatives of the German people after reunification.

Michael Lind is completing a book on the theory of representative democracy.

Startling as this development has been, it pales beside the recommendations of a vocal school of foreign policy analysts in the United States, Britain, and France. Although these officials and pundits differ in their prescriptions for the future of Europe, most advocate a change in the mission of U.S. forces on the continent from deterring Soviet invasion to containing the alleged dangers of a united and prosperous Germany—even if a democratic one. Because these analysts propose a prolonged American presence on German soil for this explicit purpose, they deserve a title they no doubt would reject: the Occupation School.

The Occupation School

"WE CANNOT agree to any permanent and compulsory division of the German nation," President Eisenhower told the American people in a 1959 television address. He was restating what has always been the official U.S. position on German reunification. "Pending the peace settlement," the Western Allies promised by treaty with the FRG in 1954, "the Signatory States will cooperate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a reunified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic, and integrated within the European community." In the 1957 Berlin Declaration by the United States, the UK, France, and the

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Federal Republic of Germany, "one of the basic reasons" for a failure to establish "a just and lasting peace" was identified as "the continued division of Germany, which is a grave injustice to the German people and a major source of international tension in Europe." In a 1958 memorandum, the U.S., the UK, and France reaffirmed "the common responsibility of the four powers for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany" by means of "an all-German government to be formed by free elections."

Not only was Germany to be formally reunified as a single democratic nation-state with its capitol in Berlin after a brief period of four-power occupation, but its compulsory disarmament was to be temporary. In 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes proposed a twenty-five year, renewable disarmament of a unified, democratic Germany, in spite of the country's recent history of dictatorship, genocide, and imperialism.[1] The Western Allies also favored a free choice by a united Germany to be neutral, or to join any alliance. At the Berlin Four-Power Conference in 1954, the three Western powers agreed to give a reunited Germany absolute freedom to decide its own foreign policy.[2] In 1955, the Western Allies reaffirmed that a reunited Germany would not have to participate in the Western security system, if it chose not to; Germany would be "free to choose its associates in collective defense."[3]

German reunification, so long an explicit goal of Western governments, remains overwhelmingly popular with the public in West Germany's major allies. According to a December 1989 *New York Times International* poll, 67 percent of Americans believe that West and East Germany should be united as one nation again; only 16 percent believe that a reunited Germany would try to dominate the world. In similar recent polls, 74 percent of those questioned in France and 61 percent in Britain favored German reunification (surprisingly, almost twice as many British as French thought German reunification would be a bad idea). As Enno von Loewenstern, editorial page editor of the German daily *Die Welt*, wrote last October, "*The* French are not afraid of the Germans. French intellectuals habitually worry over crises that they usually invent themselves in order to have something to worry about."

Yet popular support for German reunification in the West is not matched in the elite foreign policy circles of the United States and its allies. Writing in the *New Republic* last December, James Chace of Columbia University proposes the indefinite demilitarization of a reunified Germany, though such a Germany would inevitably be dominated by a Federal Republic with forty years of credit as a stable democracy and a faithful American ally. Chace asserts the need for

> a revamped NATO, whose purpose is no longer simply to deter the Soviet Union from aggressive moves against Western Europe. In fact, what will be needed is a cooperative arrangement with the Soviet Union that will allay Soviet and European fears of both German revanchism and German military and economic power.

The state of war between the United States and Germany was terminated by a joint resolution of Congress on October 19, 1951, while the Soviet Union terminated its own state of war with Germany by a decree on January 25, 1955. The Allied occupation of West Germany terminated on May 5, 1955. Nevertheless, Chace points out, "There is still no German peace treaty signed

[1] "Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Germany, Submitted by the United States to the Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris, April 29, 1946," *Department of State Bulletin*, May 12, 1946, pp. 815–16.

[2] *Foreign Ministers Meeting: Berlin Discussions, January 25-February 18, 1954*, State Department publication 5399, p. 218.

[3] "Western Proposal on German Reunification and European Security, Submitted to the Foreign Ministers Meeting, Geneva, October, 27, 1955," *Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955*, State Department publication 6156, p. 27.

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by the victorious powers of World War II." To him, the absence of a formal peace treaty, along with legally tenuous "occupation rights" recognized in theory by West but not East Germany, gives the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Western Allies the right to dictate the future of Germany to the Germans: "A unified Germany whose military status was circumscribed by agreement between the Germans and the victorious powers of World War II is the only unified Germany that the United States, the Soviet Union, and other European powers would *permit* [emphasis added]."

What is more, Chace would impose a permanent Soviet occupation on our quondam ally:

> A demilitarized Germany, however, need not mean a Germany without the presence of foreign troops. Indeed, smaller contingents of both Russian and American troops would probably have to be stationed there—in the American case, to give an earnest of our intention to defend the new European system, *whether it be threatened by a resurgent Germany or a bellicose Russia* [emphasis added].

According to Chace, "the presence of foreign troops on German soil. . . should not be seen as some form of an occupation army. . . but as part of a new European security system." An occupation army by any other name, however, is still an occupation army, especially when its major purpose is not to protect the Germans but to keep them from growing more economically successful or militarily self-sufficient.

CHACE'S HOSTILITY to complete German national sovereignty is shared by other American and European commentators. "The truth, usually unspoken," William Pfaff writes in his recent book *Barbarian Sentiments*, "is that every country in Western and Eastern Europe, as well as the Soviet Union and the United States, has a fundamental interest in the continued division of Germany." In the Fall 1989 issue of *Foreign Policy*, Ronald Steel agrees: "By keeping Germany to a manageable size, by which it neither dominates nor threatens its neighbors, NATO has provided a solution of sorts to the age-old German Problem." Such views are shared by some on the Right of the political spectrum as well. The International Security Council, in "An Affirmative Strategy for the Free World," recently listed "German reunification" as a potential threat; and Amos Perlmutter, writing before Malta, observed in the *Washington Times* that "Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Bush can go a long way toward designing the blueprint for a Europe that would be characterized by an independent, *divided* Germany."

Such views of a new German threat are not limited to academics and journalists. Retired U.S. army chief of staff, General E.C. Meyer, has declared in the *Washington Post* that "If you believe the Soviet [Union] has decreased in its international threat, then the two biggest threats are the reunification of Germany and what that really might mean, and what happens in Japan." British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, at a press conference after the hastily-summoned summit of Western European leaders which followed the opening of the East German border, called for the continuation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: "This arrangement has suited us very well." Edward Mortimer, a British commentator, suggested in the *Financial Times* that the prime minister had enunciated "the new Thatcher-Gorbachev Doctrine," according to which German partition, officially an undesirable byproduct of the Cold War, "is now such a Good Thing that the other side must go on being the other side."

For some members of the Occupation School, the enemy is not so much the Germans as change itself. *Ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem apellant*—where they make a desert, they call it peace: surely this mordant description of Roman imperialism by Tacitus applies with equal force to the "peace" and "stability" the Soviets have achieved in their Eastern European empire for forty years. Although the "shoot to kill order" of East German border guards is only a few months

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defunct, the *Pax Sovietica*, that peace of the grave, suddenly seems less a threat to some commentators than the unrest of freedom.

In the Winter 1989/90 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, for example, Anne-Marie Burley writes that today,

> the task of all parties concerned—Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, the United States and the Federal Republic itself—is suddenly the containment of change. . . . Stability in Europe means the maintenance of the existing international structure: two superpowers and two Germanies. Stability in the G.D.R. means reform without the threat of reunification.

Burley, joining in the worship of what George Will has described as "that golden calf" of "stability," calls upon the West Germans to amend the constitution of the Federal Republic "to rule out political reunification of the two German states." This unilateral renunciation of reunification by West Germany would result, she writes, in "denying East Germans automatic passage to the West," thus helping to "stabilize" the collapsing communist tyranny from which so many Germans have fled. "Bound within their two states," Burley continues, "the Germans would be unfettered to forge new links through human rather than official relations." In return for renouncing a relationship to West Germany like that of Mississippi to Indiana, the "unfettered" East Germany will be permitted to have a relationship like that of Mexico to the United States—a *stable* relationship, of course.

While they may differ on the details, Occupation School strategists like Burley agree that a reunited, democratic Germany would, by its very existence, be a threat to the West—one severe enough to justify U.S. efforts to preserve or extend Soviet military influence in Eastern Europe, if not indeed in Germany itself. This logic leads Zbigniew Brzezinski to suggest in the Winter 1989/90 issue of *Foreign Affairs* that German "reunification through confederation could be combined with a special arrangement providing for the continued presence on German soil of military forces from the existing two alliances for an agreed period of time—say, twenty years." This joint Soviet-American occupation of Germany "would make the satisfaction of legitimate German aspirations less threatening."

BRZEZINSKI sounds another theme of the Occupation School: the idea that the Warsaw Pact, which intimidated free Europe for decades and crushed dissent in the Soviet satrapies of East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, could become some sort of legitimate defensive alliance. "[A] noncommunist Poland or Hungary," he writes, "might still be a member of the Warsaw Pact, but for geopolitical rather than ideological reasons." Chief among these "geopolitical reasons" are "the legitimate fears of Germany's neighbors of a reunited, powerful Germany." Unlike Brzezinski and Chace, William Pfaff does not advocate the continued stationing of Russian troops on German soil. However, he does call on "the East European peoples voluntarily to choose the commitment to Soviet security"—presumably against a possible invasion of the Soviet Union by the Federal Republic.

The London *Economist*, in its lead editorial of November 11, 1989, joins the Occupation School in explicitly suggesting a role for American troops in perpetuating the division of Germany. The journal calls for "the voice of a continuing America-in-Europe" to join a "murmured chorus in the West" admonishing proponents of German unity, "How much better if you didn't." "A continuing American armed presence (maybe half the size of today's)" is needed, according to the *Economist*, not simply to restrain a possibly dangerous post-Gorbachev Russia, but as "a great force for steadiness at a time when Europeans are filled with a curious mixture of exhilaration and unease about their future."

Such talk can only confirm the fear—which some Germans have expressed since the 1950s—that NATO has been the instru-

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ment of a "double containment"—of Germany as well as the Soviet Union. The logic of double containment is pithily summarized in a phrase attributed to Lord Ismay: "The purpose of NATO is to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." Some members of the Occupation School, such as Chace, are even harder on the Germans: the new purpose of NATO should be to keep the Germans down, the Americans in—*and* the Russians in.

The explicit conversion of NATO from an anti-Soviet alliance to an army of occupation of Germany in a Europe dominated by the U.S. alone or by a Soviet-American condominium is only one pillar in the strategy of the Occupation School. The other is a campaign to promote huge American and Western European investment in the reformist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe, a campaign designed as much to dilute Germany's natural economic preponderance in the area as to bolster new liberal governments against communist counter-revolution. "A German-dominated Europe is in no one's—not even Germany's—interest, even if that domination is wholly economic," writes Chace. He calls on the U.S. to "invest substantially in market-oriented industries in Central and Eastern Europe to further its own foreign policy goals"—chiefly, its goal of containing Bonn and Berlin. Although Western policy-makers cannot be as blunt as Chase, it seems likely that concern about increasing German influence in the reformed economies of Eastern Europe is one of the major motives behind calls for massive U.S., European Community, and Western European national programs of aid to the East.

The former Social Democratic mayor of West Berlin, Heinrich Albertz, has called the Federal Republic an "occupied country." On the German Right, journalist Wolfgang Venohr, in a 1982 book entitled *Die deutsche Einheit kommt bestimmt* (German Unity is Definitely Coming), has denounced the "bipolar imperialism" of the Soviet Union and the United States. If the Occupation School has its way, it will—however unwittingly—transform these assertions from anti-American canards of the German fringes into accurate descriptions of U.S. policy in Europe.

The major themes of today's Occupation theorists can be found *in ovo* in a shrill speech by Khrushchev given in Moscow in 1958. Khrushchev warned that the Germans remained fascists and that German territorial demands in Eastern Europe continued to threaten world peace. Moreover, Khrushchev continued:

> Economically, Western Germany is literally taking its West European allies by the throat. It is enough to note, for the sake of comparison, that in 1957, for instance, the Federal Republic produced 24,500,000 tons of steel, as against 22 million in Britain and little more than 14 million in France. . . . Financially, too, Western Germany is today stronger than either Britain or France. Consider their gold and currency reserves. . . . All these economic resources of Western Germany are being placed at the service of reviving German militarism.

Like many Occupation School strategists today, Khrushchev rejected German reunification on the basis of plebiscites or other free electoral means.

It is more than a little disturbing that the themes of Soviet propaganda of the late 1950s are now being recycled in Washington, London, and Paris as the conventional wisdom of Western foreign policy elites. Because of the Soviet partition of Germany, writes William Pfaff:

> The problem of disproportion is solved. West Germany is not notably more powerful than France. East Germany is an industrial power on the order of Poland or Czechoslovakia. Europe, for the first time in a century, enjoys an equilibrium of forces, and it is in the interest of everyone that this continue.

Occupation School theorists in the West implicitly endorse the postwar Soviet policy of partitioning Germany, and implicitly repudiate the policy of the Western Allies of attempting to restore Germany, like Japan, as a sovereign nation with a limited, nonthreatening military.

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A Republic Without Republicans?

AT THE HEART of Occupation School theory is the concern that Germany, which has twice plunged the world into war, might do so again. Many fear what they believe to be a deep streak of illiberalism in the German national character—a streak which, if combined with resentment over the loss of German territories at the end of World War II, might lead a reunited Germany to threaten or attack its eastern neighbors.

Generations of scholars and observers have subscribed to the belief that the Germans are inherently illiberal. Some have even suggested that the Germans are congenitally insane, if not congenitally evil. As W.H. Auden put it:

> Accurate scholarship can
> Unearth the whole offence
> From Luther until now
> That has driven a culture mad.

Now, quoting from George Bailey's *Germans: The Biography of an Obsession*, William Pfaff echoes these sentiments: "Germans do not fear death as others do. Suicide is a 'reasonable recourse.' "

One need not accept the idea of German "original sin" to acknowledge that the Occupation School has grounds for concern about the stability of German constitutionalism. The defeat of liberal nationalism in the German Europe of 1848, the circumstances of *Kleindeutsch* unification under the "military monarchy" of the Hohenzollerns, and the unification of greater Germany under Hitler's totalitarian dictatorship—all attest to the fact that the roots of liberal constitutionalism and representative democracy have not run deep in German soil. The short-lived and unhappy Weimar Republic was notorious as a "republic without republicans." Traditional German culture aside, moreover, there can be little question that deeply ingrained habits of deference to authority in the German people made it possible for the Nazis to gain unlimited state power and then use it for diabolical ends.

In light of this unpromising legacy, the extent to which popular West German acceptance of Western notions of competitive party politics and legality have taken hold is remarkable. In addition to the civil liberties guaranteed in the first twenty articles of the West German Basic Law or Federal Constitution (a list far more comprehensive and detailed than the U.S. Bill of Rights), Article 20 of the Basic Law declares that "all Germans shall have the right to resist any person or persons seeking to abolish the constitutional order, should no other remedy be possible."

Controversies about civil liberties in the Federal Republic have proven that these are not mere words on paper. In 1962, when then Minister of Defense Franz Josef Strauss ordered a police raid of the newsmagazine *Der Spiegel* and the arrest of its editors after the publication of a series of articles unflattering to the government, widespread public outrage was followed by Strauss's resignation and the quashing of the government's indictment in court. Similar opposition arose to a 1972 decree by the federal and state governments forbidding public employment for any citizen engaged in "anticonstitutional activities"; in that case, the result was a revision of the security clearance system.

Unlike the Weimar Republic, the modern West German state has witnessed the continued weakness of anticonstitutional political parties. A number of tiny and ephemeral neo-Nazi parties flickered through a marginal existence from 1949 to 1969, when the failure of the National Democratic party to obtain the 5 percent of the vote necessary for representation in the *Bundestag* led to a long-term decline of the radical Right. That decline appears to have been at least temporarily arrested by the success in some local elections of the far-right Republican party, a nationalist, anti-immigrant party formed in 1984 and led by a former Waffen-SS officer, Franz Schönhuber. The Republicans have attracted conservative and nationalist voters disen-

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chanted with the centrist drift of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) following the death in 1987 of the leader of the CDU's Bavarian affiliate, Franz Josef Strauss. Should the Republicans become a force in national politics, they are likely to have the same effect they have already had in municipal elections in West Berlin and Frankfurt: splitting the conservative vote and bringing left-liberal governments to power.

Fear of another Hitler with a basis in a right-wing party has little foundation. The appointment, by a *de facto* presidential dictator, of the leader of a parliamentary faction of right-wing splinter parties as chancellor, cannot be repeated under the West German constitution. It is conceivable that a radical rightist party could hold the balance between more moderate parties in an all-German parliament. To dwell on such speculative scenarios, however, is to beat the Germans with any stick at hand.

More significant than the radical Right in German politics is the radical Left. In the elections of March 1983 the Greens, a coalition of environmentalists, antinuclear activists, feminists, and pacifists, became the first new political party to join the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Free Democrats in the *Bundestag* since the 1950s. Whereas conventional German conservatives, committed to NATO and the European Community, have been circumspect in expressing their patriotism, the Greens, along with left-wing Social Democrats, have linked German nationalism to neutralism and a belief in the "moral equivalence" of the United States and the Soviet Union. A left-wing German nationalism, identified with a German "mission" to defend the global environment, the oppressed Third World, and a humanity endangered by nuclear war against American "militarism" and capitalism, might well be a threat to U.S. interests. It would, however, be a diplomatic threat, not a military one.

In spite of their antinomian ideology, the Greens have been willing to work within the system of parliamentary democracy in the Federal Republic. This is not true of small but lethal terrorist groups on the West German Left, such as the Baader-Meinhof gang, which engaged in bombings and assassinations during the 1970s. The assassination on November 30, 1989 of Alfred Herrhausen, a major West German banker and industrialist, shows that leftist terrorism remains a criminal, if not a political, problem for the FRG.

The strength of a constitution, political or physiological, can be gauged by its performance in sickness and stress. By that standard, the postwar West German democracy has proven extraordinarily robust. The forty-year old FRG has survived military occupation, the Cold War, several changes of government, spy scandals, government corruption scandals, terrorist incidents, and the two most severe recessions since the Great Depression (in the mid–1970s and early 1980s) without serious challenge. As David P. Conradt has commented in *The German Polity*, "Bonn, in contrast to Weimar, is not a republic without republicans."

The question remains, of course, whether the traditions of the Federal Republic would shape a united Germany. "It is imprudent to assume," Conor Cruise O'Brien has written in the London *Times*, "that a fully sovereign and united Germany will be very similar, in mood and demeanor, to an occupied part of a partitioned Germany." Yet a poll in 1969 revealed that *only 3 percent* of the West German population was willing to sacrifice competitive party elections and freedom of speech in return for reunification.[4] Is this attitude merely provisional on the part of Germans in the "occupied part of a partitioned Germany," as O'Brien interestingly describes the Federal Republic? Echoing Churchill, who observed that the Germans are "either at your feet or your throat," O'Brien notes, "The more or less humble and contrite mood of Bonn, as the capital of the Federal Republic, is unlikely to extend to Berlin as the capital of the fatherland."

[4]Institute für Demoskopie, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung, 1968–1973* (Allensbach: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1975), 5:227.

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To the Occupation theorists, German nationalism may be permissible—as long as it is *East* German nationalism. To save the West from West German proponents of a new *Kaiserreich*, O'Brien looks to the East: "The East Germans are the only people who can now peacefully avert unification." Anti-German Europeans and Americans have spoken wistfully of the possibility of an East German "patriotism," attached to the territory of the GDR if not to its communist government. Some East German dissidents who hope to preserve a separate, socialist state have indeed expressed opposition to union with the Federal Republic. East German writer Stefan Heym has said in the *Washington Times* that scenes of East Germans waving West German flags and chanting "Deutschland, Deutschland," "reminded him of 1933—the year Adolf Hitler seized power." Interestingly, this view is shared by some West German leftists as well. Günter Grass has claimed in the *New York Times* that "nothing would be gained" from German unity "except an alarming excess of power, swollen with the lust for more power."

There can be little doubt that in a united Germany postwar West German political culture would be transformed in significant and unpredictable ways by the attitudes of the former East German minority. Among former citizens of the GDR, communism would probably be discredited, except among a tiny, ideologically-committed minority. Social democracy, however, would probably be much stronger than conservative alternatives. East German resentment of higher Western living standards, the need for decades of state-backed economic and social reconstruction in the East, and the absence in the Protestant East of the particularist and Catholic traditions which have influenced the Christian Democrats in the Federal Republic—all seem to suggest there would be a greater affinity for social democratic politics in a united Germany.

It is too early to judge the strength of any radical Right among East Germans. Though the GDR leadership and the West German Left have linked expressions of conservative values and patriotism with a Nazi resurgence, Americans should be skeptical of claims that the communist glacier will recede to reveal National Socialist attitudes, preserved in deep freeze since 1945. As one West German politician recently noted, every young East German has grown up in two countries—the GDR and the country portrayed by West German television. The supporters of *Einheit* (national unity) in Leipzig wave the flag of the Bonn republic.

A New Drang nach Osten?

A FINAL FEAR common to Occupation theorists concerns German revanchism and military power. At the end of the Second World War, Germany lost almost a third of its prewar territory, most of it to Poland and Russia (this does not include Austria, briefly a part of Hitler's *Reich*). In the process, large numbers of ethnic German civilians were forcibly deported or massacred. Since the war, a tiny but vocal nationalist minority in West Germany has claimed that these territorial losses are still subject to renegotiation by a future, all-German government.

Although successive German governments have vowed that Germany will respect postwar boundaries, German diplomats and lawyers have been careful to include language in treaties reserving the right of a future, all-German government to make binding commitments to the sanctity of postwar borders. While perhaps defensible under the theory that the Federal Republic is merely a provisional state pending German reunification, these reservations on the part of the Federal Republic create reservations of a different kind among neighbors of the two current German states.

The specter of revanchism is particularly useful to the East German Communist party. Earlier, the Communists did not hesitate to rely on Soviet armed force to prevent German reunification; now, under "reformist" leaders, it hopes to enlist European fears of revanchism to accomplish the same result. "I

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am dead set against this talk about reunification," the new East German Communist leader Gregor Gysi said on December 14. "If one border falls, all the others, from Bessarabia to Tyrol, are endangered. . . . The result would be that America, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union would be forced to make a terrible choice, as at Munich, between giving in piecemeal or remaining firm." In the same interview, Gysi gave a more fundamental reason for his opposition to reunification—a believing communist, he favors "a Left alternative to the Federal Republic of Germany." Because the United States is unlikely to cooperate with the Soviet Union in Europe to preserve the existence of a "Left alternative" German state which can pursue the failed utopia of "democratic socialism," the specter of Chamberlain and Munich must be summoned up to alarm Americans.

That grim specter is probably a turnip ghost. According to Conradt's *The German Polity*, the number of Germans who accepted the Oder-Neisse line, Germany's postwar eastern border, increased from 8 percent in 1951 to 61 percent in 1972, when the Federal Republic signed treaties with Poland and other eastern states guaranteeing its own respect for postwar borders. Understandably, Germany's neighbors would prefer to have guarantees more substantial than the vagaries of German public opinion, or cleverly worded treaties.

It is no longer possible, if it ever was, to defend the West German practice of keeping the border question open in order to extract concessions from the Soviet Union or its satellites. The two German states, or an all-German government, should be expected formally and permanently to abandon any legal claim to lost German territories, as a corollary to international recognition of a new status of confederation or reunification. An all-German constitution might also include a renunciation of the use of force to change the territorial status quo in Europe. In addition, diplomatic and legal guarantees might be backed up by an all-European collective security agreement, guaranteeing the integrity of existing borders from the Atlantic to the Soviet frontier, either by means of the NATO and Warsaw Pacts or successor organizations. Such a collective security agreement, unlike the draconian arrangements envisioned by the Occupation School, would not be directed at the Germans alone; Soviet aggression, Balkan nationalist revisionism, and a possible renewal of Greco-Turkish conflict might be even more important targets.

COUPLED WITH the fear of German militarism is the related fear of its present and future economic might. Those who would justify the continued division of Germany often point to its economic power as the engine of a German return to militarism. Such arguments neglect the fact that there is no direct or inevitable correlation between economic strength and military capability.

In 1987, according to CIA estimates, the Soviet Union's gross national product was $2,375 billion, compared to a U.S. GNP of $4,488.6 billion. In the same year the GNP of the European Community was $4,690.8 billion, and that of Japan $2,792.6 billion.[5] If productivity indeed corresponded in any meaningful way to military power, then the two global superpowers would be the United States and Western Europe, with Japan displacing the Soviet Union for a distant third place. The Soviet Union is a Third World nation with a superpower military; Japan is an economic superpower with a military which, for both constitutional and historic reasons, is extremely limited. There is no reason to assume that the economic power of a united Germany could not be indefinitely compatible with the kinds of limitations on offensive military forces which the Japanese have accepted for decades.

As it is, the economic power of a united Germany can be easily exaggerated. If, after decades of reconstruction, former East Ger-

[5] See *Handbook of Economic Statistics* (Washington: CIA, 1988), p. 31; *International Financial Statistics Yearbook: 1988*, pp.164–65.

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mans in a united Germany were to have the same per capita income that West Germans have today, the GDP of a reunified Germany would be no more than a quarter greater than that of today's Federal Republic. Even if the European Community were not enlarged by the addition of Eastern European countries and other states such as Austria and Sweden, a united Germany would account for only 31 percent of the GDP of the EC—a proportion about equal to the combined GDP of Britain and Italy. Furthermore, if GDP is calculated according to purchasing power parity rather than relative gross domestic product, the GDP of a united Germany would be only 26 percent of that of the European Community.

Martin Wolf has estimated in the *Financial Times* that even in manufacturing—in which Germany has a comparative advantage—a united Germany would have only 68 percent of the combined manufacturing capability of Britain, France, and Italy. As the Mediterranean and Eastern European countries modernize their plants (in part as a result of German investment), the German advantage in manufacturing can be expected to erode. Because manufacturing potential, rather than financial or commercial strength, is the economic factor most relevant to military power, those worried about overwhelming German military-industrial capability should be reassured.

Another concern sometimes cited by the Occupation School is that Germany might abandon economic integration with the West in order to create its own economic *Mitteleuropa*. It is far from clear that a renewal of Germany's historic economic preponderance in Eastern Europe would pose a security threat to the West or the Soviet Union. At any rate, a reunified Germany is extremely unlikely to abandon its lucrative trade with its Western neighbors for what must for a very long time remain a limited trade with the impoverished economies of Eastern Europe. In 1988, 71.1 percent of West Germany's exports went to its Western European neighbors, compared to a mere 5.6 percent to Eastern Europe *and the Soviet Union*.

Eastern Europeans may modernize their economies with German and other Western help, but it will be a long time before Poles and Czechoslovaks, not to mention Russians, will share the ability of British or French to buy German goods. Ironically, one of the policies advocated by Occupation School theorists in the United States—massive U.S. subsidies of postcommunist Eastern European regimes to dilute German influence—may actually make Germany economically *stronger*, by permitting Eastern Europeans to buy German manufactures which they cannot now afford. (The same result, incidentally, may follow from proposed programs of U.S. economic aid to the Soviet Union.)

A united Germany need not, by virtue of its commercial success alone, be a military threat to its neighbors. If the United States and the Western allies, or the states of Eastern Europe, fear resurgent German military power, their concerns should be dealt with by the negotiation of limits to the armed forces of a confederated or reunited Germany within the context of general European disarmament, not by maintaining the Soviet-imposed partition of Germany. Frankfurt bankers and Munich businessmen may well out-compete inefficient British and French banks and businesses. The United States, however, should not commit forces to Western Europe if their only purpose is to protect non-German businesses from German competition and to perpetuate the brutal and artificial division of the German people which Stalin's Red Army imposed.

"Whole and Free"?

WITH THE crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communist governments throughout Eastern Europe, the American-led Western alliance is nearer than ever to two goals: the negotiated withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Central and Eastern Europe, and self-determination for the liberated nations of the former Soviet bloc. That self-determination should include the peaceful reunification of a

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nonaggressive German nation in any form the German people freely choose. The Bush administration, previously careful to avoid the appearance of hostility to German self-determination, committed a tactical blunder after Malta when it made German membership in NATO a precondition for German reunification. It should refrain from further hasty and ill-considered departures from America's long-held policy in favor of German reunification and autonomy.

Instead, the United States should reaffirm the postwar U.S. policy of supporting democratic elections to a provisional all-German government, in confederate or federal form. The new German government, after guaranteeing postwar borders and accepting temporary limitations on its armed forces, would be admitted to the community of nations, and allowed to choose the nature of its affiliation to the Western alliance, if any. This long-standing American policy, reaffirmed for forty years until the Bush administration abruptly and unwisely began to impose additional preconditions, remains both more realistic and more just than the ill-advised schemes of the Occupation School.

Its serious flaws aside, the Occupation School has identified some significant problems that must be resolved if unification is to succeed. The United States, along with Germany's neighbors, may legitimately ask the Germans to accept unequivocally the permanence of postwar frontiers (except for the disintegrating and illegitimate inner-German frontier). It is also entirely reasonable for the United States and its allies to expect that a reunited Germany will, because of its central geographic position as much as its history, tolerate negotiated limits to its armed forces and arsenals more stringent than those which might be accepted by powers with a more pacific history or peripheral location. While these are reasonable requests, they should be presented constructively as issues which the U.S. hopes to help resolve in order to facilitate German reunification. By no means should these concerns be presented as dictatorial preconditions for German reunification, or as concessions which the U.S. and the Western allies grudgingly seek to extract after failing to obtain their primary goal, the permanent dismemberment and prostration of Germany.

" 'Keeping the Germans down' may be a tenable line for newspaper columnists, but for governments which need the friendship and co-operation of actual flesh-and-blood Germans it is not," the British columnist Edward Mortimer has observed. East Germans, if given the choice, may choose to remain separate from their West German countrymen; that is for them to decide. Whether the two Germanies are reunited or merely confederated, it is in the interest of both the Germans and the Western allies, including the United States, permanently to remove the Soviet military presence from German soil.

It would be a calamity if misguided hostility to the idea of a democratic, united Germany should lead U.S. policy-makers to consider preserving a Soviet military and political role in Germany just when Soviet power seems on the verge of exhaustion. Harsh calls for permanent American or Soviet-American occupation of German soil not only risk being perceived by new generations of liberty-loving German patriots as prescriptions for a *Diktat* more hateful than that of Versailles. If heeded, those calls could lead U.S. policy-makers to surrender one of America's principal declared goals in the Cold War, at the very moment of victory.

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Who Watched Americas Watch?

Rita McWilliams

THE PUBLIC OUTCRY that greeted the Bush administration's move to repair relations with the People's Republic of China just months after the Tiananmen Square massacre is only the latest demonstration of the power of "human rights" over the American mind. Today no serious candidate for public office challenges the idea that we ought actively to encourage—if not, indeed, compel—respect for basic rights by governments everywhere. From El Salvador to South Africa, from the Soviet Union to Panama, our relations with other states have become increasingly driven by how the governments in question treat their citizens.

As a result, those who purport to provide objective reports on human rights in other nations have come to wield a large degree of influence over the direction of American foreign policy. Nowhere is this phenomenon better illustrated than in the debate over our policy toward Nicaragua in the 1980s. On one side, the Reagan administration and its allies invoked the abuses of the Sandinistas as a justification for aiding the *contras*. On the other, opponents of U.S. aid cited their own chapter and verse on abuses by the *contras* themselves. In a debate thus circumscribed, the battle over "the facts on the ground" became critically important to both sides.

The most influential arbiter of those facts was Americas Watch, a private organization which, according to its literature, has "no agenda other than the promotion of human rights."[1] Aryeh Neier, the group's executive director through most of the Reagan years, explained the philosophy of Americas Watch this way: "Our view has been that human rights abuses never thrive when the spotlight of attention is on them; that they thrive in dark corners, and that public attention is always beneficial when it comes to trying to promote human rights."[2]

Founded in 1981 as the Latin American counterpart to Helsinki Watch, an organization that monitors compliance with the Helsinki Accords, Americas Watch gained attention by criticizing the human rights practices of governments across the political spectrum from El Salvador to Cuba. It also became the first nongovernment human rights group to report on human rights abuses by the Salvadoran guerrillas.

But it was the debate over Nicaragua that gave Americas Watch its greatest prominence. Throughout the 1980s, the group issued numerous detailed reports evaluating the rights abuses of both the Nicaraguan government and the *contras*. These reports often appeared just before key congressional

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votes when media attention was at a peak. They met the needs of Congress, which preferred not to rely on State Department accounts alone, and the needs of reporters who lacked the time or resources to do a thorough assessment of the human rights issue throughout Nicaragua. Besides their reports, moreover, Americas Watch staff members often contributed articles to such prominent publications as the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *New York Review of Books*.

Perhaps most important, while other major human rights groups like Amnesty International refrained from making sweeping political pronouncements in the case of Nicaragua, Americas Watch embraced opportunities to do so. Despite disclaimers (for example, "The Americas Watch has no general position on whether the U.S. should aid the *contras*; that is beyond our scope"[3]) the group publicly opposed *contra* aid loudly and often.[4] At the same time, Americas Watch disclaimed any partisanship in its position. "We oppose U.S. aid to forces that engage in a practice of gross human rights abuses," it noted. "If the issue were support for the Nicaraguan government," it added, "we would oppose that because of the government's human rights record."[5]

The group was highly visible in the international debate. The pro-Sandinista newspaper *Barricada* often treated the group's reports as front page news. In fact, so visible did Americas Watch become that it was described by the British-based Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign as one of the U.S. organizations supportive of the Sandinista government.[6]

Americas Watch reports have been cited by members of the Sandinista government as well. I witnessed as much last spring in Managua at a briefing by Sister Mary Hartman, an American nun who works for the Sandinista-sponsored Nicaraguan Committee for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Throughout her briefing, Hartman displayed an encyclopedic knowledge of Americas Watch reports, repeatedly invoking them to support her contentions that the government did not condone torture or killings of civilians; that it prosecuted members of its security and military forces who are believed to have committed such atrocities; and so on.

I

TO ITS CREDIT, Americas Watch has uncovered abuses by the governments of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Argentina, and other Latin American nations, as well as reporting abuses by antigovernment forces such as the Salvadoran rebels and the U.S.-backed *contras*. Uncovering human rights abuses is an inherently difficult task. Each case that can be documented is a tribute to the persistence and resourcefulness of the international human rights community. Indeed, because it is so difficult to collect information on abuse, human rights monitors can never be sure that they have not overlooked something. Amnesty International, for example, regularly warns readers that because of government secrecy and intimidation its country reports "can never be comprehensive."[7]

In most of its reports on Latin countries, Americas Watch has respected this limitation, confining itself to reporting the facts its investigators have found and avoiding sweeping generalizations that might absolve a government of human rights abuses. But in the case of Nicaragua, these standards fell by the way.

Over the years, Americas Watch has repeatedly reached the conclusion that what it has *not* uncovered in Nicaragua has not in fact occurred. In many instances—even while reporting specific abuses—the organization has asserted that:

"As best we can determine, torture—as that term is generally understood—is not practiced in Nicaragua. . . . "[8]

"The government of Nicaragua does not engage in a pattern of violations of the laws of war. Nor does it engage in systematic violations of the right to life or to physical integ-

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rity of detainees. . . . Nor does it engage in a deliberate pattern of forced disappearances of persons."[9]

"There is not a policy of torture, political murder or disappearances in Nicaragua."[10]

In reaching these conclusions the group tried to achieve the impossible: to be omniscient enough to say what the Nicaraguan government *had not* done.

Torture

OVER THE LAST seven years Americas Watch has reported numerous allegations of abuse by Sandinista forces. It found, for example, that in 1982 some Sandinista agents had beaten prisoners, held guns to their heads, and threatened to kill them if they didn't "confess."[11] In April 1984, Americas Watch also reported that Sandinista forces had been dangling detainees out of helicopters.[12]

In 1987 it discussed the case of Rosa Moreira Trana. The group reported that she had been deprived of sleep, menaced with a snake, and given pills that made her ill.[13] At one point, Moreira was told that her children would be killed, and at another that the sounds she heard were those of her son being beaten. Moreira's daughter later said that Sandinista security agents "told us that if we talk about what they said to us, they were going to make me disappear. They were going to take my brother Lorenzo and me, and make it look like we were killed in combat by the *contras*."[14]

Americas Watch has also disclosed, and condemned, numerous cases in which prisoners have been abused by agents of the Sandinista regime. "Beatings and harsh interrogation practices are reported frequently in [pretrial detention] facilities."[15] "Detainees are often held in cells that are either always dark or always lighted; they are also frequently threatened with long-term confinement or even death if they do not confess or inform on others, or they are misled into believing that members of their families are also in detention."[16] "The government of Nicaragua engages, as a matter of policy, in abusive interrogation tactics against prisoners, including psychological pressure and threats used to secure their confession."[17]

Despite these reports, Americas Watch for many years insisted that the government of Nicaragua did not engage in a policy of torture. In its first report on Nicaragua in 1982 it cited "widespread agreement, even among the government's strongest critics, that physical torture is *not* [emphasis in original] practiced in Nicaragua today."[18] It reaffirmed this conclusion in 1986, stating that "As best we can determine, torture—as that term is generally understood—is not practiced in Nicaragua. . . ."[19]

Critics have asked why, in the face of the evidence the group itself has uncovered, Americas Watch has been reluctant to accuse the Sandinistas of practicing torture.[20] In 1986 Juan Méndez, then the organization's Washington office director, explained that the incidents that it would define as torture were "isolated" cases happening in "remote areas."[21] Méndez also pointed out that the Nicaraguan government had, in "a few cases," taken steps to investigate and punish those involved. "Under those circumstances, it is hard to make the case that these things are done pursuant to a deliberate policy," he said. Méndez, who had himself been tortured by a repressive government, continued: "It would be a disservice to the cause of human rights for us to jump on the bandwagon and use inflammatory charges, only because of the pressures and blackmail exerted in the United States against those who try to report on Nicaragua."

One controversial practice of the Sandinista government has been to confine prisoners for hours, and sometimes days, in tiny cells known as *chiquitas*. Americas Watch reported that political activist Tomasa Hernandez, while three months pregnant, was deprived of all food for twelve days and held in a dark cell so small she had to crouch in an uncomfortable position.[22] According to the report, she suffered a miscarriage upon her release.

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In its February 1987 report the group talked at some length about the kind of cells in which Tomasa Hernandez and others have been held. "In Nicaragua there is a pattern of treatment of prisoners in pre-trial detention that we find abusive," it said. "During 1986 it consisted of the frequent use of very small cells (*chiquitas*), where the prisoner can only stand up, for several hours at a time, preceding an interrogation session."[23] Yet, on the same page, Americas Watch went out of its way to reassert that these and other abuses do not constitute a policy of torture—because the government said the use of *chiquitas* was "against official policy," and because the government had begun punishing some of those responsible.[24] But the abuse continued.

In May 1989, when Amnesty International showed President Daniel Ortega a picture of a *chiquita*, he "expressed his total opposition to their use which he said amounted to torture."[25]

Americas Watch for many years performed a variety of legalistic gymnastics to find that the Nicaraguan government did not practice torture. In 1985, for instance, it insisted that the Sandinistas could not be charged with "torture" because "the cases we know of. . . do not constitute evidence of a *pattern* [emphasis added] of deliberate infliction of extreme physical suffering that is generally associated with the word torture."[26]

This view departs from that found in international law, which does provide a single, universally-accepted standard regarding torture. That standard is contained in the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It defines torture as

> *Any act* by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reasons based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.

The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture also explicitly says that methods "to obliterate the personality of the victim or to *diminish his physical or mental capacities even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish* [emphasis added]" shall be considered "torture."

The emphasis on psychological methods of torture in modern statements of international law reflects a growing awareness that governments have moved beyond the cruder forms of physical abuse to more subtle techniques for manipulating prisoners. As the chairman of the committee that drew up the UN convention on torture has said, adding the concept of mental suffering to the definition of torture "is highly important because regrettably mental torture is frequently applied in the present-day world."[27] Examples of torture which the drafters of the UN convention had in mind include cases in which "the victim is made to believe that he will be killed or that reprisals will be taken against his wife or his children if he does not cooperate."[28]

Amnesty International says that international law "must keep pace with modern technology which is capable of inducing severe psychological suffering without resort to any overt physical brutality."[29] The evidence from Nicaragua suggests that, in this area if in no other, the Sandinistas have kept pace with technology. Light and sleep deprivation and other techniques which "depersonalize" the victim seem to have been used on prisoners far more frequently than physical abuse. Roberto Guillen, once deputy chief of military counterintelligence for the Sandinista Ministry of Defense, has said, in a 1983 interview after he defected, that the Sandinistas preferred to use psychological abuse because they found it more effective than physical torture and because it left no physical evidence.

"The Soviets and the Cubans have found

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out that violent methods are often counter-productive," Guillen told *Time* magazine.

> People will stick to the principles for which they fought. But if you depersonalize a person, he will lose his social standards, his principles. One method is to change the body metabolism. You shut a man in a room with no light or a lot of light 24 hours a day. You interrogate him constantly, off and on. You bring him food every two hours, saying it is mealtime. After two days you lose your sense of time. . . [it] brings you to a state of desperation. The mind, upon receiving so much pressure, comes to a point where it is blocked. You are questioned constantly. The mind is so exhausted, it has no defense.[30]

Disappearances and Murders

SINCE THE Sandinistas came to power in 1979, a number of Nicaraguan civilians have mysteriously disappeared. Often the disappearances occur after Sandinista security officials have arrived at their homes to question them about alleged *contra* activity. Many incidents of this sort have taken place throughout the once heavily-contested rural areas of northern Nicaragua in the Matagalpa and Jinotega areas as well as in the province of Zelaya. Sometimes the disappeared have been found dead several days later. When asked about these incidents, the government has often told the families that their sons and daughters were killed upon their release by *contras* operating in the area, or that they were killed trying to escape, or that they were killed during a battle.

Amnesty International has always warned human rights groups to be careful when coming to conclusions about suspected murders. As the group remarks in its handbook, *Political Killings by Governments*:

> Political killings by governments are difficult to investigate and it is usually impossible to obtain all the relevant details. Even where a country has not closed its doors to outside observers, investigation is hampered by limited access, by intimidation of witnesses and by official measures taken to cover up the crime.[31]

Amnesty also warns that the governments sometimes will "go through the motions of investigating extrajudicial executions but the result is merely a cover up."

Americas Watch did not always heed this advice when reporting on the government of Nicaragua.

From 1982 to 1986, Americas Watch repeatedly stated that people may have "disappeared" because the Sandinista government had failed to set up an adequate system to notify families of the arrested who were held in detention. Since prisoners have no right to make outside calls, families would panic and complain that they had "disappeared." Americas Watch continually called on the government to set up such a system. But by 1986, when the government still had failed to take this important step, Americas Watch reasoned that the Sandinistas did not have a "deliberate governmental policy" of disappearances because:

- more people were arrested than disappeared;
- in some cases there was no evidence of an arrest by state security or the army;
- Americas Watch was unable to detect a *modus operandi* in those cases that were reported;
- the disappearances reported in Nicaragua did not appear to be attributable to one or more particular military, police, or paramilitary units as has been the case in other countries;
- that the identities of those who were reportedly victimized did not reveal a pattern;
- and that the disappearances occurred almost exclusively in remote areas.[32]

In 1987, Americas Watch did find "inexcusable violations by the government [such] as targeted killings of civilians, disappearances, killings *hors de* combat and failure to minimize harm to civilians in the course of attacks on military targets." But even then, Americas Watch clung to the conclusion that all this did not add up to "a governmental policy to commit or tolerate abuses of this nature."[33]

Finally, in August 1988, Americas Watch suggested that the government *might* be tolerating such abuses. "If the reports we have obtained prove to be substantiated," it

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warned, "the cases are numerous enough to *suggest* [emphasis added] tolerance or complicity by higher authorities."[34] This led the Nicaraguan government to conclude that Americas Watch's 1988 report "was prepared hastily, without full reflection, a practice that does not comply with the rigorous methods usually employed by this organization."[35]

In its November 1989 report, Americas Watch concluded that Nicaraguan military and security forces "engaged in a pattern of killings" in communities of northern Nicaragua.[36] It uncovered seventy-four murders, fourteen disappearances, and evidence of another twenty possible killings. It stated that it believed the killings were "a new phenomenon, not unlike the killings of the Miskitos in late 1981 and 1982." But then it noted "the problem could well be of a larger scope than we have been able to detect" because the killings "have taken place in remote areas where monitoring is very difficult."[37]

Before 1989, Americas Watch maintained that it could not conclude that the government was responsible for a policy of murder because in some cases, the government had taken steps to punish those it had found guilty of such crimes. When, for example, Americas Watch found a string of murders alleged to have been committed by government forces, such as killings in the rural area of Pantasma, the group reasoned that the murders were not part of official policy because the government had begun to punish individuals it said were responsible for the deaths. Americas Watch praised it for these steps: "We applaud the willingness of the government to listen to its critics and for beginning to punish those responsible for human rights abuse." It even singled out for particular praise the government's response to allegations of human rights abuses in northern Nicaragua.[38]

But Americas Watch reports now that the government exerted "considerable leniency" toward some sort of the very individuals it had lauded them for punishing.[39]

The Miskitos

THE MISKITO, Rama, and Sumo Indians who live along Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast have always been wary of the Nicaraguans of Spanish descent who dominate the nation's politics. Many initially welcomed the Sandinista revolution in the belief that they might finally win autonomy from Managua.

Life did change under Sandinista rule, but not as the Indians had hoped. Sandinista soldiers displaced local decision-making bodies. Literacy programs were conducted in Spanish rather than in Miskito. And the staunchly religious Indians often resented Sandinista rhetoric and the presence of Cuban doctors.[40] Within two years of the revolution, armed bands of Indians operating out of neighboring Honduras began attacking Sandinista soldiers.

In January 1982, the government began forcibly relocating large numbers of Indians from their villages near the Honduran border to an area fifty miles away, in many cases with less than twenty-four hours notice. As Indians were paraded out, Sandinista soldiers set fire to their homes and fields, tore down their fruit trees, and killed their livestock. When human rights organizations criticized the Sandinista's actions, the Nicaraguan government responded that the move was for the Indians' own protection.

Americas Watch dismissed the government's claim of protecting the Indians. But at the same time, it maintained that since the attacks from Honduras "imminently and gravely threatened" Nicaragua's security, Americas Watch was "not able to say that the Government was unreasonable in determining that such an evacuation was necessary. . . ."[41] The report noted too that the U.S. itself had forcibly relocated Japanese-Americans during World War II and American Indians in the nineteenth century, and cited U.S. Supreme Court decisions upholding the legality of these relocations.

But in 1985, when the *Salvadoran* army undertook a relocation of villagers in the zone

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of Guazapa, Americas Watch took a different approach. In a report on El Salvador entitled *The Continuing Terror*, Americas Watch declined to reach any judgment about the military necessity of the Salvadoran relocation because "Americas Watch has no claim to military expertise and cannot answer this question."[42] Nor did it include in its report a discussion of the relocations ordered by the U.S. government or the Supreme Court opinions approving them.

Americas Watch descriptions of the two relocations were different as well. The Salvadoran relocation at Guazapa was recounted by Americas Watch in vivid detail. The story, based on interviews with those relocated, painted a grim and frightening picture of what the families of Guazapa must have endured. Americas Watch noted that the Guazapa evacuees were interviewed "as they try to quiet their crying children" in a displaced persons camp. The group cited concrete testimony of several witnesses. An eighteen year-old with the initials D.R. told Americas Watch:

> Some twenty-five soldiers suddenly appeared and surrounded the house. . . . They shouted into the house that the people inside should come out if they wanted to live. They asked if the people inside wanted to live or die. Those inside, all civilians, replied that they wanted to live, and they came out.

But in a major report on violations of the human rights of the Indian population of Nicaragua,[43] Americas Watch described the government's January and February 1982 relocations of the Miskitos from the Rio Coco area of Nicaragua in less gripping terms. That report—neutrally titled *The Miskitos In Nicaragua*—told readers the government had given the elderly and others too weak to walk the fifty miles to the new villages rides in government helicopters. Food and medical care, it noted, were provided at certain intervals, and water was available from streams in the area. No information was given about how many soldiers carried out the forced relocation.

The fact remains, however, that Americas Watch did report on the plight on the Miskitos and did call on the Nicaraguan government to investigate and punish those responsible for early episodes in which unarmed Miskitos were killed by government forces. But the Rio Coco relocation was not the only instance in which Americas Watch told the story of human rights abuses of the Miskitos from a perspective other than that of the victims.

In April 1986, as many as ten thousand Miskito Indians fled their villages by crossing the Rio Coco River into Honduras. Americas Watch quickly sent investigators to interview the refugees and concluded that "interviews with refugees in Honduras did not turn up accounts of new abuses by the Sandinistas that might have caused the exodus."[44]

Buried deep within that very report was testimony which refuted Americas Watch's conclusion. Indians told Americas Watch investigators that they fled Nicaragua because the Sandinistas had begun moving in force into the Rio Coco region along the Honduran border. On March 25, at about 4 a.m., Sandinista tanks entered and fired machine guns in the village and rebel base of Bilwaskarma, according to eye-witness accounts reported by Americas Watch.[45] Other towns in which rebel forces were located came under fire as well, including those of Wasla and Kum.

What Americas Watch stressed about these episodes was that the Reagan administration was trying to use the Indian exodus to win support for *contra* aid. The exodus, Americas Watch claimed, "essentially deals a death blow to the Sandinista effort. . . to win political points by permitting the Miskitos to return to the Rio Coco."[46] This Sandinista effort had already won points with Americas Watch. Just a month before the exodus, Americas Watch had issued a report lauding the Sandinistas for improving relations with the Miskitos. "The Nicaraguan government," it declared, "should be commended for letting them go home. . . [and for ending] one

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of the bitterest events in the history of Sandinista-Indian relations."[47]

II

PERHAPS THE MOST unusual aspect of Americas Watch reporting on Nicaragua is the way it has broadened its mandate to scrutinize other individuals and groups who have reported on the conditions of human rights in Nicaragua. In a series of letters, privately circulated analyses, interviews, and reports, the group and its key staff have sharply questioned the methods, and, at times, even the motives of those whose studies of Sandinista abuse have been at odds with its own findings.

The Permanent Commission on Human Rights

THE PERMANENT Commission on Human Rights is a nonpartisan group that has earned respect on both sides of the Nicaraguan debate in the United States. The group played an important role in the Sandinista revolution, and became known internationally for its potent reporting on the brutality of Anastasia Somoza's National Guard. Among the many Somoza prisoners it defended were Daniel Ortega and Tomás Borge.

But whatever goodwill the group enjoyed from its earlier defense of Ortega and Borge was of no help when it began to criticize the human rights record of the government led by these men. Party militants have covered the building where the group is housed with graffiti denouncing its work and have burned its board members in effigy. The commission's files have been seized and photocopied by Borge's police. Sandinista security officials often park outside in order to observe and photograph visitors. The commission's leaders and their families have been threatened and several have been jailed. The government has also denied the group and its affiliates access to government ministries, prisons, trials, and many areas outside of Managua.

In several reports, Americas Watch has chastised the Nicaraguan government for its actions against the commission. Elsewhere, however, Americas Watch has taken issue with the Permanent Commission itself. Aryeh Neier has publicly criticized the group for allowing its reports to be translated into six languages by a group in Costa Rica that received U.S. taxpayer dollars. This money was channelled through Prodemca, a group that bought ads favoring aid to the *contras* at the height of the congressional *contra* aid debate. "It is a great mistake to accept that kind of funding," Neier told the *Washington Post*.[48] Ironically, Neier criticized this use of a National Endowment for Democracy grant when the Nicaraguan government itself was busy translating Americas Watch reports into Spanish.[49]

Americas Watch reports were cited forty times in an attack on the Permanent Commission entitled "The Permanent Commission on Human Rights: Can It Be Trusted?" which concludes that the Permanent Commission "functions as the Nicaraguan cog in the U.S. administration's wheel of misinformation."[50] The pamphlet, funded by a Sandinista solidarity group called Scottish Medical Aid for Nicaragua, has been distributed worldwide. "The arguments they use are arguments that have been cut from Americas Watch," said Lino Hernandez, the Permanent Commission's executive director.

"Americas Watch has sometimes helped us against the government," he said. "So we don't say everything about Americas Watch is bad." Though Hernandez is encouraged by the latest reports of Americas Watch, he does not overlook the consequences of the group's criticism:

> We have always been strong critics of the Sandinistas because Nicaraguan people have been coming here to complain. Aryeh Neier has tried to establish that there are political relations between us and the points that the North American administration makes. In the circumstances which we have lived in the last years—in the strong confrontation between two governments—to charge we are with the

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North Americans is something very delicate for us.

The International League for Human Rights

THE INTERNATIONAL League for Human Rights was begun in 1942 by Roger Baldwin, the man who founded the American Civil Liberties Union. The league is the oldest human rights monitoring group in the world and has reported on abuses around the globe, including those in Chile, Northern Ireland, South Korea, and the Soviet Union. It has affiliates in forty nations. Its mandate is to uphold the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In 1986 the league sent a group to report on human rights conditions in Nicaragua. Its 211-page analysis reported that arbitrary arrests and detentions were taking place throughout the country; that clergymen had been harassed and persecuted and some had been tortured; and that members of the media and trade unions had suffered reprisals by the government for their activities.

Less than a month after the league's report appeared, Americas Watch issued one of the most curious documents ever produced by an organization devoted to the promotion of human rights. Written by Aryeh Neier, then vice chairman of Americas Watch, the 42-page critique challenged almost every point the league had made. It questioned the league's methods, its motives, and even its commitment to the cause of human rights. The strident and bitter tone was all the more curious since the league and Americas Watch had worked together on the issue of human rights in El Salvador.

This document was never formally published by Americas Watch. Instead, it was circulated privately to members of the human rights community and to the Ford Foundation, which had supported the league's work in the past.

The league's report, Neier wrote, was "fundamentally wrong in conception, wrong on the law and in many places wrong on the facts." The league's purpose, he charged, was to portray "the situation in the blackest light possible." The centerpiece of Neier's attack was the league's failure to report on human rights abuses by the *contras*. Neier said the league's decision to focus its analysis on human rights abuses by the Nicaraguan government and to exclude those committed by the *contras* flawed the report fundamentally, and allowed the report to be used as a "propaganda tool" by those who supported the *contras*.

But, in January 1982, Americas Watch itself released a book-length study of human rights in El Salvador that failed to report on abuses by antigovernment rebels. And when then–UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and other Reagan administration officials called the group to task for this omission, Americas Watch asserted that to report on human rights abuses by guerrillas was at odds "both with the internationally-recognized definition of human rights and with the practice of other, international and national, human rights bodies."[51] Later, when Americas Watch began to report on human rights abuses by nongovernment forces in Latin America, this line of argument disappeared from its reports.

Neier's critique nitpicked at virtually every page of the league's report. Here is a sample of his technique:

—The league accurately reported that several political parties in Nicaragua had lost their legal status after the 1984 election. Neier simply said that this was not so because the political groups still met. This was true but beside the point; without such status parties could not legally recruit members or field candidates.

—In its discussion of the state of political freedom in Nicaragua, the league had identified twenty different basic rights suspended by the Sandinista regime. Neier listed three that had been recently restored and thus labelled the entire discussion of suspension of civil liberties "false" without elaboration or explanation.

—The league had reported two instances

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where the government had harassed the Catholic church: by forbidding it to publish a weekly newspaper on human rights, and by forcing it to close down a social welfare organization. Neier insisted that because these two events occurred around the same time they were really only a single incident.

—The league had called the brutal torture of Pentecostal pastor Prudencia Baltodano a case of religious persecution. Neier maintained this was not an instance of religious persecution because Baltodano was only a lay preacher.

—The league had said rape was a "method" of torture applied to some women prisoners but not a pattern of abuse. Neier claimed the league was inconsistent because the word "method" implied "pattern."

Neier is a former executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union. In that position, he had argued vigorously against any attempt by the U.S. government to curtail individual rights in the name of national security. But in his attack on the league's report, Neier invoked considerations of "national security" to qualify Sandinista actions, even inserting *Debs v. United States*, a *bête noir* of civil libertarians, into the debate.

The Puebla Institute

IN 1987, the Puebla Institute, a lay Catholic human rights monitoring group founded by former *La Prensa* editorial writer Humberto Belli, reported testimony by Nicaraguan refugees in Costa Rica that the Sandinista government conducted random bombings and strafings of civilian villages on as many as a dozen occasions in 1985 and 1986.

In an interview with the *National Catholic Register*, Neier questioned the institute's methods of collecting and verifying refugee testimony.[52] He pointed out that the Institute had not corroborated the statements by visiting the sites in question.

After Puebla's report, Americas Watch visited some of the restricted areas where the alleged attacks occurred and sent its investigators again to the refugee camps in Costa Rica. Americas Watch was able to confirm three incidents of attacks on civilians, all in southern Zelaya in 1986. The organization asked the government of Nicaragua about these abuses in a letter sent in May 1987 (*Supplement to the Human Rights Report on Nicaragua*). But in its next report, Americas Watch gave the incidents only several lines, concluding "we did not learn of any such incidents in 1987."[53]

The Case of Alvaro Baldizon

NICARAGUAN defector Alvaro Baldizon had for two and a half years investigated complaints lodged against Nicaragua's security and policy officials by human rights groups. As the Sandinista's chief investigator of the minister of interior's Special Investigations Commission until 1985, Baldizon traveled throughout Nicaragua investigating deaths and disappearances allegedly caused by Sandinista forces. He reported directly to Comandante Tomás Borge, who, as minister of the interior, controls security forces, police, and prisons.

On his trips Baldizon said he heard many complaints from those living in rural areas of Nicaragua, especially in the Matagalpa and Jinotega region. He said that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of civilians had been murdered—and not all by *contras*. Some security officers readily admitted to the crimes, Baldizon said. He heard a familiar story from them—that these murders were not crimes at all, that they had been authorized by Borge or his deputy, Luis Carrion, for "defense purposes." Out of the some two hundred cases of abuse he investigated, Baldizon found that 90 percent had been approved by top Sandinista officials.

On July 1, 1985, while investigating a smuggling case near Honduras, Baldizon slipped across the border. He left Nicaragua with names, numbers, and secret government documents. He brought with him detailed information on the methods of repression the

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Sandinistas were learning from Cubans, including the mobilization of "divine mobs" against the civilian political opposition. Baldizon also told of secret Sandinista documents that described methods to be used against potential political enemies—disinformation strategies and methods for carrying out interrogations without leaving evidence of physical abuse.

Baldizon spoke about his experiences before congressional committees and at numerous press conferences. The State Department released a 20-page document detailing what Baldizon had seen and experienced as a trusted member of the Sandinista regime. President Reagan used Baldizon's testimony in speeches in support of *contra* aid.

Juan Méndez, then director of the Washington office of Americas Watch, attended the briefing and immediately requested a private interview. Several weeks later, Baldizon received a 10-page, single-spaced letter from Méndez. It described a number of "discrepancies" in Baldizon's testimony and demanded an explanation for each. Each question was phrased in a way that put the burden of proof on Baldizon. Méndez challenged Baldizon to explain why his account of an incident of human rights abuse did not match exactly Americas Watch's account. In cases where Baldizon had offered information about previously unknown abuses, Méndez asked that he provide detailed corroboration. When Baldizon provided names, dates, and places, Méndez said that was not enough and requested further documentation.[54] Baldizon replied: "In order to show you proof, I would have had to break in to the offices of control of secret information, carry away several metal file cabinets, and, on a truck, also taken by force, travel nearly 200 kilometers to the border. As you will understand, that could not be."

Baldizon's most significant allegation was that the Sandinista government had adopted a plan to allow its forces to kill peasants they believed to be *contra* sympathizers. These measures could be used only against those who did not have a national or international reputation, Baldizon said. The strategy was outlined in a document called "The Rules of the Ministry of the Interior for the Application of Special Measures to Potential Enemies and Criminals Throughout Nicaragua." Baldizon saw the secret document "because as a member of the investigations commission I needed to know the rules of the Ministry of the Interior to see whether or not they were being violated."

Méndez, in his letter to Baldizon, acknowledged that a classified document Baldizon had smuggled out of Nicaragua was "evidence" that "special measures" had been taken against several Miskito Indians. But Americas Watch took issue with what it said about high-level Sandinista involvement. Méndez said the document "only implied that Comandante Luis Carrion knows of the application of [special measures] in the Atlantic Coast, not that he ordered them."

Americas Watch asked Interior Minister Borge to explain these "special measures." Borge told Americas Watch that they referred to covert operations, including infiltration and surveillance. Special measures, Borge said, did not refer to murder.

In its next report on human rights in Nicaragua, Americas Watch reported both men's versions of "special measures," and called for a further investigation. It stated: "We neither accept Baldizon's allegations as the meaning of 'special measures' nor do we dismiss it." But this neutral statement was followed by sixteen pages of rhetoric questioning Baldizon's truthfulness. For instance, Baldizon had once referred to killings as "massacres." Americas Watch concluded that this choice of words "eliminates the last vestige of credibility from Baldizon." By contrast, Americas Watch never suggested that Borge could have reasons for not being entirely truthful about the meaning of "special measures."

In a March 15, 1986, article in the *New York Times*, Aryeh Neier compared Baldizon to former Hollywood "defectors" who assisted Joe McCarthy in his hunt for communists. He lumped all of Baldizon's charges of

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Sandinista abuse together, calling them "insupportable accusations about imaginary abuses." On March 18, 1986, the Associated Press carried a story entitled "Human Rights Group Attacks Honesty of Key Nicaraguan Defector." The story, by Associated Press reporter Robert Parry, detailed Americas Watch's charges that Baldizon's testimony was unbelievable. Baldizon's credibility, and not his charges of human rights abuses in Nicaragua, had become the story. Meanwhile, the Nicaraguan government issued a terse, two-sentence statement that did not address any of Baldizon's charges.

Baldizon died on June 26, 1988. The last line of his obituary, distributed by the Associated Press, read: "Baldizon's allegations were disputed by Americas Watch, a leading human rights group which said he had repeatedly altered his stories." Even in death, Americas Watch had the last word.

III

"ORDINARILY, we do not take pains to state the abuses of which a government is not guilty," Americas Watch said in a report released in February 1987. But:

> In the case of Nicaragua, we feel called upon to do so because the Reagan Administration has engaged in a concerted effort to distort the facts, charging the Nicaraguan government with abuses far in excess of what it actually commits. . . . In this regard, we again note that the government of Nicaragua does not engage in a pattern of violations of the laws of war. Nor does it engage in systematic violations of the right to life or to physical integrity of detainees. . . . [55]

This statement was made in the very month that—Americas Watch now reports—Sandinista forces were on a killing spree in northern Nicaragua.

In August 1988, as Reagan was about to leave office, Americas Watch reported a number of these killings. Even then the group argued that government leaders in Managua might not know about these abuses. In April 1989, just as the Bush administration was deciding not to press for *contra* aid, Americas Watch went public with its conclusion that Sandinista forces had engaged in a pattern of killings. "These executions," Méndez told the *New York Times*, "are too numerous to be isolated cases."[56] For the first time, he proclaimed that the murders in Matagalpa and Jinotega, which Americas Watch had been investigating for months, "constitute a pattern of abuse by government forces." What the story did not say was that this was the same area in which Baldizon had reported government killings years before.

No party seemed more surprised by this proclamation than the Nicaraguan government, which has subsequently admonished Americas Watch for giving ammunition to those on the other side of the political spectrum. Americas Watch spent several pages in its November report dealing with this criticism, noting that "it is anathema to us. . . to see our findings used in an effort to bolster the cause of other forces that themselves practice gross abuses."[57] The Sandinista government has also expressed dismay at what it claims to be a change in its dealings with the organization. Vilma Núñez, the Nicaraguan government's national commissioner for human rights, has complained that Americas Watch did not give it a chance to reply to each and every alleged case before it went public with them in April 1989.[58]

High-level officials like Daniel Ortega and Tomás Borge, who had met repeatedly with Americas Watch delegations in the past, have now refused to meet with the group's representatives, hoping to "lower the profile" of the problem.[59] Americas Watch has responded to these criticisms by pointing out that the Nicaraguan government had always believed Americas Watch to be a "responsible" group and had even proposed that "we should act as monitors of the human rights provisions of the various accords that constitute the Central America peace process."[60]

Americas Watch, in the heat of the *contra* aid debate, reported abuses in a way that effectively played down many Sandinista hu-

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man rights violations. Lino Hernandez believes this occurred because the group wanted to ensure that its reports couldn't be misused by advocates of *contra* aid in the United States. "They were taken in by a noble banner—that of putting an end to the war, putting an end to the policy of the North American government in this sense," he said.

However noble that banner may have been, it does not excuse the fact that Americas Watch seemed willing to give the government of Nicaragua the benefit of the doubt again and again while *contra* aid hung in the balance. Whatever Ronald Reagan said about the Sandinista government, and whatever his policy was, Americas Watch's responsibility was to the victims of abuse. To take on any other role is to betray the mandate that the human rights community has assumed. For their power to bring about change derives from the public's confidence that human rights organizations have no other objective than to speak out for the victims.

NOTES

1. Americas Watch, et al., *Human Rights Reports: Publications of Human Rights Watch*, undated brochure, p. 1.
2. Aryeh Neier, speech at Columbia University School of Law, November 20, 1986.
3. Americas Watch, *Human Rights in Nicaragua: 1985–1986*, March 1986, p. 4.
4. At the height of the *contra* aid debate Americas Watch was called one of the most effective opponents of aid to the *contras*. See John Judis, "Politicians Play *Contra* Pro and Con Games," *In These Times*, March 1986, p. 3.
5. *Human Rights in Nicaragua: 1985–1986*, p. 4.
6. Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign, *Big Red Diary 1986: Nicaragua! and Latin American Directory* (London: Pluto Press, 1985), p. 4 of directory.
7. Amnesty International, *Report 1984*, p. 4. Similar disclaimers are included in the group's other studies; see, for example, *Torture in the Eighties (London: Ammesty International Publications, 1984)*, p. 94.
8. *Human Rights in Nicaragua: 1985–1986*, p. 29.
9. Americas Watch, *Human Rights in Nicaragua: 1986*, February 1987, p. 7.
10. Americas Watch, *Human Rights in Nicaragua: Reagan, Rhetoric and Reality*, July 1985, p. 14.
11. Americas Watch, *Human Rights in Nicaragua*, April 1984, pp. 28–9.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Americas Watch, *Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua in 1987*, November 1987, p. 24.
14. William Branigin, "Patterns of Abuses Laid to Sandinistas' Detainees, Rights Groups Charge Torture, Oppressive Confinement," *Washington Post*, May 18, 1987. Branigin's story was apparently the source for Americas Watch information.
15. *Human Rights in Nicaragua*, April 1984, p. 4.
16. *Human Rights in Nicaragua: 1986*, p. 71.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Americas Watch, *On Human Rights in Nicaragua*, May 1982, p. 13.
19. *Human Rights in Nicaragua 1985–1986*, p. 29.
20. Martin Peretz, "Special Dispensations," *New Republic*, May 19, 1986, p. 43.
21. Juan Méndez, Letter to the *New Republic*, April 28, 1986. An edited version of this letter appeared in the June 16, 1986, edition on p. 6.
22. *Human Rights in Nicaragua: 1986*, pp. 72–3.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–1, 81–2.
25. Amnesty International, *Nicaragua: The Human Rights Record 1986–1989*, June 1989, p. 39.
26. *Human Rights in Nicaragua: Reagan, Rhetoric and Reality*, p. 19.
27. Letter from J.H. Burgers cited in Committee on International Human Rights, "The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment," *The Record* (Publication of the Bar Association of the City of New York, 1987), p. 239.
28. J. Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius, *The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Handbook on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*, (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), p. 118.

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29. Amnesty International, *Torture in the Eighties*, p. 15.
30. "New Regime, Old Methods," *Time*, January 24, 1983, p. 46.
31. Amnesty International, *Political Killings by Governments* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1983), p. 103.
32. *Human Rights in Nicaragua: 1986*, pp. 69–70.
33. *Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua in 1987*, p. 9.
34. Americas Watch, *Human Rights in Nicaragua: August 1987-August 1988*, August 1988, p. 2.
35. Comision Nacional de Promocion y Proteccion de los Derechos Humanos, *The Right to Life in Nicaragua: An Analysis of Chapter XI of the August 1988 Americas Watch last [sic] Report*, December 1988, p. 16.
36. Americas Watch, *The Killings in Northern Nicaragua*, November 1989, p. 1.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
38. *Human Rights in Nicaragua*, April 1984, p. 7.
39. *The Killings in Northern Nicaragua*, p. 10.
40. Americas Watch, *The Miskitos in Nicaragua: 1981–1984*, November 1984, p. 5.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
42. Americas Watch, *The Continuing Terror: Seventh Supplement to the Report on Human Rights in El Salvador*, September 1985, p. 60.
43. *The Miskitos in Nicaragua: 1981–1984*, pp. 15–6.
44. Americas Watch, press release to accompany *With the Miskitos in Honduras 1981–1984*, April 11, 1986, p. 2.
45. Americas Watch, *With the Miskitos in Honduras: 1981–1984*, p. 21.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
47. *Human Rights in Nicaragua: 1985–1986*, pp. 2–3, 62.
48. Julia Preston, "U.S. Finances Rights Group in Nicaragua," *Washington Post*, July 11, 1986.
49. In fact Sister Mary Hartman complained in an interview last spring that Americas Watch does not publish its reports in Spanish: "Our office spends weeks and weeks making translations of their long documents," she said.
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51. Americas Watch, *U.S. Reporting on Human Rights in El Salvador Methodology at Odds with Knowledge*, June 1982, p. 44.
52. Joan Desmond, "Puebla Institute Monitors Rights," *National Catholic Register*, July 26, 1987, p. 1.
53. *Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua in 1987*, p. 10.
54. For a review of Baldizon's treatment by human rights activists, see Fred Barnes, "The Sandinista Lobby," *New Republic*, January 20, 1986, p. 12.
55. *Human Rights in Nicaragua: 1986*, p. 7.
56. Lindsey Gruson, "Rights Monitors See Increase in Abuses by Sandinista Army," *New York Times*, April 16, 1989, p. 1. Americas Watch also reported on the abuses in some detail in its April 1989 newsletter.
57. *The Killing in Northern Nicaragua*, p. 24.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 17–8.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

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There to Stay

The U.S. and Latin America

Robert Kagan

IN THE UNITED States today, two opposite brands of escapism are forming a tacit alliance to shape U.S. policy in Latin America. The left-liberal view gained strength at the time of President Johnson's intervention in the Dominican Republic, but its origins date back at least to the beginning of the century. This view sees Latin America as a kind of Eden and the United States as destroying innocence and leaving sin in its trail. Mesmerized by Latin Americans shaking their fists at Yankee imperialism, eager from Vietnam days to find the United States guilty of transgressions abroad, the left-liberals see the solution and the salvation in disengagement. They would have the United States withdraw from the region, except for providing economic aid without imposing obligations on the recipients.

The conservative view, just now being fully articulated in the policy journals, is that Latin America is a pit of hell. American efforts to "civilize" the Latins are not only futile but unappreciated. Equally influenced by shaking fists, these conservatives see no allies in Latin America. "The two halves of the hemisphere," as Mark Falcoff put it recently, "have split and are drifting apart." Our aid is wasted, our efforts at nation-building hopeless. We should desist from involvement.

The common ground between these viewpoints is that the United States no longer has real interests in Latin America. The left-liberals believe we never had interests there—only imperial ambitions and United Fruit pulled us into a world where we did not belong. Until recently, the conservatives and the liberal anticommunists argued that the need to contain Soviet ambitions in the hemisphere gave the United States at least some interests in the region. The Panama Canal had to be kept open and out of the wrong hands. Soviet missiles in Cuba provided a stark and continuing justification for American involvement. While the Left dismissed these concerns as exaggerations meant to justify imperialist behavior, for most of the Cold War, containment of Soviet "adventurism" in Latin America was successful politically as the strategic justification for American intervention in all its forms—from spending billions on economic and military aid to covert action to armed intervention.

The Soviet Union's retreat and possible collapse under Mikhail Gorbachev, however, has begun to undermine this most potent justification for U.S. involvement in Latin America—for conservatives and liberals alike. Twenty years ago, Carlos Fuentes speculated that one day Latin America would

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become "a *useless* entity in the eyes of imperialism." "Traditionally," he wrote, "we have been exploited societies. Soon we will not even be that: it will no longer be necessary to exploit us." In the Gorbachev era, even conservative anticommunists now predict that, in the words of Irving Kristol, Latin America will slide over the horizon of American interests. Using a word traditionally associated with left-liberal noninterventionism, Mark Falcoff argues that with the end of the Cold War, the United States can now safely "disengage" from Latin America.

For many conservatives, there is clearly a pleasant irony in fulfilling Fuentes's leftist prophecy. After decades spent fighting liberals over the need to play a role in Latin American affairs, refuting charges of "imperialism" by Fuentes and others, and suffering the insults of a procession of Latin leaders—dictators, revolutionaries, and democrats alike—these conservatives are now more than ready to declare Latin America a "useless entity." If the Cold War is over, they argue, at least one benefit should be to relieve ourselves of the thankless task of "nation-building" in a region that lacks secure foundations for the structures we help erect.

The American desire to remove Latin America from our list of important, or even marginal, interests is not new: Kennedy-era liberal anticommunists, old Rockefeller Republicans, and some conservatives in the Reagan years aside, the American foreign policy establishment has preferred since the 1960s to avoid Latin America, leaving it for the "ideologues" and politicians to squabble over. In the State Department, Pentagon, and National Security Council, Latin America stands only ahead of Africa as the recipient of senior officials' time and concern. Except for the occasional invasion, Latin American matters are to be handled at the lowest possible level while senior officials attend in minute detail to serious issues in serious countries. In academia and the scholarly world, foreign policy "realists," defense strategists, and other "big thinkers" have left the field of Latin America largely to a bevy of experts too far to the Left even for most Democrats. The old adage that the American people will do anything for Latin America except think about it is certainly true of the intellectual and policy elite.

The latest round of denigrating Latin America's importance, however, comes at a strange moment: just when President Bush decided to send the largest military force since Vietnam into that very region. Falcoff wrote at the end of last year that "with the end of the Cold War" only Mexico would "command attention," but Bush has had to send his troops further south. Even this irony is familiar. Since the beginning of the Cold War at least, the theoretical discussion of U.S. interests in Latin America has often stood in stark contrast to actual American behavior in the region. Either American policy-makers and intellectuals don't know what an "interest" is, or America doesn't act according to its interests. The latter explanation is always enticing, but for the sake of argument let's explore the former as it pertains to Latin America.

The Exercise of Will

WITH THE INVASION of Panama, the United States has now sent its troops into combat in Latin American and Caribbean lands more than a dozen times in less than a hundred years, at least eight times in significant invasions and occupations. Americans risk blood and treasure in the region, on average, at least once every ten years, twice in the last seven. In addition to the troops, we have spent billions of dollars, sent thousands of advisers, authorized extensive meddling by the CIA, and dispatched countless proconsuls to manage the internal affairs of Latin nations—including, most recently, the respected Ambassador Deane Hinton to Panama.

A man from Mars, or a historian looking back from the perspective of the next century, would conclude that from the 1890s to the 1990s, the United States took Latin America very seriously indeed. Europe apart,

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in no other region of the world did the United States play such a consistent and conspicuous military and political role over the stretch of those hundred years.

While the reasons for this constant American involvement have changed over time, fear of foreign intervention has usually been the stated rationale. The Monroe Doctrine and the "Roosevelt Corollary" of 1904 proposed to prevent European colonial powers from exploiting endemic instability in Latin America to gain a foothold. Another Roosevelt worried about the Nazis; his successors, about international communism backed by the Soviet Union. In theory, the strategic issue has never been Latin America itself, therefore, only the possibility that some hostile or competitive power—the Spanish, French, British, Germans, or Soviets—could gain strategic advantage in America's backyard.

American involvement in the hemisphere, however, transcended each of these specific threats. Foreign enemies have come and gone, and come back again, but the American interest in stability has remained, as has our opposition to chaotic change, lawlessness, and violent upheaval. Perhaps the prospect of foreign meddling has never long vanished from our thoughts or our perception of our interests in Latin America.

Yet fear of foreign intervention has been only one of America's concerns in Latin America, and not always the most important. For over a hundred years, American policy in Latin America has also been governed by forces, emotions, ideals, and interests, both real and perceived, that have nothing to do with powers outside the hemisphere and everything to do with the relationships of power within it. In fact, American involvement in Latin America through the years has been shaped by realities of power that Thucydides would have well understood. The historical weakness of Latin American states has created and perpetuated a vacuum of power in the region. As the closest great power, the United States has ventured or been drawn in to fill that vacuum from a variety of motives.

When American power grew unchallenged in the hemisphere, so did ambitions and expectations. Because their country was strong, the American people could satisfy imperial ambitions, but in the end they did not seek empire or colonies. Instead successive American leaders sought to ensure that this hemisphere would be one place where Americans could travel and do business free from arbitrary power, economic warfare, or threat of violence. America's ability to create such a climate near its borders was greater, its tolerance for disruption and interference smaller, than in most other parts of the world. Infinitely more benevolent than the Athenians at Melos, the United States nevertheless generally obeyed their ancient dictum: "Of the gods we believe and of men we know, they rule where they can."

Americans, therefore, have historically been intolerant of both indigenous and foreign threats to the safe and lucrative order they desired in Latin America. What they might need to tolerate in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, they would not tolerate in Latin America. The history of mankind offers few examples of a great power that takes no interest in the weak states on its borders, either as a place to exercise its own will, or to prevent others from exercising theirs. It would be a peculiar form of American exceptionalism to assert that the United States alone could ignore a power vacuum in its part of the world, and history has shown that the United States is not exceptional in this respect. The invasion of Panama, for example, suggests that we have not yet entered the millennium.

Democracy and Dictators

THE UNITED STATES, however, is exceptional in this respect: It is not simply a great power, but a great power with a democratic conscience. It is this fact that often affects its behavior in the world. The conscience of Americans has created two contradictory impulses in Latin America, one

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that inhibits us from greater meddling, one that constantly draws us in.

Every exercise of American power in the hemisphere has been accompanied or followed by embarrassment or guilt caused by the naked display of strength. Vocal Latin opposition to American intervention has made the United States hesitate, and on occasion check its meddling impulses or at least confine them to covert actions. It has been a long time since American leaders did not pay public homage to the principle of nonintervention in Latin America, even as they felt compelled to ignore it in practice.

But the United States has not been alone in having mixed feelings about nonintervention. Indeed, if the people of Latin America were as united in their anti-Americanism and noninterventionism as the American Left asserts and the Right now accepts, the United States might have played a much less intrusive role in the region. Yet for every Latin group that denounces U.S. intervention, there has been, and will be, a group to invite it. Few in Latin America announce their support for American intervention, but everyone knows who does and who does not seek and benefit from our action. El Salvador's President Duarte kissed the American flag during one of his last visits to the White House. Grenadians and Panamanians openly celebrated the American contribution to their freedom and independence.

The Left used to take pleasure in asserting that only right-wing dictators welcomed American help against their progressive enemies, yet no one called more vigorously for American intervention in Nicaragua in 1978 and 1979 than Carlos Andres Perez, then and now president of Venezuela and spokesman for the democratic Left in Latin America. President Alan Garcia of Peru, who recently protested the loudest against the invasion of Panama, was not long ago grateful for American "intervention" against a threatened military coup. Other recent beneficiaries of U.S. political and military support have been President Cerezo of Guatemala; Duarte's Christian Democratic party in El Salvador; various Nicaraguan political parties and leaders in the days of Somoza, in the days before Somoza, and now under the Sandinistas; the Chilean opposition; the elected government of Panama and many of the people of Panama. These Latins have been pleased to accept American help for themselves and to overlook it and even denounce it for others. The hypocritical quality of some Latin pronouncements provides ammunition for American noninterventionists at both ends of the ideological spectrum, but Latin America's genuinely mixed feelings about the northern superpower have helped keep the United States in Latin America, rather than out.

If the democratic conscience of the U.S. has nevertheless caused us to hesitate or hide our intervention, it has also affected the goals of our involvement in Latin America. Whenever the American people or their representatives in Congress and the White House turn their attention to Latin America, they concern themselves not just with stopping communism, or kicking out the Spanish, or protecting United Fruit, but with bringing better government and a better life to the peoples of this hemisphere. This impulse has too frequently played a role in shaping American policy only to be written off as a temporary fancy. It is a fact of life. Perhaps the United States has tried to make a virtue out of the necessity of involvement. Perhaps Americans succumb to what the realists deride as "missionary zeal," or what in more modern terms American policy-makers call "our commitment to supporting democracy around the world." But a central element of the order the United States has sought to protect and foster in Latin America has consistently included democratic government and economic prosperity—like our own.

If ideological and idealistic concerns have had more influence on U.S. policy in Latin America than in any other region of the world, one reason is that Latin Americans, more than any other "Third World" peoples, have themselves proclaimed their desire to emulate American democracy. Latin leaders have long professed to take seriously the

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common "New World" heritage, even if in practice they have been unable, or unwilling, to fulfill these ambitions. The United States has understandably taken an idealistic, at times emotional, interest in the success of American-style government or in the protection of American-style "human rights" in a region so close to home.

Like most such emotional attachments, this concern for the political and economic health of Latin America is not necessarily lessened by the failure of democratic ideals to take hold or of economies to prosper. Latin democracy was at its nadir in the 1970s when the democratizing strategies of first Carter and then Reagan were born. The result of those strategies was the transformation of Latin America from a predominantly authoritarian to an overwhelmingly democratic region. Americans are unlikely to turn a blind eye to the fate of democracy at a time when it is sweeping the globe, and when Latin America, though far from healthy, is more democratic than ever in its history.

American policy-makers and analysts may want to measure American interests according to a prescribed set of economic and military calculations. They may deny that their countrymen are concerned with democracy in Latin America, or wish that it weren't so. But if American idealism concerning Latin America is a national neurosis, history suggests it is incurable. Given the disparities in power, the ability of the United States to act without fear of serious material harm to itself, and the opportunities, illusory or not, to alleviate suffering by helping the better forces against the worse, we may not be able to rid ourselves of the notion that we should try to help, and that we have a responsibility to do so. These emotional attachments and feelings of responsibility have deepened and perpetuated our involvement, which in turn has given the United States an interest in Latin America.

There is more to American support for democracy than idealism. It was once an article of faith among conservatives and realists that while democracy was a worthy goal for the United States to pursue when possible, it was also something of a luxury. American interests in stability and the prevention of radicalism were well enough served by allied autocrats. Indeed, it was widely agreed that dictators were more secure and reliable allies. As George Kennan put the case to Dean Acheson, "Where the concepts and traditions of popular government are too weak to absorb successfully the intensity of communist attack, then we must concede that harsh governmental measures of repression may be the only answer; that these measures may have to proceed from regimes whose origins and methods would not stand the test of American concepts of democratic procedure." Latin democrats, moreover, were wedded to the rhetoric of nonintervention, to "democratic socialism," not to mention simple anti-Americanism, while the dictators usually acted like allies, speaking out for the United States, capitalism, and American values, and voting correctly in the UN and the OAS.

The dictators, however, ultimately failed, despite Kennan's faith in them. They proved not to be reliable bulwarks against instability and radicalism. In part they failed because we, their allies, proved not so hardheaded as Kennan. When not only communist guerrillas, but the mass of the people rose up against repression, the United States found itself unable to support the tyrannies. In the more dramatic cases of Cuba and Nicaragua, both the dictators and the United States bungled what had become inevitable transitions away from authoritarianism. In those moments, the dictators were no longer an antidote to communism. In truth, they had become the communists' best friends and the Americans' worst enemies.

At least four American administrations, two of them belatedly, arrived at the conclusion that American intervention on the side of democrats and military reformers was a better defense against communism and instability than "nonintervention" on the side of dictators. It should be even more apparent in 1990 that however weak, inefficient, and frus-

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trating the infant democracies may be, however precarious their survival, it is dictatorship that inevitably breeds instability in this populist era and democracy that stands the best chance of long-term survival.

It is natural for the United States to be deeply involved in this hemisphere, and as part of that involvement to seek to build and protect an order where democratic principles—which most Americans believe are universal if not universally respected—can be upheld. The far less moralistic Athenians rarely left a conquered Greek city without first replacing its oligarchs with democrats. The United States has rarely intervened in a Latin American nation without trying to leave a stable democracy behind when it withdrew, no matter what the original cause for involvement. Sentiment and interest both play a role.

The fact that this task of nation-building in Latin America is difficult and frustrating, perhaps even impossible, would be more pertinent if there were a practical alternative. But the choices for the United States—withdrawal, nonintervention, support for and acquiescence in the rule of dictators—are proven failures. The United States cannot disengage from Latin America, and it cannot engage successfully except on the side of democracy. This would be true if there had never been a Soviet Union and will remain true in the decades ahead. The question is not whether American interests in Latin America are as great as in Europe or Japan. What matters is that we recognize the interests we do have, and that we are prepared to protect them. The long history of American involvement in Latin America, the strong emotional ties to the region, the influence of ideology, and simple proximity all make Latin America an interest of the United States that cannot be wished away, and that we ignore to our detriment.

The Most Recent Lesson

PANAMA ALONE should teach us our lesson. The invasion of that country was a successful and proper use of American power. But American *policy* in Panama over the past four years was a failure, a textbook example of how wars that are neither necessary nor inevitable break out despite the wishes of those who start them. Fortunately for the United States, overwhelming power in the region makes up for many errors.

For four years, the United States ignored, even denied, its interests in Panama. The prevailing opinion in both the Reagan and Bush administrations, particularly in the Pentagon, was that American interests were not harmed if the leader of Panama was a military dictator; nor did it affect our interests if he fired presidents, stole elections, corrupted the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) and played with drug dealers. After all, the American mission in Panama was to defend the canal. The only interests the military clearly recognized in Panama were the sea lines of communication and the bases to protect them.

The American people, however, leading or being led by their elected representatives, perceived interests in Panama unrelated to the canal. Angered by the dictator's involvement in drugs and appalled by the beatings his thugs inflicted on opposition political candidates, people led, or were led by, their politicians into an increasingly open and vocal confrontation with Noriega. Responding to the growing clamor, two consecutive American presidents publicly called for General Noriega's ouster.

Despite their rhetoric, however, the two Presidents did not authorize actions to fulfill their proclaimed goals, and the military opposed using force to accomplish them. The gap between rhetoric and action grew wider, because while the domestic political stakes were high, American interests were still deemed by senior officials to be low.

It is reasonable to assume that Noriega decided over time that the United States was a blowhard and a paper tiger. He began probing the limits of American tolerance, shedding Panamanian blood before American cameras, annulling an internationally-supervised election, and welcoming the soli-

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darity of the Sandinistas, the *bête noir* of the two Republican administrations. The United States did nothing, failing even to win support for "multilateral" action in the OAS.

Noriega tested the American military as well, letting his soldiers harass and beat American soldiers, inciting literally hundreds of small confrontations as American troops went about their normal duties as permitted by treaty. The American military at first took no action, kept publicity of these incidents to a minimum, and tried to negotiate peace with their colleagues in the PDF. Then our military tried to show strength, but without firing its weapons. Soldiers travelled in armed convoys to all areas permitted under the treaty, even those rarely visited, to show resolve and an unwillingness to be bullied.

Noriega was not impressed. The American news media revealed successive covert operations—ranging from "psychological operations" to coup-plotting. The fine points of what the Senate Intelligence Committee authorized were irrelevant to Noriega. He knew the United States wanted him out, but he was increasingly confident that the United States lacked the nerve to do the job itself. As for coup-plotting, Noriega was prepared to take his chances with his own troops.

Imagine the conclusion Noriega must have reached when the coup finally came, and the United States stood back, unwilling to commit forces in any meaningful way. After that, Noriega must have become convinced of American weakness—as Hitler said of the French and British before he invaded Poland: "I saw them at Munich. They are worms."

Noriega, like Hitler, miscalculated. He declared the United States and Panama to be in a state of war. His troops felt emboldened first to beat up one soldier, threaten an American woman with sexual abuse, then kill another soldier. It hardly mattered whether Noriega ordered these actions personally. He made them possible.

So, in a different way, did the United States. Two successive administrations misled Noriega, because they misled themselves. They assumed a higher American tolerance for a "tin-pot" dictator than in fact existed. They sent signals of indifference that anyone might have misread, but which Noriega, a far less clever statesman than his mentor, Torrijos, took as an invitation to heightened belligerence.

President Bush and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, are reported to have reacted viscerally to descriptions of the threats of sexual violence made against the American woman by her Panamanian captor. Some critics have belittled that visceral response as a rationale for a full-scale American invasion of Panama. Yet at that moment the President and General Powell, emotional or not, must have realized that Noriega might do anything to the United States and its citizens—so completely convinced had he become that the United States would never do anything to him. At that point, there was no way to end the cycle with finesse, with negotiations, with the OAS, or even with coups. All American actions short of the definitive use of force would be seen by Noriega as weakness and fear. If the United States had any interests at all to protect in Panama, right down to the very lives of American citizens, it had no choice but to invade.

There were many ways for the United States to have avoided falling into such an "invade-or-leave" trap. We could have tried to capture Noriega during the last coup. He could have been kidnapped on other occasions. Such ideas were deemed "reckless" by the Pentagon, or they were considered improper and illegal actions for the United States. All such criticisms have since been trampled by the large invasion eventually required to accomplish the same goals.

A policy that effectively pursued U.S. interests in Panama would have begun much earlier. The United States could have put more serious and sustained pressure on Noriega years ago to begin a nonviolent transition from power, pressure that could have been backed by the threat of U.S. force if he did not comply. The United States could

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have underlined the sincerity of its commitments in a variety of ways, not least of which was to respond to *any* harassment by the PDF with a convincing show of force. There can be little doubt that democracy in Panama would have served American interests better than Noriega's rule. Democratically-elected leaders rarely deal in drugs, and they don't stay in office forever. Even a flawed Panamanian democracy would never have been invaded by the United States.

The failure to take these less costly actions was not due only to post-Vietnam political fear and military timidity. The United States also failed to understand its own interests, in a manner that has been repeated many times and will be repeated again in the future if our leading policy intellectuals continue to underestimate our interests in Latin America. The Panamanian case is instructive because the Soviet Union was decidedly not the issue. If the canal was threatened, it was by a Panamanian, not a European. But even the canal was not the issue. Indeed, Noriega was fully aware that the United States would act without hesitation if he threatened the canal. That much we had made clear. On the day he declared a state of war with the United States, Noriega told his followers, "We, the Panamanians, will sit along the banks of the canal to watch the dead bodies of our enemies pass by, but we would never destroy the canal." Somehow Noriega came to believe that the United States valued the canal—but not the lives and well-being of its citizens. When he acted on that belief, brutalizing his own people and eventually ours, he reminded Americans—or, more precisely, American leaders and policy-makers—of all those historic emotional and practical concerns that lay unnoticed at the foundation of our involvement in Latin America. The confrontation with Noriega began because he was a dictator and an international criminal. It ended when he pushed to the limits of America's seemingly infinite tolerance. We invaded then because we could, and because if we intended to stay in Panama and demand conformity to certain minimal rules of international behavior, we had no choice.

America's error was in failing to foresee the inevitable chain of events—not just Noriega's actions, but much more importantly, our own. In Panama under Reagan and Bush, as in Nicaragua under Carter and Reagan, and Cuba under Eisenhower, the United States, and particularly its foreign policy experts, ignored, denied, and put off thinking about American interests until it was too late. They neglected to realize not only that the United States had interests in the region, but what those interests were.

There to Stay

"THERE ARE CERTAIN geographical considerations which impose upon us a very special interest as to how. . . these nations fulfill the responsibilities which go with sovereignty and independence," Henry Stimson said of Central America in 1927. The United States may now take a less paternalistic attitude toward Latin America than in those days. But if our actions are any indication, whatever our rhetoric, we have not drifted far from Stimson's perception of our interests. As we look to the future, whether the Cold War has ended or not, we have to expect that the same problems that have preoccupied us over the past hundred years in Latin America will persist. Poverty, instability, lawlessness, violence, and tyranny will continue to threaten our interests at some level and draw us into the region, whether we like it or not.

If the Soviet Union goes the way of Spain, France, and England, some new power may one day arise to take its place as our rival and competitor. Moreover, there are forces in Latin America itself that can threaten U.S. interests as much as Noriega did. We have seen alliances form between Latin groups with little in common except their opposition to the order historically supported by the United States. Whether these alliances between drug dealers, guerrilla groups, and military dictators grow to

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threaten us depends not on fate, but on whether the United States discourages, or, by its inaction, encourages them to test the limits of our tolerance. If, in their struggle against us, they turn to terrorism or piracy, will our response be to withdraw all Americans from the region?

Latin communism, for instance, will not die a quiet Eastern European death. The lost ideological confidence in Moscow has not yet fully translated into Spanish in Havana, Managua, San Salvador, or Lima. Marxism-Leninism in Latin America has a life of its own. It was not meant to bring healthy economies, but to topple oligarchs, trample the bourgeoisie, and above all throw out the Americans. And the weapons of guerrilla war and terrorism can be bought on the international arms market and captured from soldiers.

Today the United States is involved in a large land war in El Salvador. To the degree we make light of our interests there and understate the dangers of defeat, we draw closer to that defeat, and closer to the limit of our tolerance for communist success in Central America.

Today we edge deeper into the drug wars in Columbia, Bolivia, and Peru. Those problems involve more than carrier battle groups patrolling far off the South American coastline. We now have, as in the past, a stake in the political health of those countries, in their systems of justice, in their armies and police. Our involvement, our money, our trainers, our advice will help determine their futures, and their futures will help determine our success or failure in the drug war.

History, as well as geography, is destiny. In Latin America our responsibility for present conditions, although not as great as the Left would claim, is long and deep. Latin America may be unmanageable, but we have a long history of trying to manage it and the marks we have left are indelible. In Nicaragua alone, the United States shares responsibility for the rise of Somoza, the fall of Somoza, the rise of the Sandinistas, and now, it would seem, their fall and replacement by pro-U.S. moderates; in Chile, for the fall of Allende, the rise of Pinochet, and the fall of Pinochet. Much happens in Latin America beyond the control of the United States, but little happens in Latin America without the United States playing some role, even if that role is to do nothing. There is no neutrality, no disinterested behavior. As Carlos Rangel once noted, "However Washington reacts to a Latin-American crisis, its position will be a factor in determining the future course of events, even if it decided to stay strictly neutral."

The intimate role of the United States, for good or ill, in the evolution of Latin politics and society cannot be conveniently ignored out of the liberal's guilt or the conservative's frustration over the results so far achieved. To argue, as Mark Falcoff does, that the North and the South of this hemisphere no longer share a "common historical destiny" and that they are "drifting apart" both washes America's hands of its role in shaping Latin America's present and suggests the moral acceptability, and the practical capability, of extricating the Unites States from any role in Latin America's future. It ignores, as well, the choices made by Latin Americans in Chile, Panama, El Salvador, and now Nicaragua, for Western democracy over tyrannies, both traditional and imported.

We will be ill-prepared to protect those interests we have in Latin America if we stand on our southern shore waiting for the southern half of the hemisphere to drift over the horizon.

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Supply-Side Demography

Karl Zinsmeister

FOR MORE THAN two decades, population control groups have waged a powerful political and philosophical campaign to advance the proposition that a continued rise in human numbers is one of the world's gravest problems. Popular concern took root in 1968, when Professor Paul Ehrlich wrote a best-selling book in which he described population growth as a "bomb," and claimed that during the 1970s it would "explode," causing hundreds of millions of deaths, leading to war and violence, and destroying the planet's ability to support life.

An equally apocalyptic view was expressed five years later by Robert McNamara, then president of the World Bank:

> The greatest single obstacle to the economic and social advancement of the majority of the peoples in the underdeveloped world is rampant population growth. . . . The threat of unmanageable population pressures is very much like the threat of nuclear war. . . . Both threats can and will have catastrophic consequences unless they are dealt with rapidly.

A large international apparatus of population control groups has promoted the idea that we are in the midst of a runaway crisis. Population growth, these groups maintain, is a major cause of poverty, starvation, pollution, unemployment, and political tension today; extreme measures are called for. The United Nations and the World Bank have made population control a central part of their work. Public opinion has also been strongly influenced. Polls show that much of the public in the Western world believes mankind is darkly threatened by current population growth. Indeed, this view has become so strong that until very recently it was considered intellectual heresy to question it publicly.

But in the last few years that has begun to change as an expanding revisionist school of population studies has taken root. Research by economists, demographers, and social historians has shown that much of the alleged harm from population growth has turned out to be nonexistent and that population change has often been used as a scapegoat for problems that actually have other sources. Revisionists point out that it is not slowed population growth that brings social prosperity, but rather social prosperity that brings slower population rise. The result: A great, new population debate is now underway.

What brought about this turnaround? Why is it that the last decade's conventional wisdom has suddenly been called into question? Three reasons stand out.

First, there was the shock of reality itself. As new data on population growth and its

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effects came in over the last decade or so, it was clear that the dire predictions of the "population explosionists" had failed, and failed utterly, to come true. There were no population wars in the 1970s. There were famines but they were not population famines. The exponential growth and predicted calamities just didn't take place. On the contrary, there were many pleasant surprises.

For instance, Paul Ehrlich wrote in 1968 that it was a "fantasy" to think that India—which he cites as a paradigm of overpopulation—could feed itself anytime in the near future, "if ever." One participant at the Second International Conference on the War on Hunger in 1968 argued that India's 1967–68 grain production of approximately 95 million tons represented the maximum possible level. Yet today India's annual grain production is over 150 million tons, and the country has become a net *exporter* of food. The fact that the quality of life has improved so markedly and so rapidly even in India—which, until recently, was referred to as an international "basket case"—suggests that those who argue that production can never keep up with growing numbers of people do not appreciate how quickly new technology and improved economic structures can convert formerly "redundant" people into productive resources.

Another fact the traditional population theorists did not fathom was how fast the world was changing demographically when they made their dire predictions. As recently as 1970, women of the less developed world were bearing an average of 6 children each. Today, that average is down to 3.7 children. When you consider that about 2.2 children would produce *stable* populations in the less developed countries (that is, each generation merely replacing its parents, with a small factor for childhood mortality, etc.) then this remarkable fact can be seen: *In just the last fifteen years or so, the less developed world moved three-fifths of the way toward a fertility rate that yields "zero population growth."*

So great was the change, it now appears, that the official United Nations' estimates of world population in the year 2000, put together at the end of the 1960s, will be more than 20 percent too high.

To be sure, it should be noted that the less developed countries did not all share equally in the fertility fall. Fertility in Asia dropped very rapidly, while in parts of Africa it has remained high. But, after all, it was in Asia (with 2.8 billion people, almost 60 percent of the world's total) that the population problem was supposed to be the worst. Africa, the partial exception to the worldwide downward fertility trend, is still a relatively sparsely inhabited continent with a total of 550 million residents and low overall population density, even excluding desert areas.

ANOTHER FACTUAL development often overlooked by population alarmists is that, contrary to popular claims, the standard of living in most of the Third World has been rapidly improving, not declining, during the last few decades—the very decades when population was growing fastest. The Third World infant mortality rate has fallen from 125 deaths per 1,000 births in 1960, to 69 in 1986; life expectancy at birth has risen incredibly—from 42 years to 61 years; adult literacy rates in the Third World doubled in 20 years; the number of physicians per 100,000 people went up 2.5 times; and the calorie supply per capita rose from just 87 percent of healthy daily requirements to 102 percent. The claim that rapid population growth vetoes social progress runs head-on into strong countervailing evidence from the last 25 years.

The second major factor that led many to question the prevailing orthodoxy was the serious human rights violations that followed in the wake of the population control alarms of the 1960s and 1970s.

In 1976 the Indian government declared, "Where a state legislature . . . decides that the time is ripe and it is necessary to pass legislation for compulsory sterilization, it may do so." In the six months following that ruling, over six million Indians were sterilized, many thousands forcibly. That episode inspired such fierce resistance among Indians

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that the government of Indira Gandhi was eventually brought down.

Even before the government issued this public justification, coercion in the name of population control had been rife in India. The distinguished demographer Richard Easterlin reports that when he was a member of a United Nations Family Planning Mission to India in 1969, program administrators in Bombay told him how strong-arm tactics were used in the slum districts to assure that government vasectomy targets were met. When he expressed concern at this, a surprised official answered, "Surely, the end justifies the means."

Indian authorities were not the only ones who held this view. In November 1976—after the forced sterilization program had already been unveiled—World Bank president Robert McNamara paid a personal visit to the Indian family planning minister "to congratulate him for the Indian Government's political will and determination in popularizing family planning."

An even more massive campaign of intimidation and violence in the name of population control has been, and to a considerable extent continues to be, conducted in China. In the early 1980s reports began to reach the West that the Chinese government was exerting enormous and often brutal pressure on couples to limit their family size to one child. After a graphic series of articles was published by the *Washington Post* in January 1985, American authorities could no longer ignore the evidence. Upon returning from a four-year assignment in China, when he was finally free to publish his findings without risking expulsion, correspondent Michael Weisskopf filed his report:

> What emerges from more than 200 interviews spaced over three years with officials, doctors, peasants and workers in almost two-thirds of China's 29 local jurisdictions is the story of an all-out government siege against ancient family traditions and. . . reproductive habits. . . .
>
> Nowhere is this dark side of family planning more evident than in Dongguan. . . in southern China. Here, abortion posses scoured the countryside in the spring of 1981, rounding up women in rice paddies and thatched-roof houses. Expectant mothers, including many in their last trimester, were trussed, handcuffed, herded into hog cages and delivered by the truckload to the operating tables of rural clinics. . . .
>
> Any mother who becomes pregnant again without receiving official authorization after having one child is required to have an abortion, and the incidence of such operations is stunning—53 million from 1979 to 1984, according to the Ministry of Public Health. . . .
>
> Nor is the timing of abortion usually a factor. Many are performed in the last trimester of pregnancy—100,000 in Guangdong last year, or 20 percent of the province's total abortions—and some as late as the ninth month. . . .
>
> In the Inner Mongolian capital of Hohhot . . . hospital doctors practice what amounts to infanticide by a different name. . . . After inducing labor . . . doctors routinely smash the baby's skull with forceps as it emerges from the womb. In some cases . . . newborns are killed by injecting formaldehyde into the soft spot of the head. . . .
>
> China's family-planning work is backed by the full organizational might of the Communist Party, which extends its influence to every factory, neighborhood and village. Every Chinese belongs to a "unit"—workplace or rural governing body—and every unit has a birth control committee headed by party officials.
>
> Few unauthorized pregnancies can elude the tight supervision of birth control activists, a phalanx of female members of the party . . . who are deputized by local officials to monitor the reproductive lives of Chinese couples. . . .
>
> They keep detailed records of every woman's menstrual cycle, checking to make sure of regularity. . . .
>
> A positive test spells trouble for any woman who already has a child. She is urged to have an abortion, offered a cash bonus and time off from work as a reward. If she refuses, the pressure mounts.
>
> First come the tactics of persuasion played out in what is known euphemistically as 'heart-to-heart chats.'
>
> If she holds her ground, the talks intensi-

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fy. . . . Now the pregnant woman is criticized for resisting and warned of the penalty for unauthorized birth, which varies from place to place but can include loss of farmland, fines of up to $1,000, firing from factory jobs, public censure and the denial of land, medical benefits, grain rations and educational opportunities for the unplanned child. . . .

Meanwhile, the meetings go on, often all the way up to the point of delivery. Where talking fails, force often prevails.

The Indian and Chinese programs are extreme examples of the human rights violations carried out in the name of population control in a number of countries. What is worse, international authorities of the population control movement have presented, and continue to present, rationalizations and apologies for harsh measures of these sorts. In 1983, the United Nations awarded its first UN medal for family planning achievement. Its joint winners: the heads of the Chinese and Indian programs.

American population control groups continue to praise the Chinese program. They fought to overturn Congress's 1985 decision to end U.S. foreign aid to the United Nations' Family Planning Agency (UNFPA) because of UNFPA's close collaboration in the Chinese brutality. In late 1989, a foreign aid bill restoring UNFPA funds was passed, only to be vetoed by President Bush.

The sad fact is that it is not merely officials of totalitarian governments who are willing to see these delicate family decisions transferred from the private to the public realm. Traditionally, international family planning efforts supported by the United States aimed to do only one thing: extend human choice by bringing modern supplies and services to persons who wanted but could not afford them. Few persons would object to such an effort. Recently, however, important parts of the international family planning apparatus have begun to veer dangerously *beyond* voluntary family planning, toward social control and coercion. In a widely cited 1984 report, the population division of the World Bank—an institution which is completely dependent upon American sponsorship—presented a mainstream rationalization for taking the voluntary family-planning movement a step further, into active efforts by national governments to suppress reproduction through financial, political, and social pressures. "Ensuring that people have only as many children as they want . . . might not be enough," the World Bank report asserted. Where "privately desired" childbearing exceeds the "socially desired" level, it claimed, government ought to step in. Readers with a sense for *realpolitik* will detect in this logic a chilling door-opening for massive state intrusion into the most sensitive of human prerogatives.

In addition to the problem of making such fundamental decisions for people without their consent, there is a deeper philosophical issue. The argument is often made by advocates of state-dictated population control that the life of certain Asian or African or Latin American peasants is miserable, and that we who understand cannot allow them to perpetuate their misery. Population revisionists, on the other hand, start with the belief that there is dignity and potential in every human life, that even an existence considered deprived by modern standards can carry great meaning and pleasure. Population revisionists believe it is very dangerous to construct a generalized, systematic argument the bottom line of which is that humans are economic, social, and ecological nuisances—in short that people are a kind of pollution.

So, sharp changes in demographic conditions as well as worrisome human rights trends helped spark some of the new thinking on population. But probably even more important in reshaping the debate has been a third factor: the influence of new research and empirical analysis on the actual results of population growth. Over the last decade the prevailing shibboleths about alleged economic and social ill-effects have been examined, one by one. Most of them have been found wanting.

For instance, it was claimed in the 1960s that the presence of children in a society

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would depress savings and investment. It was also argued that population growth would have major negative effects—slowing income growth, increasing unemployment, and deterring technological innovation. None of these assertions has proven true.

WHEN THE population scare was in full bloom, it was claimed that population growth reduced educational attainment—which turned out to be absolutely false. Population rise was said to be responsible for the growth of Third World mega-cities. In truth, the rural to urban shift has been shown to spring primarily from other sources. It was asserted that population was the major cause of world hunger. But population level has had almost nothing to do with the famines of recent decades. Experts agree that those famines have been, almost without exception, the result of civil strife, of political and economic disruptions.

Through most of the 1970s those who saw population as a problem insisted that less was always better. After all, more people meant more mouths to feed, more feet to shoe, more schools to build. More people, in short, meant more trouble.

Plenty of activists still think that way. But many scientists have changed their minds, believing it is a mistake to talk of population as an undifferentiated global problem. What matters is not some abstract total number of people in existence, but where they are and how they are living. There are certain countries with ample population and others with too few people.

It does not matter to the people of Zaire—which suffers underdevelopment partly because in many parts of the country there are not enough people to support an efficient infrastructure—that there are 97 million people in Nigeria. Zaire has certain needs and Nigeria has certain needs, and it is nonsense to lump them together under the simple heading of "overpopulated Africa."

Related to this is another insight of the new demographic thinking: The number of people which a given area can "support" is subject to constant change, and is related to the way those people are economically and socially organized. There are 120 million people jammed onto the rocky islands of Japan. Yet, because of their well-structured and highly-productive society, they are among the richest and longest-lived people in the world. If you had asked the Algonquian Indians who inhabited the island of Manhattan in the 1700s how many people they thought it could support, they might have told you it was already full. Holland—which few people would describe as being unable to support its population—has a population density of 354 people per square kilometer; India, which we are told is one of the most overpopulated nations in the world today, contains 228 people per square kilometer.

There are many other such interesting contrasts. The United States is the richest nation in the world, and is sparsely populated with 25 people per square kilometer. West Germany is the second richest nation, and is densely populated—246 people per square kilometer. South Korea is even more densely populated—409 citizens per square kilometer—yet it is also one of the fastest-growing countries on earth. A very slow-growing and very poor nation is Bolivia—thinly populated with just 6 persons per square kilometer. The poorest nation in the world is Ethiopia. It is also one of the more sparsely populated—35 Ethiopians per square kilometer.

In other words, there are dozens of lightly populated countries that are poor, dirty, and hungry. And there are plenty of countries with large, dense populations that are prosperous and attractive. This is not to argue that density is an advantage, but rather that the number of people is not the critical variable in determining these things.

There is no such thing as a "proper" number of people—economic success can be achieved in both sparsely and densely populated countries. Revisionist demographers like to point out that each baby comes equipped not only with a mouth, but also with two hands and a brain. People not only

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consume, they produce—food, capital, even resources. The trick is to organize society so that each person will be an asset and not a burden. In a country whose economy is a mess even one additional baby can be an economic liability. But if the country is structured in such a way as to allow that child to labor and think creatively, he becomes an asset.

In short, people are a valuable resource. The fundamental insight of a diverse group of revisionist scholars—including Simon Kuznets, Colin Clark, P.T. Bauer, Ester Boserup, Albert Hirschman, Julian Simon, Richard Easterlin, and others—was in building up a body of thought that emphasizes the creative potential of individual humans and demonstrates their productive capacities when living in well-organized societies. Because these thinkers have emphasized production more than consumption, human supply more than human demand, their school might rightly be called "supply-side demography."

WITHIN THE citadels of population alarmism at the United Nations, the World Bank, and elsewhere, resistance to these new insights continues to be strong. But the monolithic character of the population debate has thankfully passed. One of the first public airings of the insights of supply-side demography took place at the World Population Conference sponsored by the United Nations and held in Mexico City in 1984. Under the leadership of James Buckley and Ben Wattenberg, the American delegation introduced several revisionist declarations into the conference report. The main one was a plank suggesting that in Third World efforts to moderate population growth, economic development ought to be given equal emphasis with family planning. Economic growth is, of course, desirable in its own right. But the more direct, often overlooked, effect of economic growth on population is its vital role in bringing about the very social transformations which ultimately reduce high birth levels. Improvements in income, education, and health, and the changes in cultural mores and living patterns that economic development brings—like improved female status, more urbanization, and so forth—all act powerfully to suppress fertility.

That is the position Indira Gandhi came around to late in her life. In 1984 Mrs. Gandhi stated:

> The very best way of inducing people to have smaller families is more development. Where we have highly industrialized areas or much better education or even much better agriculture, we find automatically families tend to grow smaller.

To put the idea in shorthand, one might say that economic growth is itself the equivalent of a powerful contraceptive.

Not only is development the best way of producing smaller families, it may be the *only* fully effective way, short of coercion. To see why this is the case, consider that surveys throughout the developing world show that when women are asked what number of children they consider ideal, what number they would *like* to have in their lifetime, how many they *desire*, the answers average approximately four children per woman. That would of course double the population every generation (two parents yielding four children).

Such an answer is not terribly surprising. After all, roughly three-quarters of the people of the developing world still live in rural settings—in villages where hands are needed for agricultural labor, where social practices tend to be traditional, where values change slowly. For a variety of reasons, most families in the Third World still *want* relatively large families. And that is rational behavior.

Consider specifically the case of Africa. The World Fertility Survey canvassed ten nations there. It showed that African women want families even *larger* than their already high current average of over six children. It is absurd, then, to argue that high world fertility is just a result of unmet demand for modern contraception. In many places such

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demand is limited or nonexistent because Third World families view children as social and economic assets.

It should not be assumed from any of this that revisionist demographers are opposed to family planning programs. In fact, most would argue that access to products that allow individuals to control the number and timing of their offspring is one of technology's great liberating gifts to this century. But while contraception is a family right, revisionists would argue, it is *not* a national duty. Too many governments—under pressure from the international population control apparatus—are setting up programs which pressure families about childbearing choices, on the false grounds that unless certain nationwide fertility goals and timetables are met, social progress will be unattainable.

In truth, that formulation is exactly reversed. Fertility levels reflect a society's level of development and proceed apace with it. Small families are a symptom, not a cause, of socio-economic advancement. Former Population Association of America president Richard Easterlin has written that "Family planning programs may be a misuse of scarce public funds early in the development process" because cultural modernization must take place before birth desires will decline significantly and demand for contraception will root. There is no shortcut. A society that is backward in every other way cannot be jumped to an advanced demographic stage. (Absent force, that is.) Attempts to push new reproductive attitudes onto a society faster than its social and economic standing allow it to assimilate such changes only brings on instability.

It follows from all this that socio-economic development ought to be the centerpiece of population policy. And if rapid social and economic progress is the goal, as the U.S. delegation at Mexico City asserted, then the institution of free markets ought to be the favored instrument. (In the period since 1984 even the opinions of world communist leaders have been added to the economic history of the West in making that case.)

The influence of this global move toward market-based economics on population policy can be seen in a landmark report by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. In 1986 the academy released the results of a major two-year study by some of the world's leading experts on population and economic development. The summary report was a committee document, and as such contained plenty of the usual genuflections to the previous generation of scholarship. Nonetheless, it surprised those who had taken the pessimistic view of population trends as an obvious truth. It suggested that while slower population growth might be helpful in some developing countries, the economic, resource, and environmental benefits would usually be very modest.

The critical insight of the academy scholars is the fundamental premise of revisionists and supply-side demographers, namely that in most nations, the crucial variable in determining future development will be the structure of the country's economic and political institutions, not the number of people. The "key" factor, the academy wrote, is the "mediating role that human behavior and human institutions play in the relation between population growth and economic processes."

The academy particularly emphasized the importance of free markets in achieving this development. They suggested that national leaders interested in directing their people down the path to both further development and continued decline in birthrates ought to stop ignoring the new lessons on the importance of socio-economic reform, and to start freeing up their economies.

As a hard-headed scientific document which challenged many of the longstanding assumptions of population policy, the academy report caused a considerable stir in the demographic community. One leading authority, Dr. Allen Kelley of Duke University, described the report as representing "a watershed. . . . It retreats very substantially from many previous assessments which concluded that population growth exerted a strong negative impact on development."

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"We have before us," he concluded, "a strong revisionist interpretation."

Revisionist demographers accept that population growth must eventually end. That will happen as a matter of course, they believe, in an organic natural process that occurs as a society matures, modernizes, and the incentives for very large families disappear. A society need not wait until it is rich for this to happen. Even modest levels of development bring steep drops in birthrates. Assuring that contraceptive availability matches private demand in the interim is a reasonable undertaking for governments and interested parties. But to force fertility preferences will inevitably lead to unhappy results. No intellectual justification can be claimed to exist for intrusions on family and individual sovereignty when it comes to questions of family size.

It is now possible to leave behind the erroneous belief that population growth is a catastrophic, uncontrollable horror. The obvious, long-neglected truth is that in addition to consuming and making demands on society, people also produce. It is not governments, corporations, banks, or even natural resources that produce wealth, but people availed of efficient and open economic systems—witness the Japanese, the Swiss, the Taiwanese.

What prevents most developing countries from providing for their growing populations is not a lack of family planning programs or a paucity of physical resources or a shortage of Western aid. Rather it is a defective economy and government. Individuals concerned for the welfare of people in poor countries around the globe ought to focus not on raw numbers, but on the institutions that prevent citizens from exercising their creative and productive potential.

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THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

Brad Roberts, *Editor*



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America First—and Second, and Third

Patrick J. Buchanan

ON THE BIRTHDAY of Thomas Jefferson, dead half a decade, the President of the United States raised his glass, and gave us, in a six-word toast, our national purpose: "The Union," Old Hickory said, "it must be preserved.

It was to "create a more perfect Union" that the great men came to Philadelphia; it was to permit the Republic to grow to its natural size that James K. Polk seized Texas and California; it was to preserve the Union—not end slavery—that Lincoln invaded and subjugated the Confederate states.

"A republic if you can keep it," Franklin told the lady in Philadelphia. Surely, preservation of the Republic, defense of its Constitution, living up to its ideals—that is our national purpose. "America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy," John Quincy Adams said. "She is the well-wisher of the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own."

Yet, when the question is posed, "What is America's national purpose?", answers vary as widely as those who take it. To Randall Robinson of TransAfrica, it is the overthrow of South Africa; to Jesse Jackson, it is to advance "justice" by restoring the wealth the white race has robbed from the colored peoples of the earth; to AIPAC, it is to keep Israel secure and inviolate; to Ben Wattenberg, America's "mission" is a crusade to "wage democracy" around the world. Each substitutes an extra-national ideal for the national interest; each sees our national purpose in another continent or country; each treats our Republic as a means to some larger end. "National purpose" has become a vessel, emptied of original content, into which ideologues of all shades and hues are invited to pour their own causes, their own visions.

In Charles Krauthammer's "vision" (in the Winter issue of *The National Interest*), the "wish and work" of our nation should be to "integrate" with Europe and Japan inside a "super-sovereign" entity that is "economically, culturally, and politically hegemonic in the world." This "new universalism," he writes, "would require the conscious depreciation not only of American sovereignty but of the notion of sovereignty in general. This is not as outrageous as it sounds."

While Krauthammer's super-state may set off onanistic rejoicing inside the Trilateral Commission, it should set off alarm bells in more precincts than Belmont, Massachusetts. As national purpose, or national interest, like all of the above, it fails the fundamental test: Americans will not fight for it.

Long ago, Lord Macaulay asked:

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> And how can man die better
> Than facing fearful odds
> For the ashes of his fathers,
> And the temples of his gods?

A nation's purpose is discovered not by consulting ideologies, but by reviewing its history, by searching the hearts of its people. What is it for which Americans have always been willing to fight?

Let us go back to a time when the establishment wanted war, but the American people did not want to fight.

In the fall of 1941, Europe from the Pyrenees to Moscow, from the Arctic to North Africa, was ruled by Hitler's Third Reich. East of Moscow, Stalin's gulag extended across Asia to Manchuria, where it met the belligerent Empire of the Rising Sun whose domain ran to mid-Pacific. England was in her darkest hour. Yet, still, America wanted to stay out; we saw, in the world's bloody conflict, no cause why our soldiers should be sent overseas to spill a single drop of American blood. Pearl Harbor, not FDR, convinced America to go to war.

The isolationism of our fathers is today condemned, and FDR is adjudged a great visionary because he sought early involvement in Britain's war with Hitler. But even the interventionists' arguments were, and are, couched in terms of American national interest. Perhaps we did not see it, we are told, but our freedom, our security, our homes, our way of life, our Republic, were at risk. Thus do even the acolytes of interventionism pay tribute to the true national interests of the United States, which are not to be found in some hegemonic and utopian world order.

When Adams spoke, he was echoing Washington's Farewell Address that warned his fickle countrymen against

> inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others. . . . The Nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.

For a century after Washington's death, we resisted the siren's call of empire. Then, Kipling's call to "Take up the white man's burden" fell upon the receptive ears of Bill McKinley, who came down from a sleepless night of consulting the Almighty to tell the press that God had told him to take the Philippines. We were launched.

Two decades later, 100,000 Americans lay dead in France in a European war begun, as Bismarck predicted it would begin, "because of some damn fool thing in the Balkans."

"To make the world safe for democracy," we joined an alliance of empires—British, French, and Russian—that held most of mankind in colonial captivity. Washington's warning proved prophetic. Doughboys fell in places like the Argonne and Belleau Wood, in no small measure to vindicate the Germanophobia and Anglophilia of a regnant Yankee elite. When the great "war to end war" had fertilized the seed bed that produced Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin, Americans by 1941 had concluded a blunder had been made in ignoring the wise counsel of their Founding Father.

After V-E Day and V-J Day, all America wanted to "bring the boys home," and we did. Then they were sent back, back to Europe, back to Asia, because Americans were persuaded—by Joseph Stalin—that the Cold War must be waged, because Lenin's party had made the United States the "main enemy" in its war against the West. As the old saw goes, you can refuse almost any invitation, but when a man wants to fight you have to oblige him.

If the Cold War is ending, what are the terms of honorable peace that will permit us to go home? Are they not: withdrawal of the Red Army back within its own frontiers; liberation of Central Europe and the Baltic republics; reunification of Germany; and de-Leninization of Moscow, i.e., overthrow of the imperialist party that has prosecuted the Seventy Years War against the West?

Once Russia is rescued from Leninism, its distant colonies, Cuba and Nicaragua,

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must eventually fall, just as the outposts of Japan's Empire, cut off from the home islands, fell like ripe apples into the lap of General MacArthur. Withdrawal of the Red Army from Europe would remove from the hand of Gorbachev's successor the military instrument of Marxist restoration.

The compensating concession we should offer: total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. If Moscow will get out, we will get out. Once the Red Army goes home, the reason for keeping a U.S. army in Europe vanishes. Forty years after the Marshall Plan, it is time Europe conscripted the soldiers for its own defense.

As the Austrian peace treaty demonstrates, troop withdrawals are the most enduring and easily verifiable form of arms control. If we negotiate the 600,000 troops of the Red Army out of Central Europe, they cannot return, short of launching a new European war.

There is another argument for disengagement. When the cheering stops, there is going to be a calling to account for the crimes of Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam, where the Great Men acceded to Stalin's demand that he be made cartographer of Europe. In the coming conflicts—over Poland's frontiers east and west, over Transylvania, Karelia, Moldavia, the breakup of Yugoslavia—our role is diplomatic and moral, not military.

In 1956, at the high water mark of American power, the U.S. stood aside as Soviet tanks crushed the Hungarian revolution. With that decision, Eisenhower and Dulles told the world that, while we support freedom in Central Europe, America will not go to war with Russia over it. The year of revolution, 1989, revealed the logical corollary: From Berlin to Bucharest to Beijing, as Lord Byron observed, "Who would be free, themselves must strike the first blow."

Would America be leaving our NATO allies in the lurch? Hardly. NATO Europe contains fourteen states, which, together, are more populous and three times as wealthy as a Soviet Union deep in an economic, social, and political crisis. Moreover, NATO would have a new buffer zone of free, neutral, anticommunist nations between the Soviet and German frontiers. Our job will have been done.

To conquer Germany, the Red Army would have to cross a free Poland of 500 miles and 40 million people, before reaching the frontier of a united Reich of 80 million, whose tradition is not wholly pacifist. In the first hours of invasion, Moscow would see her economic ties to the West severed, and a global coalition forming up against her, including Germany, France, Britain, China, Japan, and the United States. As the Red Army advanced, it would risk atomic attack. To what end? So the Kremlin can recapture what the Kremlin is giving up as an unwanted and unmanageable empire?

The day of the realpoliticians, with their Metternichian "new architectures," and balance-of-power stratagems, and hidden fear of a world where their op-ed articles and televised advice are about as relevant as white papers from Her Majesty's Colonial Office, is over.

WHY SEEK a united Germany? Because it is consistent with our values, our promise to the German people, and our national interest. Moreover, the Germans desire it, and will attain it. "Conditions" set down by President Bush and Secretary Baker will prove as ineffectual as they are insulting. (If the Germans decide to unite, what, exactly, would we do to stop them: Occupy Munich until they yield to our demand that they stay in NATO?)

A free, united Germany in the heart of Europe, inoculated against Marxism by forty-five years of the disease, would be a triumph of American policy, a pillar of Western capitalism, and the first line of defense against a resurgent Russian imperialism. For the United States to permit itself to be used by London, Paris, and Moscow to impede reunification is to reenact, seventy years later, the folly of Versailles. Deny Germans the unity they rightly seek, and we shall awake one morning to find the Russians have granted it.

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But, disengagement does not mean disarmament.

Still the greatest trading nation on earth, the U.S. depends for its prosperity on freedom of the seas. The strength of the U.S. navy should be non-negotiable; and, when the President is invited to enter naval arms control negotiations, the answer should be no, even if it means Moscow walks out.

With the acquisition of ballistic missiles by China, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, with atomic weapons work being done in half a dozen countries of the Third World, the United States needs—nay, requires—a crash research and development program for missile defense, to protect our homeland, our warships, our bases. No arms control agreement is worth trading away SDI.

An island-continent, America should use her economic and technological superiority to keep herself permanent mistress of the seas, first in air power, first in space. Nor is the cost beyond our capacity. For, it is not warships and weapons that consume half our defense budget; it is manpower and benefits. When defense cuts are made, they should come in army bases no longer needed for homeland defense, and ground troops no longer needed on foreign soil.

As U.S. bases close down in Europe, we should inform Moscow we want all Soviet bases closed in the Caribbean and Central America, all Soviet troops out of the Western hemisphere. They have no business here. This is our hemisphere; and the Monroe Doctrine should be made again the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy.

As the U.S. moves off the mainland of Europe, we should move our troops as well off the mainland of Asia. South Korea has twice the population and five times the economic might of North Korea. She can be sold the planes, guns, missiles, and ships to give her decisive superiority; then, U.S. troops should be taken out of the front line.

We are not going to fight another land war in Asia; no vital interest justifies it; our people will not permit it. Why, then, keep 30,000 ground troops on the DMZ? If Kim Il Sung attacks, why should Americans be first to die? If we must intervene, we can do so with air and sea power, without thousands of army and marine dead. It is time we began uprooting the global network of "trip wires" planted on foreign soil to ensnare the United States in the wars of other nations, to back commitments made and treaties signed before this generation of American soldiers was born.

The late Barbara Tuchman wrote of the Kaiser that he could not stand it if somewhere in the world a quarrel was going on and he was not a party to it. Blessed by Providence with pacific neighbors, north and south, and vast oceans, east and west, to protect us, why seek permanent entanglement in other people's quarrels?

The beginning of the end of the Cold War is surely time for that "agonizing reappraisal" of which Dulles only spoke. As Chesterton said, one ought not tear down a wall until you know why it was put up, but we must begin asking why some walls were built, and whether maintaining them any longer serves *our* interests.

AS WE ASCEND the staircase to the twenty-first century, America is uniquely situated to lead the world. Japan has a population older and not half so large as ours; her land and resources cannot match California's. Even united, the two Germanies have but a third of our population, a fifth of our GNP, and a land area smaller than Oregon and Washington. Neither Japan nor Germany is a nuclear power; neither has a navy or air force to rival ours; even their combined GNP is dwarfed by ours. While the Soviet Union has the size, resources, and population to challenge us as a world power, she is a prison house of nations whose ethnic hatreds and unworkable system mean a decade of turmoil. Who is left? The corrupt, bankrupt China of Deng Xiaoping? It will not survive the decade. Nakasone was right: The twentieth century was the American century. The twenty-first century will also be the American century.

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But America can only lead the world into the twenty-first century if she is not saddled down by all the baggage piled up in the twentieth.

For fifty years, the United States has been drained of wealth and power by wars, cold and hot. Much of that expenditure of blood and treasure was a necessary investment. Much was not.

We cannot forever defend wealthy nations that refuse to defend themselves; we cannot permit endless transfusions of the life blood of American capitalism into the mendicant countries and economic corpses of socialism, without bleeding to death. Foreign aid is an idea whose time has passed. The communist and socialist world now owe the West a thousand billion dollars and more, exclusive of hundreds of billions we simply gave away. Our going-away gift to the globalist ideologues should be to tell the Third World we are not sending the gunboats to collect our debts, but nor are we sending more money. The children are on their own.

Americans are the most generous people in history. But our altruism has been exploited by the guilt-and-pity crowd. At home, a monstrous welfare state of tens of thousands of drones and millions of dependents consumes huge slices of the national income. Abroad, regiments of global bureaucrats siphon off billions for themselves, their institutions, their client regimes.

With the Cold War ending, we should look, too, with a cold eye on the internationalist set, never at a loss for new ideas to divert U.S. wealth and power into crusades and causes having little or nothing to do with the true national interest of the United States.

High among these is the democratist temptation, the worship of democracy as a form of governance and the concomitant ambition to see all mankind embrace it, or explain why not. Like all idolatries, democratism substitutes a false god for the real, a love of process for a love of country.

When we call a country "democratic," we say nothing about whether its rulers are wise or good, or friendly or hostile; we only describe how they were chosen, a process that produced Olaf Palme, Lopez Portillo, Pierre Trudeau, Sam Nujoma, Kurt Waldheim, and the Papandreous, *père et fils*, as well as Ronald Reagan.

Raul Alfonsín, elected president, led Argentina to ruin; while General Pinochet, who seized power in a coup, rescued Chile from Castroism, and leaves her secure, prosperous, and on the road to freedom. Why, then, celebrate Alfonsín, and subvert Pinochet?

As cultural traditions leave many countries unsuited to U.S.-style democracy, any globalist crusade to bring its blessings to the natives everywhere must end in frustration; and will surely be marked by hypocrisy. While the National Endowment for Democracy meddles in the affairs of South Africa, the State Department props up General Mobutu. Where is the consistency?

Democracies, too, place their own selfish interests first. India, the world's largest, supported Moscow's genocidal war of annexation in Afghanistan, while General Zia, an autocrat, died aiding the resistance. Who was the true friend of liberty?

In 1936, Franco rescued Spain from a corrupt "democracy"; in 1937, Hitler received a "democratic" mandate from the German people; in 1941, Britain declared war on Finland, a democracy, at the behest of Stalin; in 1942, we deprived our own fighting men of needed weapons to send them to the USSR, the most contemptuous enemy democracy has ever known.

How other people rule themselves is their own business. To call it a vital interest of the United States is to contradict history and common sense. And for the Republic to seek to dictate to 160 nations what kind of regime each should have is a formula for interminable meddling and endless conflict; it is a textbook example of that "messianic globaloney" against which Dean Acheson warned; it is, in scholar Clyde Wilson's phrase, a globalization of that degenerate form of Protestantism known as the Social Gospel.

"We must consider first and last," Walter Lippmann wrote in 1943, "the American

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national interest. If we do not, if we construct our foreign policy on some kind of abstract theory of rights and duties, we shall build castles in the air. We shall formulate policies which in fact the nation will not support with its blood, its sweat, and its tears." Exactly.

What do Tibetans, *mujaheddin*, UNITA rebels, and *contras* have in common? Not belief in a bicameral legislature, or in separation of church and state, but love of liberty and a hatred of communism. Is it not that spirit of patriotism that brought down the vassal regimes of Central Europe, that today threatens to tear apart the Soviet Empire?

"Enlightened nationalism" was Mr. Lippmann's idea of a foreign policy to protect America's true national interest. What we need is a new nationalism, a new patriotism, a new foreign policy that puts America first, and, not only first, but second and third as well.

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Freedom Remains the Touchstone

Carl Gershman

WITH THE stunning collapse of communism in Central Europe, it is appropriate to reconsider the goals of American foreign policy in a post-Cold War world. It is true, of course, that the communist regime in the Soviet Union remains in place, that in military terms Moscow is still a superpower, and that it continues to give military assistance to Afghanistan, Cuba, Angola, and other Third World client states. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union is exhausted economically and ideologically, and is in the throes of a profound systemic crisis. The challenge ahead is not to defend against its expansion but to manage its decline.

In this altered world, the policy of containment is clearly outdated. It does not respond to the immediate challenge of consolidating democratic systems in the liberated countries of Central Europe and facilitating their eventual integration into an expanded European Community. It is rapidly becoming obsolete in the Third World as well.

That said, however, it does not follow that the United States must define a new "central purpose" for its foreign policy. Containment itself was not the central purpose of U.S. policy but rather a response to a specific geopolitical situation in which the United States found itself challenged by a formidable military and ideological rival. The central purpose, as stated in the Truman Doctrine, was to "support free peoples" in defense of a "way of life" based upon "the will of the majority" and "distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression." Support for this way of life against its totalitarian alternative was the purpose for which containment was designed. The attenuation of the totalitarian challenge does not invalidate this purpose, which was enunciated before the Cold War by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. It only raises the question of whether a policy of support for free institutions and for adherence to democratic political norms around the world can and should be sustained in the absence of a grave threat that necessitates U.S. action.

In answering that question, it may be helpful to recall that the consensus supporting the containment policy broke down as a result of the debate over U.S. involvement in Vietnam and was not reestablished during the following two decades. At issue was the policy of the United States toward noncommunist authoritarian governments threatened by communist attack or subversion. In effect, one side in this debate favored withdrawing the containment shield from such governments if they did not take meaningful steps to improve their human rights performance. The other side favored retaining the shield

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not only to resist communist expansion but also in the belief that authoritarian systems were less repressive and more open to democratic reform than the totalitarian alternative.

The debate sharpened in the 1970s when it appeared that the United States faced the bleak prospect of having to choose between these two options only. It came to a head in 1979 over the Nicaraguan revolution, but the bitter lesson that each side came away with from that experience—that authoritarianism is not a bulwark against communism, and that the overthrow of authoritarianism is not a guarantee of democracy—actually laid the foundation for a new policy fostering peaceful transitions to democracy. As the democratic wave of the 1980s in Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World gained momentum, and despite the bitter dispute over funding the armed resistance to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, a new bipartisan consensus began to form around this pro-democracy policy. In March 1986, following the peaceful revolution in the Philippines, President Reagan enunciated the new consensus by committing the United States to the "democratic revolution" taking place in the world. The core of his message to Congress was that "The American people believe in human rights and oppose tyranny in whatever form, whether of the Left or the Right."

The collapse of communism has given this policy renewed support as Republicans and Democrats outdo each other in calls for assistance to the democratic revolution in Central Europe, and as the fear of another Vietnam—still a cautionary factor in any policy expressing global support for democracy—recedes. Nonetheless, strong reservations persist about the merits of such a policy. They are associated with no single political camp, but can be found among both conservatives and liberals, as well as among foreign policy "realists" who have always been skeptical of American universalism.

The reservations may be summarized as follows: Democratic globalism, or Wilsonian internationalism if you will, betrays an ethnocentric point of view that mistakenly assumes democracy is an appropriate system for everybody. It is not, and the desire to implant it where it does not exist reflects cultural arrogance, missionary zeal, and a dangerous tendency to impose abstract principles on political reality. Moreover, a policy of globalism implies unlimited commitments along the lines of President Kennedy's pledge to "pay any price" to support freedom. If commitments exceed power and resources, policy will become insolvent, as Walter Lippmann once wrote. On top of this, there is no compelling, tangible national interest that is served by such a policy. The United States should not go abroad, in the famous words of John Quincy Adams, "in search of monsters to destroy," but only in pursuit of clearly defined interests to protect.

THE RESPONSE to this line of argument begins with the democratic revolution which demonstrates that successful democratic systems, as well as the aspiration for democracy, now extend far beyond the industrial democracies of the West. The last months of 1989 alone saw not only communist dictatorships overthrown in Central Europe but the holding of transitional elections in Chile, Namibia, and Taiwan; the peaceful transfer of power following sharply contested elections in the two largest Third World democracies, India and Brazil; and the installation of a democratically-elected government in Panama (by U.S. troops, to be sure, but with the overwhelming approval of the Panamanian people). These dramatic events were the culmination of a period of unprecedented democratic gains that began in the 1970s with the democratic transitions in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, then spread across most of Central and South America and to a large part of Asia before it reached Central Europe. While the democratic movement in China was brutally suppressed, it probably did more than any single event to signal to the world that the democratic idea is truly universal and that there are young people continents and cultures away from the historic centers of dem-

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ocratic life who are prepared to lay down their lives for freedom. The democratic movement in Burma (which was suppressed) demonstrated the same point.

No single factor accounts for this worldwide phenomenon. The technological and communications revolutions have made the attributes of modern democratic society accessible and discernible throughout the world, thereby introducing into non-Western societies expectations and aspirations for democracy not present before. Moreover, the decline of traditional forms of authority in modernizing societies, combined with the more recent collapse of Marxism, has left democratic consent as the only means of conferring legitimacy on governments. Developing countries are also discovering that democracy, while by no means a panacea, offers a way to limit and decentralize state power, to expose corruption, to reduce the potential for civil violence by integrating different economic and ethnic groups into the system, and to achieve economic growth. As the alternative to tyrannical force in the management of increasingly complex societies, democracy would have to be invented, as Peter Berger has written, if it did not already exist.

IF DEMOCRACY is developing indigenously within countries because it offers the best way to manage the affairs of society and to achieve national objectives, the issue for us to decide is whether we should assist and encourage this process, not whether we should seek to impose our system on others. We cannot force others to do what they are not prepared or willing to do for themselves; the American people would not support this approach in any event. But we can insist upon adherence to political norms and provide support and encouragement to those seeking to establish democratic systems. Such a policy is consistent with American values—pluralism as well as democracy—and it does not risk insolvency because it can be pursued with relatively limited resources.

In fact, the basic elements of such a policy are already in place, having been assembled in the course of more than a decade of attempts to find common ground between liberals and conservatives, and between the executive branch and Congress, on these questions. They include the integration of human rights issues into the fabric of U.S. policy through such mechanisms as the establishment of a Human Rights Bureau at the State Department; the annual preparation of "country reports" on human rights; the conditioning of economic and security assistance, trade benefits, and votes in international lending agencies on human rights performance; and the provision of funds under the Foreign Assistance Act for programs that encourage respect for human rights. They also include instructions to U.S. ambassadors to carry out this policy by maintaining close contacts with democratic groups and by encouraging wherever possible steps toward stable democratic transitions. (The results of this activist approach have already been evident in such countries as the Philippines, Chile, Paraguay, Poland, and Hungary.)

An additional element in this policy has been the establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy which enlists the involvement of private U.S. organizations—principally institutes associated with our two political parties, the AFL-CIO, and the Chamber of Commerce—in assisting the development of democratic political and social institutions abroad. Military force is also an element in the policy, though its use is circumscribed by criteria, set forth by Defense Secretary Weinberger in 1984 and now widely endorsed, that favor the commitment of U.S. forces only as a last resort and only with broad bipartisan backing. Significantly, the recent commitment of U.S. forces in Panama and the show of force in the Philippines during the coup attempt against the Aquino government were justified in terms of supporting democracy.

But does this policy serve a compelling, tangible national interest? Or is it, to borrow the phrase of one commentator, "a special

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kind of international social work"? The events of the last months offer the most eloquent answer to this question, for it was the democratic revolution in Central Europe, more than any military or diplomatic factors, that brought the postwar era to a close and redrew the political map of the world. Despite all the attention devoted to disarmament over the last decades by governments and demonstrators alike, it was the success of the democratic struggles in the communist world that made meaningful disarmament a real possibility.

Beyond these immediate issues, the United States has a clear interest in the establishment of democratic governments abroad. Such governments are more likely than dictatorships to enjoy political stability and to establish peaceful relations with their neighbors. In addition, while governments that share our values may not agree with us on every issue, they are likely to be our friends and to desire a close mutual relationship. Just as important, we would be able to sustain such a close and collaborative relationship with *them*, something we have difficulty doing (given the nature of our polity and the importance we attach to democratic values) with countries that are not democratic. Moreover, given our position as the world's first and leading democracy, we have a unique opportunity to exercise leadership in supporting the progress of democracy, arguably the foremost political issue of our time. Our prestige and morale would inevitably suffer if we were to relinquish this responsibility.

Is the objective of supporting democracy sufficient to serve as a "central purpose" for the United States in its relations with the world? The question should answer itself, for this already *is* our central purpose and has been ever since our nation was founded on the basis of universal democratic principles. The moments when we strayed from these principles—during the Vietnam malaise, for example, when many Americans ceased to believe in our national purpose—have not been happy times for America. More recently, our national self-confidence and sense of purpose have been restored. The fact that this restoration coincided with the world democratic revolution may have been purely coincidental. More likely, however, these developments were mutually reinforcing; the former giving renewed impetus to the idea of freedom in the world, and the latter reminding us that our heritage does, indeed, have a universal meaning. That is a useful thing to recall as we set our course at the beginning of a new era.

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What's on the Table?

John D. Sullivan

SHOULD THE United States assist Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to make the passage from centralized, totalitarian societies to market-based, democratic systems and, if so, how? Scarcely a year ago, this issue concerned only academic experts and foreign policy officials. It is now one of the key foreign policy issues of the decade and is being debated vigorously both in official Washington and in think-tanks and op-ed pages.

As Burton Yale Pines noted in an article entitled "Waiting for Mr. X" (*Policy Review*, Summer 1989), one of the deficiencies of this debate has been the absence of an adequate and agreed conceptual framework for coming to grips with Mikhail Gorbachev's initiatives. The title, of course, pointed to the pivotal role George Kennan's 1947 essay played in shaping the containment doctrine that guided U.S. policy for nearly four decades. While Mr. X has not reappeared, Mr. Z has offered "To the Stalin Mausoleum." Partly due to the anonymity of the author, both the lengthy article in the Winter 1990 issue of *Daedalus* and an excerpt in the *New York Times* have gained a great deal of attention.

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On the question of whether "we" should help Gorbachev succeed, Z concludes: "If by perestroika's success we mean producing a communist system that is economically effective and politically democratic, then the answer must be no." Z concludes as much because he believes that the command system cannot be reformed, it can only be replaced. He goes on to pose the issue differently, but still arrives at the same conclusion: "Yet, if by perestroika's success we mean effecting a transition from a party-state and a command economy to democracy and the market, then the answer, unfortunately, must still be no." No, in this case, because Z believes that while the U.S. and other democracies may share the goal of having the Soviet Union make the transition to market-based democracy, Gorbachev does not.

Based on these conclusions, Z's policy prescriptions are modest indeed. He recommends that the U.S. continue to pursue arms control initiatives and seek to assist the emergence of a private sector as an alternative to the Soviet state.

Z's prescriptions are only one set among a multitude of proposals, suggestions, and caveats offered by well-known foreign policy figures, business leaders, and academics. So many that a pause for a stock-taking is in order.

Shortly after Solidarity entered into a coalition government with the Communist party in Poland last August, pressures began to mount in Washington for U.S. assistance.

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President Bush's original offer of immediate food aid plus assistance for private sector development was widely regarded as inadequate and the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees set out to put things right. The result of ongoing negotiations between Congress and the administration was the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989.

THE SEED Act aims at nothing less than the complete transformation of Poland and Hungary into market-based, democratic systems. While the full range of programs created by the act are too comprehensive to detail, the principal elements are these:

- U.S. support for a multilateral stabilization loan, IMF and World Bank loans, and debt relief.
- Agricultural assistance and appropriate food aid.
- Creation of enterprise funds to provide loans, grants, equity investments, technical assistance, and training to private entrepreneurs.
- Peace Corps programs and support for credit unions.
- Trade and investment assistance including Most Favored Nation status; admission to the Generalized System of Preferences Export-Import Bank, and Overseas Private Investment Corporation programs; and new investment treaties.
- Cultural, scientific, and academic exchanges and scholarships.
- Building democratic institutions such as legal, legislative, journalistic, and electoral institutions.

While the administration and Congress were putting together the SEED Act, the Polish government was developing its own plan for transforming the economy of Poland. Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs was heavily involved in developing the Polish plan and has become one of its chief advocates in the United States. Essentially, the Poles have opted to take the same shock approach successfully followed in Bolivia, where Sachs was also heavily involved. That is, all major changes will be introduced at once rather than phased in over a period of years.

According to Sachs's plan, as summarized in the December 1989/January 1990 issue of *International Economy*, in order to stabilize the Polish economy in the first six months of 1990, major prices will be freed, budgets cut, subsidies removed, exchange rates reduced to market levels, and inefficient state firms dissolved. After an initial bout of even higher inflation, the economy is expected to stabilize and inflation to drop dramatically. Transformation of the economic structures into a market-based system will require a complete overhaul of laws, regulations, and economic institutions to establish property rights, provide incentives to private entrepreneurship, privatize state firms, create financial institutions, capital markets, legal protections, market-oriented regulations, and a host of other innovations.

The plan also calls for a "social safety net" including food stamps, unemployment compensation, and other measures to ease the pain of transition. It is hoped that the combination of a safety net, a speedy transition to a market system, and election of a democratic government will gain the support of a desperate people, allowing enough time for the plan to take hold.

Substantial assistance will be required from the industrial democracies for the transformation program to succeed. Both the Polish plan and various articles by Sachs have argued persuasively for creation of a $1 billion currency stabilization fund, IMF and World Bank loans, International Finance Corporation support for privatization, and debt relief—nearly all of which have been put into effect or agreed to in principle with the SEED Act. The Bush administration now has the authority for U.S. participation in multilateral efforts, in addition to creating a framework for promoting private enterprise, trade, investment, and technical assistance as well as creating a social safety net.

Will the Polish plan work and is the assistance sufficient? No one knows. Sir

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William Ryrie, executive vice president of the International Finance Corporation, recently offered a well-taken warning in the January 5, 1990 *Financial Times:*

> People who know quite a lot about how capitalist economies work should not imagine that they therefore know how to make the transition from communism. In Poland markets have been suppressed and distorted for half a century and most of the population has no recollection of such a world. At the same time, economic man cannot be far beneath the surface. One has to believe that a decontrolled environment with the right incentives will lead to the emergence of entrepreneurs; the difficult question is one of time.

The critique by Amitai Etzioni in this issue goes directly to the heart of the dilemma posed by Ryrie: How much time will it take for the Polish population to change the attitudes and practices of some forty years? And, one should add, given the political realities facing new democracies, how much time is available? These questions are currently being put to the test as large scale strikes erupt, with thousands of workers facing the prospects of unemployment.

No one knows how to effect a massive attitudinal shift quickly in a people, except by changing the nature of the institutions, incentives, and choices. For some forty years, economic decision-making in Poland has been based on a command system. People learned to live with the distortions and perversities introduced into the system. The result was a flourishing "second economy" that operated outside the command system and, in fact, probably kept the system operational. The hope is that by changing the system profoundly and quickly, the people will alter their economic decision-making, restoring a functioning economy.

Over the longer term, however, there are steps that can be taken to assist the Polish people and other Eastern European citizens in making the shift from a distorted, command system to a functioning market-based democracy. Surprisingly, none of the various proposals, nor the SEED Act, have addressed the issue of educational reform seriously. True, there are a variety of exchanges and scholarships provided in the act, and the private Soros Foundation has provided substantial assistance to Hungary in management education. But such programs need to be expanded dramatically, particularly to provide civics education, entrepreneurship and management training, and basic economic education. Only thus can an appropriate cultural foundation for the contemplated economic transformation be established.

THE POLISH experience with the "shock treatment" they have chosen will be carefully monitored by other countries in the region. New governments, expected to take office this year following free elections in Eastern Europe, will face a choice between the Polish approach and a more evolutionary one. Vaclav Klaus, the new Czechoslovak finance minister, advocates the latter, arguing in the December 13, 1989 *Financial Times* that, with a stable economy such as exists in his country, a more gradual approach offers better prospects. However, Hungary has been following such a process of gradual change for years, and many economists in the Hungarian opposition argue that it has failed—producing a patten of reform-retrenchment-reform and a heavily distorted system. While the Hungarians don't face the prospect of complete systemic collapse, neither have they created a "mixed" economy, as is so often claimed. Should the Polish plan succeed in achieving such a transformation, other countries could be prompted to follow with similar programs under far better initial conditions.

How should the other Eastern European countries be assisted? Discussion on Capitol Hill and in the administration contemplates extending the SEED Act provisions to others in the region, provided they demonstrate a commitment to fundamental democratic change. Czechoslovakia may be the first to qualify, if the Czechs follow through on their announced intention to conduct free elec-

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tions. East Germany, of course, is a special case, complicated by the question of reunification and political reform. Bulgaria, Romania, and, perhaps, Yugoslavia, all present unique features as well. Barring unforeseen developments, always possible in today's Eastern Europe, the U.S. government appears ready to deal with each country on a case-by-case basis.

Other suggestions for how to deal with these issues vary widely. The *Economist* (January 13, 1990) has presented a comprehensive plan for the region. The editors propose liberalizing trade flows from Eastern Europe into the Common Market; relaxing export controls on technology; extending financial support to establish convertible currencies, social safety nets, and long-term finance for development; and the cancellation of debt.

Part of the answer, as noted by the *Economist*, could come from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development proposed by President Mitterand. Discussions on the bank's creation are nearly complete, with all twenty-four OECD governments agreeing to participate, in principle, at a reported level of $12 billion. Among the items still to be decided is the participation of Eastern European governments and the Soviet Union; if these governments contribute funds, either in hard or national currencies, they would be in a position to influence the bank decisions. Both the U.S. and British governments appear opposed to Soviet participation, and have been among those arguing that bank activities should be restricted to assisting the private sector. This last issue is unresolved, with the French and West German governments pressing for infrastructure loans to Eastern European governments.

The *Economist* argues that debt cancellation should precede any loans made by the bank, that these loans should be made directly to the private sector, and that infrastructure support should be either in the form of grants or loans at below market rates. The issue, of course, is that most Eastern European governments cannot service existing debt while simultaneously transforming their systems. Even Czechoslovakia will have to seek debt rescheduling for official loans, and some form of debt reduction from private creditors through Treasury Secretary Brady's debt reduction plan or a similar mechanism.

A similar set of proposals was recently presented in the *New York Times* (January 11, 1990) by Robert Hormats of Goldman Sachs, though he stops short of proposing debt cancellation or relaxing export controls. Hormats points out that the Soviet-imposed trading system known as COMECON has placed very tight constraints on Eastern Europe's participation in the world economy. At a recent COMECON meeting, the Czechs insisted on a complete overhaul of the system. However, given their dependence on Soviet oil and other resources as well as access to Soviet markets for exports of noncompetitive goods, it will take substantial time for Eastern European governments to make the transition to the international market. Hormats proposes the creation of a revolving fund similar to the European Payments Union, which in the wake of World War II helped integrate Eastern Europe into the world trading system.

THE ISSUE of intent and type of assistance, however, is only half the equation. Equal attention has to be paid to the issue of resources. Interestingly, a recent proposal by Senate minority leader Robert Dole to reduce assistance to the five largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid by 5 percent would yield only an additional $330 million for all of Eastern Europe. When one considers that the SEED Act for Poland and Hungary alone will absorb in excess of $600 million a year, the limits on U.S. action become stark indeed. Fortunately for Eastern Europe, the U.S. is not the only donor involved. At the current rate of new commitments, the U.S. may end up behind the West Europeans and the Japanese in terms of funds obligated. Given the U.S. budget deficit and the corresponding surpluses found elsewhere, this line-up appears inescapable in the short run.

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The question of assistance to the Soviet Union is a very different issue. While a consensus on aid to Eastern Europe appears to be slowly emerging, differences over similar help for the Soviets are sharpening. To date, President Bush has taken important but carefully limited measures. The Malta Summit package stopped short at removing some restrictions and allowing the Soviets access to agreements and measures that are routinely granted to other countries. These included a number in the economic arena:

- The completion of a trade agreement granting Most Favored Nation status by waiving the Jackson-Vanik amendment, though this step is dependent upon Soviet enactment of new emigration legislation.
- Support for Soviet observer status at the GATT.
- The expansion of U.S.-Soviet technical cooperation in finance, agriculture, small business development, budgetary and tax policy, the setting up of a stock exchange, and antimonopoly policy.
- Consideration of lifting statutory restrictions on export credits and guarantees after a Jackson-Vanik waiver.
- Initiation of discussions on an investment treaty giving protection for American investors in the Soviet Union.

A comparison of the SEED Act and the Malta initiatives makes clear the magnitude of difference between the two approaches. In the case of Poland and Hungary, the aim is nothing less than the complete transformation of the political-economic system. In the Soviet case, the intent is more limited, encouraging the processes of perestroika and glasnost by engaging the Soviet Union in reentering the international economic system. The Soviets stand to make substantial gains from Malta's economic initiatives only if they change their economic and decision-making systems to allow normal commercial transactions.

Marshall Goldman, associate director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, argues that the U.S. must go much further in supporting perestroika and glasnost. In a recent article in *The World & I* (January 1990), he proposed assisting the Soviets to expand their consumer goods and agricultural industries. To begin, Goldman would provide emergency supplies of food and consumer goods in return for a delayed form of barter repayment. Such aid, he maintained, would allow Gorbachev to withstand the political pressures building in Soviet society for tangible benefits from perestroika. For the longer term, Goldman proposed many of the economic steps since taken at Malta and new initiatives to assist the Soviets in converting military production to consumer goods and food processing. One of his more interesting ideas was to provide U.S. support for retraining the 500,000 Soviet military personnel Gorbachev has promised to demobilize.

WHILE GOLDMAN'S ideas are provocative, in the opinion of Anthony M. Solomon of the S.G. Warburg Group they are also premature. Solomon, Goldman, and Donald Kendall of Pepsico debated these ideas in a discussion in the *New York Times* last October. Both Solomon and Kendall concluded that the Soviets had to undertake a number of deep-seated reforms, such as freeing up prices, before U.S. and foreign assistance would be appropriate.

Solomon is also co-chair of an international task force, convened by the Institute for East-West Security Studies, to consider alternative ways of supporting perestroika. The other co-chair is Abel Aganbegyan of the USSR Academy of Sciences, reputedly one of the architects of Gorbachev's reforms. Solomon and Aganbegyan gathered 175 business, political, and academic leaders from the U.S., Japan, China, and Eastern and Western Europe to consider ways of responding to Gorbachev's initiatives. In an institute report, issued in October 1989, they concluded that "integration of the reforming socialist economies into the world economic system, to the benefit of East and West, is one method of supporting perestroika."

The task force mentioned that, in order for economic integration to work, a series of

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conditions must be met by the reforming socialist governments, including the Soviet Union:

> Integration of the socialist economies is possible if: 1) the existing international system of rules for political and economic behavior, based on the principles of liberalism (minimal restrictions on international commerce), and symmetry (all nations should be treated equally), are accepted by the East; 2) the threat to international security posed by integration is reduced or eliminated; and 3) the systemic barriers to trade—including the myriad of administrative barriers [imposed by] central planning and the lack of economic data based on scarcity prices—are removed.

The task force recognized different stages of change in the various countries and recommended a series of confidence building measures to be taken by the East, and a series of reciprocal measures for the West to take in response. In short, this represents a form of conditionality or quid pro quo actions. More particularly, the report concluded that prior to the signing of any investment and trade treaties the socialist economies, including the Soviet Union, must "move toward realistic market pricing of goods produced for export" and "the East should provide greater information and accessibility to domestic markets."

While the Polish and Hungarian governments have taken such steps and the East German and Czechoslovakian governments are poised to do so, the Soviets have adopted a new five year plan that postpones fundamental price reform and other basic changes for some years. Based on this, it would appear that the Bush administration would be wise to insist on price reform as a condition for negotiating a trade and investment treaty with the Soviets.

Indeed, many of the caveats regarding assistance to the Soviets are based on a careful reading of economic reforms actually put in place. The Z article is a case in point. Another is Irwin Stelzer's January 1990 article in *Commentary*. Stelzer, the U.S. political and economic correspondent for the London *Sunday Times*, warns that ". . . the Soviet Union's continued refusal to move toward a market economy, and its unwillingness to reform its currency or reduce its enormous budget deficit, make it doubtful that any assistance can be productively employed." Stelzer, however, agrees that the Eastern European governments, particularly Poland, have made such reforms and should be supported.

Paul Nitze, one of the nation's leading foreign policy analysts, also recommends against providing aid to the Soviets at this point. Although "economic chaos" in the Soviet Union is not in U.S. interests, Nitze asserts in the *Washington Post* (December 31, 1989) that ". . . until those in charge in the Soviet Union cast off the ideological barriers that prevent them from accepting private ownership of land, homes and small businesses, there is little prospect of economic revival." Nitze's reading of the actual record of Soviet reforms, like those of Z and Stelzer, is that nothing approaching a market-based transformation has yet been accepted by Soviet decision-makers. In a later *Washington Post* article (January 10, 1990), Nitze also questions Gorbachev's commitment to democracy as a goal.

Whether one accepts Nitze's views or the more optimistic views of Marshall Goldman, a number of initiatives can be taken to support the domestic opposition or dissident movement within the Soviet Union and elsewhere. National Endowment for Democracy (NED) programs are the most encompassing of such efforts. Over the last six years, the endowment has provided crucial support for opposition groups, independent publications, discussion groups, and nascent political movements in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. These investments have paid off in Eastern Europe where some of the supported groups have assumed power or are posed to do so. NED, it should be noted, has the support of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, and two political party institutes loosely affiliated with the Demo-

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cratic and Republican parties. The AFL-CIO, in particular, has provided support for Solidarity during the martial law period. A substantial expansion of the kind of programs pioneered by NED, either directly by Congress or through the SEED Act mechanism, is one viable and quick way of supporting the transformation of the socialist world into market-based democracies.

The Bottom Line

A CONSENSUS is emerging, at least at a broad policy level, with respect to assisting Eastern Europe. The debatable points concern how such assistance should be provided and at what resource level.

Two of the most contentious issues yet to be resolved are the relaxation of export controls and debt relief. With respect to export controls, the urgent need in Eastern Europe for computers, computer chips, machine tools, and other medium to high technology goods has to be weighed against continuing Communist party control of military and intelligence networks in Eastern Europe, including Poland and Hungary. Despite this, some relaxation ought to be possible, particularly in the area of telecommunications equipment and other quite pressing needs. Discussions within the Bush administration appear to be leaning toward a more flexible position, reflecting both recognition of changing conditions in Eastern Europe and a concern to avoid an open split with U.S. allies. If guarantees can be developed to prevent reexport of sensitive goods to the Soviet Union, China, and other closed systems, it is likely that the Eastern Europeans will gain access to materials desperately needed for economic growth.

As for debt relief, the debate is likely to go on for some time. Neither Poland nor Hungary can repay the enormous debt burden incurred by former regimes. Even Czechoslovakia and East Germany will require debt rescheduling if they are to transform their systems. The issue is complicated by the fact that other highly indebted countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and the Philippines, can make an equally good case that their foreign debt was accumulated by former repressive regimes. If Polish and Hungarian debt is cancelled or they receive more favorable treatment, demands for similar concessions will escalate from other governments, increasing the strain on the international financial system.

The Soviet Union represents quite a different level of concern. Among both analysts and political leaders, there is a division between those who believe that whatever the U.S. and the democracies can do to support *perestroika* should be done, and those who insist on a conditionality approach. Fundamentally, the differences between these approaches stem from two related factors.

First, there is a difference in perception about Gorbachev and Soviet intentions. Some see the Soviet leader's plan to create a democratic Soviet regime as being threatened by domestic conservatives who want to retain the existing command-style apparatus. In this view, assistance from the West would tip the political scales toward Gorbachev-as-reformer. The opposing school of thought sees Gorbachev as intent on restoring a progressive brand of communist economics loosely modeled on Lenin's New Economic Program, and is concerned that any assistance provided would only prolong the "terminal crisis of communism."

In addition to the differing opinions regarding Gorbachev's intentions, there are fundamental differences about the nature of change in socialist countries. Those who are most in favor of providing substantial aid to Gorbachev believe that political reform—democratization and glasnost—is the key to change. In contrast, those who oppose direct aid see the contest in terms of changing the structure of the political-economic system: until the fundamental parameters of the command economy are altered, democracy through systemic transformation is impossible.

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Because this summary is vastly simplified, perhaps the best conclusion is simply to recall Pines's essay: We are still "Waiting for Mr. X," either in the form of a seminal article that provides a coherent conceptual framework appropriate to the changed conditions, or of a major, authoritative statement by the administration. In the absence of either, policy is likely to evolve incrementally, based on various coordination mechanisms established in Geneva. This would be a poor way for the United States to surrender its leadership and a disservice to the thousands of people who suffered to create a new, free Europe.

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New Hopes, Old Habits

Amitai Etzioni

BEHIND THE current proposals to provide large amounts of Western economic aid to Poland and Hungary lie specific sociological assumptions that are quite false. These assumptions should be of concern even to those who care little about those two countries or the several hundreds of millions—soon billions—of dollars involved. Similar sanguine assumptions are made in the policy debate over whether the West should provide significant aid to shore up Gorbachev's reforms. Ultimately, the question is whether one can significantly affect lasting social change in a foreign country, or whether it must be largely indigenously grown and cultivated. Above all, the question is whether such reforms can and ought to be hurried along, or, on the contrary, if expectations ought to be lowered to allow the time required for the inevitably gradual adjustments.

Nobody seriously entertains the possibility that the U.S., or even the West, should finance the economic reconstruction of half a dozen Eastern European countries and the USSR in a kind of end-of-the-century mega-Marshall Plan. The idea is to give economic aid in order to ease and facilitate the transition, to reduce the pain involved to tolerable levels, and to avoid riots and direct attacks on the governments engaged in political and economic reforms.

The most outspoken American proponent of massive yet transitional economic aid to at least one (until recently) communist country, Poland, is Jeffrey D. Sachs, a Harvard economist retained by Solidarity. Sachs's argument is neatly encapsulated by the remark of an Eastern European economist he quotes: "You don't try to cross over a chasm in two leaps." Sachs, and many other Western economists, believe that the transition from a central command economy to a free market should be done in one fell swoop. Resorting to a different metaphor, these countries should go "cold turkey."

The economy should be opened to outside investment by making the currency convertible, allowing free reparation of dividends and capital, privatizing state industries, opening branches of Western banks, creating a stock market, making "draconian" cuts in government expenditures, and implementing other similar, largely financial, adjustments that can be introduced quickly. Many of these policy suggestions were actually launched in rapid succession in Poland at the end of 1989.

Sachs sees mainly what might be called psychological difficulties, in which fear of the expected pain of the transition leads to a flight from the currency and/or active opposition to the implementation of the reforms by

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stressed workers. Transitional economic aid, he argues, is necessary to keep the pain low until the jump is completed. Many other economists have taken similar positions. (One, Professor John F. Stehle, writing in the *Wall Street Journal*, is confident that "all that needs to be created are tradeable shares in the land and factories currently 'owned' by the state." It is worth noting however that Stehle prefers to apply stock market capitalism to East Germany, where it might well have a greater chance to succeed than in other East European states.) Critics have picked up the call for the Bush administration—and more generally the West and Japan—to be less timid and jump in with aid, more credit, and more technical assistance in the multi-billions, although no exact figures are suggested.

Process and Friction

FEW REALIZE, and Sachs rarely mentions, that mainstream American economics has no systematic, empirically grounded conception of the transition of a communist to a free-market economy. It has no theory of processes—how to get from A to B—and draws on highly simplified models of what A and B look like. "A" stands for the current state of affairs, which is depicted, quite correctly, as a highly-centralized, planned, bureaucratized economy with all the well-known attendant ills. "B" is a model of perfect competition, a market-driven, efficient economy with all the blessings of the American way of life. A jump from communism to a free market is hence ideal—if not for Poland, then for economic theory.

While many economists no longer assume instantaneous adjustments will result from changes in the market, "signaled" via prices, they still tend to assume that such adjustments will come about quickly and at relatively low economic and human costs. To gain a sense of this economistic predisposition, note the way economists discuss the effects of attempts by other countries, especially Japan, to capture the market of some of our industries. Economists say that if Japan wants to subsidize, for instance, the production of airplanes and thus push American-owned Boeing out of business, there is no reason for the U.S. to be concerned. We shall be able to purchase airplanes below cost and the Boeing workers and investors will move to another industry. And if the Japanese will then target *that* industry, we shall be able to obtain some more below-the-cost goods and again move on. This argument disregards the costs of adjustments or assumes them to be minimal. If, instead, we recognize that retraining and resettling the workers of Boeing or any other industry has high economic and human costs, we should also recognize that such continuous churning of an economy can be detrimental and unsettling.

In fact, we know that people in general respond very slowly and poorly to new information. One of the many examples from our own experience: Years after IRAs were introduced, despite their indisputable benefits for practically anyone who paid taxes (until the law was changed in 1986), many millions of Americans entitled to open IRAs did not do so; and most of those who opened IRAs did so only after being reminded frequently of their benefits, and even then typically deposited their funds toward the end of the year rather than on the first day, the time when they should rationally have done so. This despite the fact that there were no emotional, traditional, or any other nonrational reason to "resist" IRAs; these are the kind of factors that play an important role in many other social changes and the kind at issue here. All of this holds, only much more so, for societies in which the capabilities for adjusting are significantly lower then ours.

Socio-economists, a new breed of social scientists who seek to merge economics with the findings and concepts of other social sciences, stress that many factors increase frictions, make adjustments slow and difficult, and hence increase the economic, human, and political costs of transitions. What are the specific factors that make adjustments

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in Poland and other communist countries of necessity slow, painful, and costly? Here are some of them.

Ingrained Habits

AFTER DECADES of developing poor work habits, many millions of workers, civil servants, and cadres—all of whom are used to making their living by political service—are not readily employable in a Western kind of workplace. There is no question they desire Western goods and services, but it does not follow that they wish (or are able) to work hard to pay for them. Imagine a Polish factory worker who is used to hanging around, as many of them do, spending much of his time at work taking care of private business (especially shopping), suddenly being thrust into, say, a McDonald's. Actually, imagination is not necessary, as there is an example at hand. In Yugoslavia (which has had a much longer and broader exposure to Western ways, with millions of Western tourists roaming its streets each year and a relatively free economy) as many as 40 percent of new employees in McDonald's quit in the first weeks of employment because they found the pressures of work too taxing. Or imagine a politically-appointed commissar who may never have done an honest day's work in his life, who is used to spending his days checking people's political loyalties and lecturing on Marxism, being "converted" to work in a high-tech job, say, as a computer programmer.

True, as Albert Hirschman pointed out years ago in his observations about Latin America, it is possible to find in such countries some people, say 10 percent, who, for whatever sociological fluke, are more able to work in a Western style. Thus, for instance, in Central America's so-called "banana" republics, one can find enough "modern" workers to run a quite efficient airline; and in the USSR there are now some relatively efficient hotels and restaurants. In Poland, where the farm sector has never been highly collectivized, their number may well be significantly larger. But it would be a gross error to conclude that most people, with poorly ingrained work habits after decades of communist rule, could be quickly shifted to a Western style of work.

Jane L. Curry, in an article on the psychological barriers to reform in Poland, writes, "Unreformed habits are comfortable enough —and, often, individually profitable enough—that both the workers and their bosses want to reform others, but not themselves." One Soviet working woman put it quite explicitly to a Western reporter: "I don't want to work like an American. . . . The Soviet Union is a good place because if you don't want to work hard you don't have to." She is grateful for what she says is "the one freedom Soviet society appears to provide in abundance: the freedom to loaf" (*Wall Street Journal*, June 3, 1987).

In *Political Studies* (1988), Jack Tarkowski writes:

> One should not forget the widespread and deeply rooted conservative values and attitudes which support routine and stagnation [in Poland]. Many people, including those at the very top of the power structure, simply cannot change their world view, attitudes and behavioral patterns, shaped by 40 years of a centralistic, 'command-distributive' system.

He observes that there is a fear of change and innovation, because every change entails a risk, and people at the poverty level prefer what the author calls an "equilibrium of poverty" over innovation. Further, even where there is no active, effective resistance to change, there is resistance by "bureaucratic inertia."

Tarkowski cites Witold Morawski's conclusion that, "Polish workers are not orientated towards catching up with more prosperous workers elsewhere, but rather towards sheer survival." There is a lot of "wringing of hands and a fatalistic way of thinking." According to Tarkowski, 1987 Soviet data reveal that 20 percent of Soviet workers do not want perestroika, 50 percent are passive and mistrustful, and only 30 percent support re-

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cent reforms and changes. Also, there is a prevalent "claimant attitude" according to which people expect the state to provide for employment and a very modest way of life, always "taking care" of all the people. He suggests that "these attitudes are very deeply rooted in the paternalistic mode of operation of the state," accompanied by a fear of uncertainty—i.e., competition. Surveys show that these attitudes are not only common among the less educated, less skilled, and older people, but are also found in a high proportion of the skilled, more educated, and younger people.

The Importance of Envy

NEXT, THERE IS a matter of relative deprivations—in plain English, envy. Socialism is a great equalizer; all but the party elite and a few choice scientists, intellectuals, etc., live in the same basic misery. Following the opening to market forces—once there are some who are economically successful, who employ others, and who display wealth—the resentment rises rapidly.

In the Soviet Union, the formation of small private companies called "cooperatives," which work for profit and are owned by their employees, generates much envy. Charles P. Wallace reports that "the relatively large sums being earned by cooperatives have aroused a considerable amount of jealousy, both from state institutions that work far less efficiently and private workers who grumble about the disparity in their take-home pay" (*Los Angeles Times*, May 2, 1988). He also found that "State employees are becoming increasingly jealous of the sudden wealth being harvested by the co-ops. 'Is this socialist justice?' asked a tractor driver, who complained that in the winter months he earned only 3 rubles a day fixing machinery, while he read about cooperative workers making clips for women's lingerie earning 100 rubles a day."

James Lloyd, a researcher for Radio Free Europe, found the same attitudes in (pre-Tiananmen Square) China: "Many officials do little to help private initiative because they dislike seeing private businessmen, who have no legal limit on their earnings, earn many times their own salaries." These private businessmen "are looked down upon as greedy and uneducated and find it difficult to marry."

Americans react to this phenomena by seeking the same riches for themselves, by trying to keep up with the Joneses. Members of socialist societies respond by demanding punitive taxes on the more successful ones, or by openly raising the question of whether they wish to buy the whole "deal"; many state that they would rather have the old ways than a society with highly differentiated standards of living. Thus the *Wall Street Journal* reports that "many East Germans find that there is no place like home; emigrés to the West miss the subsidized lifestyle and loaf on the job." They miss the child care programs that cover 90 percent of the children and make it easy for mothers to work outside the home. Many of those who stay behind stay because they do not have the urge to compete in what they call the "elbows out" society. In short, they are committed to a different set of values than those in the West. These values and attitudes may be changed gradually, but at least for a significant transition period, and possibly for much longer, they prove a major barrier to rapid economic change.

Illicit Behavior

THERE ARE STRONG traditions of illicit behavior in the countries at issue. One often cannot make do by playing it straight. People survive by illegal trading in foreign currency, taking home parts and raw material from the work place, paying bribes, making illicit deals across bureaucracies, and so on. Not a few on the margins, but most. As Steven Sampson has noted about Poland in his article "The Second Economy of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe" (*Annals of the American Academy of Political and*

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Social Sciences, 1987), "bribes to obtain supplies and protection money to controllers are part of normal business operations"; "the typical collective farmer uses the collective as a resource to be exploited, working not for the collective but for the household enterprise."

According to Gregory Grossman, "The most common crime of this kind is theft of socialist property. . . . It takes place everywhere" ("Notes on the Illegal Private Economy and Corruption," a paper submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, October 10, 1979). Grossman found that people steal goods and money directly and routinely by means of short measuring and adulteration of products, by private production on the job, and by producing on company time goods which are smuggled out of the workplace. Grossman describes the whole process in terms of "the Four B's": barter, black market, bribe, and *blat* (Russian for "connections" or "influence").

Soviet economist Tatyana Koryagin says that, "Soviet society is riddled with millionaires who make their fortunes through the country's vast 'shadow,' or illegal, economy" (*Washington Post*, August 13, 1988). She estimates that "the Soviet Union's illegal economy is worth 'roughly' as much as $145 billion a year." Cheating the system is widely condoned:

> Speculation [trading in the black market], which has become a customary and everyday phenomenon, encounters no active moral disapproval. In some cases, if it is not approved, it is indulgently justified: well, a person works and does his damnedest, but you cannot live on your wages alone. . . . The opinion that you cannot survive honestly in trade is considered axiomatic among salespeople themselves: cheating and deceiving the buyer is considered an indisputable fact of life (G. Belikova and A. Shokhin, *Soviet Sociology*, March/April 1989).

Beyond lining their own pockets, Sampson points out, managers find illegal activities necessary to meet centrally-planned goals:

> Plan fulfillment is every manager's primary concern, if only because this is the only way his or her career can advance. Hence, various extra-plan strategies are used to cut through bureaucratic bottlenecks or to procure supplies, transport, repair, extra labor, and spare parts. This shadow economy involves misreporting to the authorities and bribing or making connections with other managers in what are known as family circles.

Political scientists have long called attention to the fact that while some corruption is found in most if not all societies, including those that function very efficiently (e.g., Japan), and while some forms of corruption (e.g., bribes to officials) often allow Third World countries to improve their performance somewhat (they make entrenched bureaucracies "move"), a high level of illicit conduct is very burdensome and incompatible with a modern economy. Indeed, Sampson concludes: "By stealing labor, time, materials, or funds from the first economy, the second economy makes the formal system even more inefficient than it is already. Labor is wasted, goods are shoddy, and no one really seems to care."

We tend to forget that modern economies work on a measure of legality, morality, and trust. Indeed, our own recent scandals should remind us that as the pursuit of greed spreads from its contained compartment (the market) into the containing vessel (the societal capsule), the economy suffers. In a society in which faking records, quotas, systematic theft, and so on is a way of life, before major economic changes can be introduced the standards of private and public morality must be raised. It is a daunting task.

The Infrastructure

ON TOP OF all this, there are problematic factors associated with the infrastructure. In Poland for example, while state banks exist, there is no system for clearing checks and most business is done on a cash basis, a typically precapitalist condition. Furthermore, the radical change called

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for in the work-mix will entail major shifts in population. In the U.S., when the auto industry was being curtailed and the oil industry was expanding, workers moved from Michigan to Texas; and in later years, when these fortunes were reversed, labor followed in the opposite direction, although even in the U.S. such movements entail considerable economic and human costs. In Eastern Europe such relocations are very difficult. First of all, there is much less traditional precedent for people to leave their families and communities in order to move about; and, second, the housing shortage is such that it is very difficult to relocate—not to mention the costs of building new schools, hospitals, and the other facilities required by new concentrations of the work force. Many other parts of the infrastructure are similarly quite underdeveloped.

The Importance of Capital

LAST BUT NOT least is the matter of capital. While productivity is affected by workers' morale, work ethic, and dedication, the amount of capital available per worker is critical. Needless to say, Poland and other such countries are very short of capital. It might be said that the West, through economic aid, credit, and private investments could provide the capital needed for a new infrastructure and capital goods. But first, it must be understood that the necessary amounts are much larger than the transitional aid cited; after all, $24 billion in aid was given to Poland in the 1970s and was used up without leaving much of a trace, other than $40 billion of accumulated debt. To get a sense of the magnitude of the sums involved, *Business Week* reports that East Germany, the most productive and well-financed communist economy, would need $800 billion to bring its technology and economy up to par.

Moreover, Western banks and other investors are unlikely to ignore the risks involved. There are very strong reasons to believe that sometime over the next decade there will be a major traditionalist reaction to the recent changes in the USSR and at least in some of the Eastern European countries. It does not take a full return to Stalinism for the Western investors to lose all or most of their investments—as they did in recent decades in scores of countries. We already have a case study of what happens when, as Ambassador Ronald S. Lauder put it, Americans grab deals in the East they would walk away from in the West. A study by Jim Mann shows how Americans lost their shirts in China trying to build a "Beijing Jeep" (the name of his book) the result of which is well summarized in the book's subtitle: *The Short, Unhappy Romance of American Business in China.* Most Western investors are unlikely to repeat the same mistake on a large scale.

It follows that Poland and other Eastern European countries will have to prove their political stability over years and accumulate more capital of their own if economic development on a higher level is to take place. In short, progress will be, at best, gradual.

The Inflation Problem

WHAT ABOUT well-known cases of success in quick fights against inflation? Indeed, Western interventions have helped to reduce inflation in several countries very drastically. However, these basically recessionary policies often resulted in low growth rate, massive unemployment, and political instability; moreover, they were often followed quite shortly by resurrected inflation, albeit not to the previous rates. For example, inflation in Israel was reduced from 185 percent in 1985 to 16.4 percent in 1988; but economic growth fell from near 4 percent to 1.6 percent in the same years, and inflation is heating up again. Also, unemployment has risen sharply. That is, the inflationary cure, which relies largely on monetary restrictions (a typical IMF prescription) rather than focusing on strengthening economic growth, tends to lead to recessions followed by stagnation. The effect is like reducing the temperature of a patient from 105 degrees to 103—an impor-

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tant achievement, but a treatment that often leaves the patient quite feeble. He is better off, but still very far from economically healthy. It follows that if these economies are to be truly converted from command and control to mixed economies, with a strong market component, the main work will have to be internal, encompassing both the social (morality, attitudes, habits) and economic fronts, and that Western help should focus on long-run changes, not seeking or encouraging quick fixes.

Cooling Expectations

WESTERN HELP, especially if couched in terms of promising to alleviate the pain of transition and helping to ensure a quick fix, may backfire in more ways than one. Psychological factors are at work but not quite in the way Sachs and company have it. They hinder the desirable progress by vastly inflating expectations. People who have been frustrated for decades and who have enormous pent-up demands are increasingly exposed via television, contact with tourists, and their own travel, to the "American" way of life. They are practically obsessive in their preoccupation with consumer goods. (A Soviet colleague used to call me on a regular basis to feel out American public views on this or that matter, hardly concealing that he was going to write reports on his return. When he visits now, he hurries through his business to ask me the important questions: Where can he buy a Sony or a good suit?) Out of these unbounded aspirations rise completely unrealistic notions—hopes, in effect, that Poland (with its current GNP per capita estimated at less than $2,000) and other countries could double and triple their standard of living in no time once they embrace Western free-market economics.

The last thing the West should do is add fuel to this fire of aspirations with promises of quick cures to be achieved by relatively limited financial reforms, ignoring the very large scale economic, cultural, institutional, and other changes that will have to be made. On the contrary, the West should stress that it took us several *generations* to build up our economy to its current level, and we still have a hard time holding on in a highly competitive world. True, given certain circumstances it may be possible for the process to be accelerated for late-comers, but there is a limit, and in any case those conditions do not yet exist in most Eastern European countries. Gains will come to those who work hard for them and save, and they will come gradually.

It is sometimes suggested that unless there is a rapid increase in the supply of consumer goods, the reformers, especially Gorbachev, will run out of political support. Hence they should spend their hard currency reserves on, and we should finance their purchase of, massive amounts of consumer goods. It might well be true that such steps would buy time, but such a "purchase" makes sense only if one assumes that their economies can be turned around quickly to the mass-production of consumer goods on their own. If this is not the case, as I most strongly believe, *then an avalanche of consumer goods in one year (and the expenditure of reserves, credits, and aid on them) will only make it harder the next year to satisfy the raised demands.* Consumers do not have in mind a fixed basket of goods; they have flexible aspirations. If they expect little, then regular supplies of soap, bras, and some meat will be perceived as progress. If they learn to expect a steady stream of staples, televisions, and cars, they are likely only to be much more disappointed the next year. What do we or they gain if we keep Gorbachev and the other new leaders in office one more year, only to face more deeply disappointed masses the next? We should support the development of light industries that can provide a steady stream of consumer products and those that can produce exports to pay for imports.

If the excessive expectations are not going to be curbed, they will very likely be followed by an explosion of frustrations and resentments. Moreover, the concept of a free market and the victory of capitalism, which so many in the West are already celebrating,

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will be discredited. People in the East may then conclude, wrongly, that the system cannot work for them. This point is crucial. The West is now basking, as it well might, in a tremendous sense of euphoria and vindication; after many years of challenging the West, communism is visibly falling apart and the people of these countries are voting—with their feet and voices, as well as their actual votes—in favor of our system. But this should not be confused with a transition to a free market, as much of the Western media assumes. It is very possible that some or all of these countries will regress. The recent developments in the Philippines (for very different reasons in a very different country) show that transitions are rarely smooth or proceed in a straight line. Before the dust settles in Eastern Europe, there will be many vicissitudes.

We need to overcome our national predisposition to look for quick optimistic solutions and easy happy endings. We must learn to be patient and to sustain support of historical trends that gradually—after twists and turns—work in our favor and to the benefit of the people involved. We should provide some economic aid, but as a symbol of our approval and support, rather than in the expectation that it can transform the economic prospects of Eastern Europe.

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Scalapino's Asia

Nicholas Eberstadt

MODERN ASIAN history may be said to begin with Western contact—more precisely, with the systematic intrusion of Western power, thought, and political arrangements. While the instruments of this intrusion have been diverse, and have involved great numbers of people from across the entire Western world, the task of interpreting what resulted today falls upon a handful of specialists and academics. For whatever reason—be it the difficulty of mastering the region's languages; the profoundly alien nature of many Asian cultures; the decline of the missionary tradition; or our absence of an indigenous colonial tradition—many of the most perceptive American observers of modern Asia have in recent generations found their home in the academy.

In view of the strategic, political, and commercial importance that once-distant Asia has assumed in this century, it may fairly be said that our specialists in Asian affairs have come not only to record history, but to shape it. The influence of the American Asia specialist appears at its most felicitous in the example of Harvard University's Edwin O. Reischauer. During the American postwar occupation of Japan, Reischauer served as an adviser in the drafting of a new constitution for the country—the document that has provided the legal framework for the peace, prosperity, and freedom which Japanese citizens enjoy today. Not all American scholarship on Asia, however, has proved conducive to such fortunate outcomes. At the time of the Vietnam War, for example, many academic assessments of Southeast Asia were deficient, even misinformed. On such questions as the nature and structure of the Vietnamese communist movement, relations between North Vietnam and China, Chinese capabilities during the Cultural Revolution, and the nature of the Khmer Rouge opposition to the American backed forces in Cambodia, in fact, a number of the most influential studies have proved, in retrospect, to be seriously amiss.[1] Though poor scholarship was hardly responsible for the American failure in Vietnam, it may well have had a role in making that involvement more costly—not only for the United States, but also for the peoples of the region.

In the years since Vietnam, the political and commercial importance of Asia as a whole has increased further. One need not concur with predictions of "the coming dominance of the Pacific" to recognize that the need for accurate analyses and assessments of

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[1]For a recent review of some of this scholarship, see Stephen J. Morris, "Ho Chi Minh, Pol Pot, and Cornell," *The National Interest*, no. 16 (Summer 1989).

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the region has become progressively more acute. That need leads us, as it has throughout the twentieth century, to the corpus of learning that is now known as "Asian studies." There is currently perhaps no better vantage point from which to judge the state of "Asian studies" in America than from the writings of Robert Scalapino, a singular figure among today's students of Oriental affairs and one of the foremost commentators on the topic in the world today. His latest book, *The Politics of Development: Perspectives on Twentieth Century Asia*,* provides a welcome vehicle for just such an examination.

Through five decades of research and writing, Scalapino has established a remarkable academic career. A prolific writer, a superb archivist, an active coauthor, and an accomplished editor, Scalapino has left a trail of pathbreaking contributions to the understanding of modern Asia. Unlike other leading figures in Oriental studies, moreover—Edwin O. Reischauer, John K. Fairbanks, and the late L.S.S. O'Malley come to mind—Scalapino has not limited his focus to a single empire within Asia.

Shortly after World War II, Scalapino completed what remains the definitive analysis of the breakdown of Japan's prewar democracy. He was later to write what may still be the finest study in any language on the Japanese communist movement. Scalapino then turned to communism in North Korea—where, as he notes in *The Politics of Development*, a political system has been fashioned "as close to totalitarianism as a humanly operated society could come"—coauthoring the single best book to date on that strange experiment. He has written perceptively on the breakdown of the imperial order in China, the origins of that country's still influential anarchist movement, and the configurations of power within China's post-Liberation Communist elite. In recent years, as director of Berkeley's Institute of East Asian Studies, he has convened, and contributed to, research on a variety of contemporary questions, including the balance of power in the Far East, the nature of the American security commitment to various countries in the region, the development of the so-called "Pacific economy," and the prospects for communism in Asia.

The Politics of Development takes as its focus the year 1945. "At the end of the war," Scalapino notes, "Asia was virtually stateless." European colonial authority had been decisively weakened during the course of the Pacific campaign, and those countries that had enjoyed sovereignty before the war were either living under occupying armies or convulsed in turmoil. New states, and polities, were to establish themselves throughout Asia in a few short years. Their progress and behavior, however, were strongly conditioned by the events that had resulted in this pervasive disintegration of state power.

THE WESTERN political presence in Asia, Scalapino suggests, was compromised by a visible inconsistency. The Western idea of liberal rule proclaimed the elevation of the individual and committed itself to the protection of his rights—but one of these many rights was understood to be the right to self-government. Even within Europe itself, the rise of the nation-state had provided the example of self-government defined by reference to ethnicity. Ethnic distinctions have never been lost upon populations in the East. To the contrary: in Scalapino's honest appraisal, in Asia "the issue of race was omnipresent." "Submerged or overt," he writes, "the Asian's consciousness of white domination of the world—including his own society and to some degree himself—could never be erased." Thus, the very fact of Western political power in the region was to evoke the deepest, and most powerful, reaction from otherwise disparate societies.

Central though the influence of "race" may have been to indigenous political motion in prewar Asia, its impact was anything but uniform. Scalapino contrasts Japan and

*Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 137 pp., $19.95.

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China, Asia's largest independent countries at the time. Of all Asia's regions, Japan—territorially distinct, ethnically homogenous, nationally conscious, independently administered—most closely matched the Western conception of the nation-state. In the course of only a few decades, the country not only absorbed considerable Western technology—on its own terms—but fashioned itself, if briefly, into what Scalapino deems to have been a genuine Western-style democracy ("replete," he concedes, "with Japanese characteristics," but nevertheless "embod[ying] two indispensable requirements: political choice and civil rights"). China, on the other hand, did not even remotely resemble a nation-state. At the turn of the century, it was still a far-flung empire—an empire, moreover, in which "the imperial institution" was "in the hands of the Manchu," a people separate from and historically hostile to the Han Chinese. For these reasons, in Scalapino's estimate, "the West simply had nothing to offer early twentieth-century China in the form of a political system that could be emulated or adopted. The unfolding of modern China's tragedy is inextricably connected with this fact."

RACIALISM, of course, was not the only potent illiberal doctrine to circulate in the Far East before World War II. Others—including Leninism and what Scalapino terms "fascism"—came from the West itself. Asia found itself essentially stateless in 1945 because an earlier liberal international order had collapsed. Events in Asia had played their part in this drama. In 1937 Japan, by then industrialized but no longer democratic, began what was to become World War II in a quest to carve a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere out of China and the European colonial territories. In Scalapino's view, Japan's contribution to the postwar order, while inadvertent, was nonetheless signal. As he puts it, "The military and political elites that were to emerge after August 1945 owed much to Japan, both because it had humiliated their foreign rulers and because it had given them a chance to organize, and in some cases, to arm." No less significant, Japan's adventures in China affected the struggle between Nationalist and Communist forces on the Mainland. Indeed, by Scalapino's account, Mao Zedong once greeted a visiting delegation of Japanese generals with the words, "Gentlemen, we owe our victory to you!"

Rapid material advance has been characteristic of much of Asia in the years since the war. In Scalapino's view, economic results during this period were particularly sensitive to politics; political arrangements, in turn, were decisively and distinctively influenced by a handful of new rulers. "The significance of the personal element," he warns, "is often overlooked by those who search for ironclad laws of development." In postwar Asia, "it was not institutions but men that moved people and shaped the broad course of society."

His assessments of the leading figures of the day are succinct. India's Nehru was "a blend of Brahmin aristocrat and British university graduate"; South Korea's Syngman Rhee, "like many revolutionaries, possessed a combination of single-mindedness and unquenchable optimism that enabled him to survive decades of failure"; Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, "at his zenith, set standards for good government that others could emulate." As for Mao, he was ultimately to "treat the world. . . to the extraordinary spectacle of personalized and increasingly irrational rule at the apex of a giant bureaucratic pyramid. . . . The saga of an aging emperor, enfeebled by a stroke and assorted other ills, insulated from the world by a small coterie of retainers, was not new to this ancient land."

China, of course, was not the only place in which reckless and personalized rule wrought tragedy. Vietnam, North Korea, Indonesia, and even Burma would also figure on such a list. Reflecting upon this unhappy facet of the recent Asian experience, Scalapino wonders aloud whether "insufficient homage has been paid to monarchy as a vehicle for successful evolutionary change in

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Asia. In Japan and Thailand, the survival of the monarchy. . . prevented a cult of personality from forming around others." "Where the monarch disappeared," he argues, "some substitute had to be found, often an individual who assumed the trappings of monarchy without its traditional restraints."

Although today Asia's postwar development is commonly told as a success story, that has not always been the most obvious interpretation. "Viewed from the perspective of the late 1960s," Scalapino recalls, "pessimism seemed warranted"; however, "a relatively dismal picture change[d] in the two decades that followed."

Why the change? By Scalapino's reading, a principal reason is that today, "in contrast to earlier times, economics is in command, and politics is the dependent variable." Over the past generation, in his estimate, the economic exhaustion of Leninist regimes has become evident. Surveying conditions in China, Vietnam, North Korea, Mongolia, and in Asia's most powerful communist state, the Soviet Union, Scalapino suggests that we may be "witnessing the most profound changes in Leninist societies since the Bolshevik revolution—changes that may warrant our speaking of a second revolution auguring the irreversible decline of Leninism." China, in his view, is in the vanguard of this process, now "moving into the authoritarian-pluralist category of societies."

Within the grouping of states that Scalapino categorizes as "authoritarian-pluralist," meanwhile, the spread of prosperity, itself abetted by improved communication and increased external contact, is seen as militating for political openness and competition. There is much talk today of the role of the "middle class" in moving such places as the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea toward a more liberal polity. To Scalapino, however, "the term 'middle class' is inappropriate if understood in its classical Western sense. The vanguard agitating for a new politics consists primarily of students, intellectuals, journalists, and assorted professional elements." These groups, he cautions, are "at once critical to the initiation of democracy and potentially its ultimate enemies."

Then there are what Scalapino calls the "older Asian democracies"—by his count, Japan, India, Malaysia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka. Their vigor and resilience, he says, have been widely underestimated. "Indian democracy," for example, "continues to survive multiple problems, defying the pessimists." But the difficulties facing these states, and others aspiring to a "democratic" status, remain very real. Even in Japan, one-party dominance is still the rule; "the accommodation of Asian democracy to periodic alternations of power at the center remains to be tested. When one party knows only how to govern and others know only how to oppose, none of them can be fully responsible." The development of democracy in Asia may be further tested, he suggests, by religious strife, regional passions, and mediocre leadership (the latter, in his view, calls to mind India and the Philippines).

Nonetheless, Scalapino's prognosis for Asia sounds generally optimistic. "The odds against a major war and in favor of a gradual accommodation on various fronts," he says, "have grown exponentially." Moreover, "ties among and between Asian states are proliferating" and "on balance, the growing interaction is positive, contributing both to economic development and political openness." In such a world, he feels, foreign policy is less likely to require alliances, more likely instead to reward nuanced alignments. Thus, "for the United States, as for the Soviet Union, the management of alignments" is "a supreme diplomatic and strategic challenge."

THERE IS MUCH to praise in *The Politics of Development*. It is difficult, in fact, to think of a more concise and judicious reading of political trends in the Far East by an American scholar in recent years. It is precisely the book's merits, however, that should make its shortcomings the more apparent. Scalapino's panoramic presentation has its drawbacks as well as many strengths. These drawbacks tend to limit its value pre-

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cisely in areas where it might otherwise be most relied upon for counsel.

Scalapino's treatment of contemporary Asia, for example, is organized around a schema that classifies regimes as either Leninist, "authoritarian/pluralist," or democratic. Conventional though that taxonomy may have become, it is nonetheless surprising that so seasoned an historian should embrace it. It is a deeply flawed and potentially misleading construct.

The problem with the schema lies in its middle link. The authoritarian/pluralist "system" to which Scalapino frequently refers, and by which he would presumably define most present governments in Asia, is no "system" at all. By convention, "authoritarian/pluralist" governments are understood to be regimes that are neither totalitarian (in the liberal Western sense) nor democratic (again, in the liberal Western sense). In effect, it is a catch-all classification for what is left after governments with distinctive and characteristic modes of organization have been subtracted from the roster of identifiable states. Like the notion of the "Third World," the label "authoritarian/pluralist" can only describe countries on the basis of what they are *not*.[2]

If "authoritarian/pluralistic" governance is of limited use as a descriptive device, it is more problematic still as a predictive tool. Scalapino has asserted that China may be making a transition to "authoritarian/pluralist" government. This sounds to be an important conjecture—but what, exactly, does it mean? The totalitarian project in China, of course, looks to be in better health today than many diagnoses in 1988 would have indicated. But presuming a departure from Leninist rule, what sort of government might be anticipated in China? Scalapino strongly implies that the passage to the authoritarian/pluralist "system" would presage an orderly and relatively enlightened rule, perhaps rather like Taiwan's. He may, of course, be right. China's own history, however, suggests a variety of less heartening alternatives. Rapacious bandit-government, civil war, fractured and contentious warlord fiefdoms, and decay of authority to the point of near-chaos are but a few of the "authoritarian/pluralist" arrangements familiar from Chinese past. If Marxist-Leninist government in China eventually gives way, it may do so in any of a number of fashions. To impose a label upon the result so elastic as to encompass all of these diverse possibilities is to obscure, not illuminate, an event that would be of central importance to the population of China, and indeed to the world.

IF THE FUTURE of communism in China is an issue of indisputable importance, Japan's prospective role in the world economy would certainly seem to be another. Scalapino contends that Japan's "domestic market must be greatly expanded, a development requiring major reform and innovations. . . . [There is] a widespread feeling in the world that Japan has been selfish, taking from the international economic order far more than it has contributed. . . . In this age, one must avoid an epitaph that reads, 'Too little, too late.' " That assessment, of course, conforms with a viewpoint—commonly expressed in America and Europe these days—that "Japan, Inc." profits immensely from unfair competition with its trading partners in world markets. Sophisticated variants of the argument are currently in vogue in academic circles. Whether expounded in a barroom or a classroom, however, it is an argument of dubious validity.

If Japan's trade strategy leads it to subsidize exports heavily, as critics assert, there would be ample ground for complaint. The

[2]The very terms chosen to define the category suggest the weakness of the classification. *All* governments rely upon the exercise of authority; when a state ceases to exercise authority, it ceases to be. By the same token, some measure of pluralism is common to all societies, if only because local rulers are incapable of preventing it. A category that includes all governments, past or present, is of little descriptive power.

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injured parties, however, would not be international consumers (obvious beneficiaries of such a process), but rather Japan's own taxpayers. In the short run, it is true, heavily subsidized exports could displace products manufactured elsewhere, artificially increasing Japanese market share for specific internationally traded items. Even so, at the national level (the accounting unit that seems to be preferred by so many academic critics of Japanese trade practices) Japan's principal trade partners would likely gain more from heavily subsidized imports than they would lose, in terms of value added, from export production foregone.

It is unclear, moreover, how Japan profits from what some foreign observers take to be its sinister practice of accumulating enormous reserves of competitor's currency, insofar as these currencies have generally been depreciating against the yen over time.[3] To the extent that Japan's trade regimen diverges from the "free trade" ideal, it would seem to transfer wealth from Japanese hands into the hands of foreigners.

In and of itself, moreover, the portrait of a Japan propelled to affluence by predatory export practices seems almost bizarrely inconsistent with the particulars of the case. For all the excitement about the Japanese "export offensive" in Western policy circles, the fact is that exports account for a rather *low* fraction of Japan's production. According to the latest figures from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the ratio of exports to national output is twice as high for Britain and Canada as for Japan. There is not a single country in Western Europe for which exports comprise as small a share of national output as for Japan; correspondingly, the domestic market is proportionately larger in Japan than in any Western European economy.

Comparisons between Japan and West Germany may be especially instructive. In 1988, the latest year for which figures are available, export of goods and services were estimated at a little less than 13 percent of GNP in Japan, and a little over 32 percent in West Germany. In 1988, West Germany's export volume, measured in dollars, was greater than Japan's—as, indeed, it has been virtually every year since the end of World War II. As a fraction of national output, West Germany's trade surplus has also been higher than Japan's for at least three decades.[4] One may note that West Germany does not receive regular instruction from abroad on how to reform its trade policies and expand its domestic market.

It is true that the Japanese economy, by comparison with others in the industrial world, is marked by some unusual distortions—most notably, a relatively small service sector and a real estate market in which prices are amazingly high. Government policies are at least partly responsible for these aberrations. But what if such policy-induced distortions were attenuated? On the whole,

[3]For many years, foreign critics of Japan's trade practices charged Japan with deliberately undervaluing the yen to increase Japan's trade advantage. That case no longer looks even superficially tenable. In 1988—the latest year for which figures are available—the exchange rate between the yen and the dollar was roughly $1 = 128 yen. On the basis of domestic price levels in the two countries, however, the "purchasing power parity" (PPP) between the two currencies would have been roughly $1 = 208 yen. In other words, by this measure the yen appeared to be "overvalued" in international markets by more than 60 percent. An overvalued currency may have many merits, but it is not commonly regarded as a vehicle for promoting exports. PPP estimates from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *National Accounts* 1960–1988 Volume 1 (Paris: OECD, 1989).

[4]Figures derived from World Bank, *World Development Report 1989* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), and the following serial publications: International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics;* Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *National Accounts* and *Economic Outlook*.

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of course, Japanese consumers and taxpayers would gain (a matter admittedly of less than central concern to many critics of Japanese trade). The adjustments projected, however, would likely *reduce* overall Japanese costs of production. Other things being equal, therefore, Japanese "competitiveness" would improve, and Japan's world market share would be expected to increase. Incidentally, an indirect consequence of such adjustments could be an "export" of recessionary pressures to Japan's principal trade partners. In short, it is by no means self-evident that "reform" of Japan's domestic market would actually assuage the foreign critics who currently assail the country for economic "selfishness." In the final analysis, such critics may find that their complaint is not actually with Japan, but with the prospect of a liberal international economic order.

IF SCALAPINO'S judgments about the Japanese economy seem to reflect strands of contemporary popular sentiment, there are also instances where he lends seemingly casual support to some current, highly ideological interpretations of the human condition. *The Politics of Development*, for example, subscribes unreservedly to the notion of the "population threat," and reviews current events with an alertness to their potential impact on "overpopulation." Scalapino writes, without irony, of the "surplus population" in Asia's cities; chides early postwar regimes for paying too little attention to "population planning"; and describes improvements in public health and life expectancy in China as "a mixed blessing, to be sure."

Scalapino's adherence to this controversial, and arguably extreme, doctrine does not aid him on his tour through modern Asia. Reviewing the current situation in China, for example, Scalapino remarks that the country is "afflicted with overconsumption in terms of per capita income." While such a judgment may be consistent with a neo-Malthusian sensibility, it is not in keeping with facts. According to the World Bank's numbers, the share of private consumption, and overall consumption, in China's economy is lower than for practically any other country in the world, rich or poor. Leninist regimes, as Scalapino would ordinarily be among the first to point out, are not famous champions of the consumer.

Scalapino's enthusiasm for "population planning" apparently leads him to view China's ongoing antinatalist campaign with equanimity; in any event, that momentous and widely discussed experiment rates not even a mention in his survey of modern Asia. For an observer of political events, such an omission is both significant and unfortunate. As is widely known, the 1980s witnessed a relaxation of many of the harshest and most costly economic policies Beijing had previously imposed. The widely heralded "liberalizations" occasioned speculation overseas that the Chinese government might be voluntarily passing from a Leninist polity to some other form of rule. Such speculation was essentially incognizant of, and uninformed by, the actual nature of China's "one child norm" program. Contemplation of that far-reaching, coercive, and relentless exercise of power would have left little doubt about the totalitarian *intentions* of China's Communist rulers, however constrained their means.

As it happens, population policy does afford broader insights into contemporary politics in Asia. For China is not the only state in Asia to impose ambitious programs of "population planning" upon its subjects. Vietnam, though currently aligned with Moscow, is implementing a stringent and intrusive program of fertility limitation modeled after China's own. While many of North Korea's internal policies remain shrouded in mystery, it appears that Pyongyang has been secretly enforcing an anti-natal policy for many years. In Singapore, where the aging prime minister has long talked fondly of eugenics, a muscular policy of fertility suppression has been abandoned for an equally enthusiastic effort to raise birth rates; the very dangers previously ascribed to rapid population growth are now officially adduced to

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slow population growth. In Malaysia, pronatalism has also recently been embraced, in the thinly disguised hope that local Malays will increasingly outnumber the country's ethnic Chinese. At the very least, the fact that such practices are widely enforced might seem to call into question Scalapino's judgment that "today economics is in command, and politics is the dependent variable."

In a sense, the shortcomings evident in *The Politics of Development* are unexceptional. This is not the first time, after all, that an ordinarily independent and penetrating observer of political events has felt the pull of prevailing academic fashion. What is intriguing in Scalapino's case, however, is that such lapses should so comfortably coexist with an analysis otherwise quite at odds with the current word on Asia.

It is paradoxical that Scalapino should be so keenly aware of the individual's potential to influence history, yet so dismissive of the potential of human beings in the aggregate; so enthusiastic about the prospect that liberal international forces might temper and improve international relations, yet so ambivalent about the extension of human choice that economic liberalization necessarily requires; so penetrating about the historical evolution of government in the East, yet so inattentive to the profound differences among its current regimes.

There is a pattern to these paradoxes. Intermittently, and unpredictably, Scalapino appears to embrace a perspective that is distinctly illiberal—out of touch, one might say, with that tendency in the Western tradition that is peculiar to the West alone. Illiberality, in fact, accounts for the greatest paradox of this study. For the defining limitation to this American assessment of Asian politics is not in the author's knowledge of the East, but rather in the extent to which his analysis strays from the liberal precepts of the West.

To be sure, unlike some American students of Asian affairs, Scalapino holds the liberal Western tradition in respect, not contempt. Unlike many of his peers in the academy, he argues that the tradition has relevance, and advantage, for the peoples of Asia. On the relativistic terrain that demarcates intellectual discussion in contemporary America, however, it is even possible for self-avowed exponents of this tradition to be a bit uncertain about precisely what it is that they mean to cherish and defend. *The Politics of Development* is a work of analysis, not advocacy. It is ironic, therefore, that its analysis should suffer precisely to the degree that its appreciation of the constituting characteristics of the liberal order proves inconstant.

Such inconstancy, it must be said, did not mark the writings of the best Orientalists of an earlier age. The change is significant, and may in itself provide a telling, if inadvertent, indication of prospects for Asia in the years to come.

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Oil and Power in the Nineties

James Schlesinger

IT IS MY purpose in this article to examine certain trends in energy use and supply and their possible impact on geopolitics in the decades ahead. In energy, recent trends amount to the reemergence of older tendencies temporarily suppressed by the oil shocks of the 1970s. These will be related to prospective changes in military strength, in political attitudes, and geopolitical structures—which are also a reflection of forces discernible to the past, though less rigorously so than is the case for energy.

By confining myself to major trends, already discernible, I hope to limit the risks of prophecy. One cannot, of course, measure with any precision either the strength or the pace at which these trends may influence future developments. Moreover, one can have no assurance they will not be reversed. Indeed, the very act of specifying such trends (as in the 1977 CIA estimate of Soviet oil production) is likely to generate forces or even specific countermeasures that serve to bring about such a reversal. (That risk is inherent in any intelligence projection.) Nonetheless, behind the trends that I shall specify, there is considerable momentum. They may be slowed, but it would take a supreme act of will to reverse them entirely.

As the seventeenth-century English political operative and savant, the Marquis of Halifax, stated: "The best qualification of a prophet is to have a good memory." Quite right, for the future is certain to be influenced by the reemergence of past tendencies which, for one reason or another, have been temporarily submerged. Among such tendencies is the intimate association between energy security and the strength of nations or, more broadly, the strength of alliance systems. That association—which in the past has led to military conflict to establish control over fields of coal or oil—has been partially obscured since World War II. The major power blocs have possessed sufficient energy resources—or sufficient political and military power to assure security of supply. But those halcyon days when energy security could be taken for granted came to an end in 1973. Since then the rise of nationalism, the rebirth of religious fundamentalism, and the weakened cohesion of the major power blocs have called renewed attention to the issue of energy security.

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The Energy Scene

WITHOUT DOUBT, the most significant, indeed the dominant, trend in energy is the rapidly growing dependency on OPEC and the producing nations of

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the Persian Gulf. In just four years the demand for OPEC crude oil has risen by some 40 percent—thereby eliminating the atmosphere of desperation, instability, and cutthroat competition that marked OPEC in the middle of the decade. Of late, OPEC has had the comforting task of allocating shares of a *growing* pie. Moreover, the demand for OPEC's supply promises to continue to rise—steadily eliminating whatever surplus capacity presently (or prospectively) exists. This dramatic change in the market has in large measure been driven by developments in the United States. Others too have made their contributions, but in moving the world back toward a sellers' market in oil the United States has again demonstrated that it remains the leader of the Free World.

America's appetite for oil is growing. In four years consumption has increased some 15 percent, recovering from the comparatively low level of 15 million barrels per day (BPD) in 1985 to a level now approaching the peak reached before the second oil shock. At the same time America's ability to satisfy this appetite from domestic resources has been shrinking. The result has been a growth in oil imports, a trend that has recently accelerated. By the end of 1990 imports will have grown by some 4.5 million BPD—roughly doubling in the five year period. Demand continues to rise. Production continues to fall—though the volume of this decline must diminish with time. Nonetheless, by the middle of the decade imports will again have increased by an amount similar to that of the last five years.

There is nothing that compels import growth to occur at this pace. Yet, despite the persistent political rhetoric, not to say hand-wringing, regarding national security, nothing has been done to arrest the growth of imports—and precious little is likely to be done in the foreseeable future. In this era the United States appears wedded to reliance upon "free market forces." Despite a deep-seated public myth or conceit regarding the robustness of America's energy industry (a conceit not significantly extending into the energy industry itself), America has in Ricardian terms virtually no comparative advantage in the production of crude oil. Indeed, it has an impressively high-cost oil industry, getting higher as depletion proceeds.

To be sure, there exist the usual possibilities of enhancing domestic oil production or achieving fuel substitution and limiting oil consumption through a variety of fiscal or regulatory measures. But fiscal options are drastically limited by the budgetary stalemate and by the political constraints that have led to that stalemate. Discouraging oil consumption or directing usage to other fuels through regulatory devices is highly suspect at this time—save for motives of environmental protection. Thus, in brief, imports will continue to grow and to grow rapidly because the measures required to restrain such growth are not in accord with the prevailing national psyche.

Despite the continuing declamations regarding the villainy of the OPEC cartel—which curiously reached their peak at precisely the moment of the cartel's greatest weakness—the United States is now unquestionably the best ally OPEC has. The growth in U.S. import requirements (followed by a corresponding rise in OPEC production) has done more to remove excess slack from the market than has any other force. Though it will have much outside assistance, all by itself the U.S. will dissipate much of the remaining surplus capacity and make the market quite snug by the mid–1990s.

The United States has become the main engine for the restoration of OPEC power. From the perspective of the cartel, actions should speak louder than words. A friend in need is a friend indeed. The United States has been such a friend.

What is true for the United States is, to a lesser degree, true elsewhere. At least for the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) nations production has already peaked and will continue to decline. For non-OPEC producers, generally including the centrally-planned economies, it is likely to stabilize and then decline. World

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consumption continues to rise, perhaps most markedly among Third World nations.

As the market tightens, excess availability declines, and ultimately prices rise, other nations will pay increasing attention to the rapidly expanding role of the United States in the international oil trade. There will be renewed criticism for its propensity to squander energy. Such criticism flourished during the late 1970s, when the growing U.S. appetite for imports similarly pushed up the market. It will be the Return of the Energy Squanderer.

It should be also noted that by the mid–1990s the United States will be facing foreign exchange requirements of over $100 billion a year just to finance its oil imports. Particularly in light of the present health of the U.S. balance of trade, these additional payments for oil imports will detract both from the U.S. economy and from the strength of its geopolitical position.

It is not my primary purpose to speculate on the rate at which prices might be pushed up. If OPEC has learned a lesson from its overreaching at the end of the 1970s, it will exhibit restraint and allow the price to rise gradually enough that it attracts only minimal public attention. Nor is it my purpose to delve deeply into the financial repercussions of the growing oil trade for the balance of payments of importing nations. Suffice to say that the strong will survive and the weak will be hurt. The main point is to emphasize the steadily growing dependency on OPEC and upon the Persian Gulf, a region of the world not noted for its political stability.

As the outside world steadily becomes more dependent upon Gulf crude, the Middle East will become the focus of revived and ever increasing external interest. Even without such outside attention, internal passions and rivalries have turned that region into something like the world's cauldron. Add to those seething rivalries an ever-growing dependency and an ever-rising stake, and the Middle East becomes something akin to the Balkans before 1914—a potential tinder box. Any spark must draw the immediate attention of outside forces.

The Geopolitical Scene

BUT, WHAT is happening to those outside forces—those changes in military capabilities, political goals and attitudes, the cohesion of alliances, and the relative strength and weakness of economies which together provide the structure of geopolitics? Here the trends are less defined and less certain than they are in energy. Nevertheless, they are sufficiently well-defined that they can be delineated with some precision.

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty in determining what the geopolitics will be is the evolution of the Soviet Union, which is as yet unresolved. Under Mr. Gorbachev the Soviet Union, at least temporarily, has placed less stress on military intimidation. Starting with the Afghanistan adventure, but more spectacularly with the recent collapse in Eastern Europe and its own internal strains, the Soviet Union has visibly faded as a threat. But its future remains uncertain and, reflecting that uncertainty, questions persist regarding the perceptions of the military threat, superpower rivalry, and East-West tension. Right now one must judge that there will be, at a minimum, an extended armistice in the Cold War—with no return likely to the tensions of either the high point of the Cold War or the early 1980s. Nonetheless, in assessing the geopolitical future the Soviet Union does remain, as Churchill called it, an "enigma."

As the perception of the Soviet threat fades, the nations of the West will gradually (or perhaps precipitously) relax. U.S. military power will be substantially reduced—the changed appreciation of the threat environment reinforcing what had already become inevitable because of budgetary pressures.

The power of the West will decline, indeed *continue* to decline, as it has been doing in some sense since 1939 or 1945. The process of decolonization followed by the general withdrawal of the European colonial pow-

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ers—perhaps most dramatically exemplified by the withdrawal of British power "east of Suez"—was for a long time masked by the preponderant power after World War II of the United States. It is quite clear, indeed it has become a cliche, that the era of *preponderant* American power is now ending. The United States will remain the single most powerful state on the world stage, but the period of *pax Americana* is now over. Western power, while it will remain formidable, will gradually be reduced—for demographic if for no other reasons. In the twenty-first century the population of the Western bloc will have fallen to less than 10 percent of the world's population—in contrast to the 30 percent that it was prior to World War II.

The spread of sophisticated military capabilities is likely to continue. The perceived decline of the Soviet threat and a less bipolar world means that the number of ready suppliers of military equipment is likely to rise. For similar reasons the inhibitions regarding sales will be weakened. The Middle East will continue to be a major and perhaps growing repository of such sophisticated military equipment. That would substantially reduce the ease and increase the military and political cost of outside intervention.

One should not be misled by the ease of U.S. intervention in the Gulf tanker war during the later 1980s to protect Kuwaiti tankers and generally to offset Iranian power (despite American protestations of neutrality in the war). Those conditions were unique. Iran, through its own follies and through the course of the war, had largely eliminated its own air and naval capabilities. The flow of events led it to a point of substantial exhaustion both militarily and economically. Given its weakness, particularly of its air and naval forces, it was remarkably, if not deceptively, easy for the U.S. to neutralize residual Iranian military power. Many in the West, however, are likely to trick themselves into believing somehow these unique conditions involving an exhausted Iran is the normal model.

Over time, Soviet capacity for military intervention in the Gulf region is likely to increase relative to the West—assuming that the Soviet Union can surmount its current "time of troubles." Western military forces will be reduced—along with the inclination, and perhaps the will, to become militarily engaged in the region. At the same time, Soviet conventional forces will remain immense. If logistics are improved, their capability for intervention will grow. The Soviet Union is near at hand; the United States is far distant. Thus, if there were a sudden introduction of outside forces—*and that remains a very big if*—it becomes increasingly plausible that the outsider would be the Soviet Union. And the temptation to intervene may grow as the long-anticipated decline in Soviet oil production sets in.

WHAT ABOUT the Gulf region itself? As the outside world becomes increasingly dependent upon the Gulf, the principal nations of the region will become far more influential. Their financial difficulties will rapidly or gradually come to an end. Their place in the sun will be restored—along with their self-esteem. They will become increasingly cocky. They will also become more tempting as a target.

The Middle East will likely continue to be marked by disunity. If so, as the oil market tightens, it will be subject to disruptions and supply interruptions due to indigenous conflicts. It is possible, of course, that the producing states may become more unified. Given the present conditions, and particularly the historic rivalry between the Persians and the Arabs, this appears implausible. Unity would likely be an imposed unity—an attempt at such imposed unity by the Ayatollah Khomeini has visibly failed. Nonetheless, if such unity could be achieved, it would further enhance the economic and political power of the region relative to the outside world.

Far more likely is a continuation of political disunity along with limited economic cooperation. The broader OPEC cartel will gradually be replaced by an "inner cartel" of the Gulf nations—those that have the re-

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serves for additional production. The attitude and behavior of this "inner cartel" will come to be the chief, indeed the dominant influence, in oil markets.

Concern about the Soviet Union may at some point revive among the nations of the region—as the memory of the failed Afghan adventure recedes. Although the Soviet Union has proved to be a far weaker competitor in terms of military technology than generally was believed in the 1970s, its capacity for local intervention will not diminish significantly and could grow substantially. There are asymmetries in the ways in which the strength of the superpowers are reduced. Consequently, the nations of the region may ultimately choose to adopt the long-time Chinese injunction: Bring to one's aid the barbarian far-removed, thereby to neutralize the barbarian close at hand. In a sense that would represent a return to Persia's historic policy.

We can foresee a world that has grown increasingly and perhaps excessively dependent on the Gulf region for its energy resources and for the performance of its economies. The Middle East will thus become the cockpit of contending world forces—and a potential tinder box. If there is a major conflict, the Middle East is likely to be its vortex. "If there ever is a World War III," as one oil industry analyst has hyperbolically observed, "it will be fought over the Middle Eastern oil reserves."

The Middle Eastern nations themselves will be more influential, more self-confident, better armed, and, yet, probably still marked by disunity. Western capacity and inclination for intervention will likely diminish. The ability and the incentive for the Soviets to intervene may grow. Indeed, the latent threat of Soviet domination of the region (and of the world's oil valve)—with all that it implies—will not diminish for a long time. In their relations with the Soviet Union the nations of the Gulf will vary between fear and flirtation.

Let me close with two final observations. First, an early student of geopolitics, Karl Haushofer, reached his ultimate conclusion with the pithy declaration: "Who controls the Heartland, controls the world." That may have been academic or pseudo-academic melodrama—but it does provide food for thought. It might now be said that whichever great power may come to control the world's oil tap in the Gulf region, will to a large extent control the world.

Second, you will all recall the Beatitude: "The meek shall inherit the earth." Reportedly it was amended by the late J. Paul Getty to the effect that, the meek may inherit the earth, but not the subsoil rights. His judgment has been strongly reinforced by the actions of the Ayatollah Khomeini and by others. Whatever else, those crucial subsoil rights in the Middle East are not now, nor are they likely to be, controlled by the meek.

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
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
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Keep an Eye on Turkey

Daniel Nelson

TURKS, RUSSIANS, and warfare—for centuries, these words were virtually synonymous. From the Balkans to Central Asia, the Ottoman and Russian empires alternately fought and ruled over each other's territory and peoples. Only once in recent centuries—near the end of World War II—have Turks and Russians been on the same side in war. The Turkish republic today retains a healthy suspicion of Moscow. After the return of civilian government to Turkey in 1983, both the strong military influence in Turkish politics and the leadership interregnum in the USSR caused Ankara and Moscow to fall back on old slogans and antipathies.

But in dramatically changing circumstances, it would be dangerous to assume that the force of history alone will determine the future relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. As Turks look north from the Bosporus now, there are indications that they have begun to alter significantly their assessment of both Soviet reality and their own security. Changes in the USSR, the pragmatism of Ankara's centrist civilian leadership, and other more imminent security issues confronting Turkey may be propelling relations between the two countries into uncharted waters—and more important for the United States, causing serious concern about the fate of NATO's cornerstone southern flank.

Just how disquieting that shift might be to the United States and its NATO allies was suggested in May of last year, when Turkey's leaders found themselves in possession of a Soviet defector—not an unusual event, except for the way he arrived. Landing his MIG–29 Fulcrum—perhaps the best plane in the Soviet air force and the pride of its air defense system—on an airfield in eastern Turkey, Captain Aleksandr Zuyev's defection provided an unparalleled opportunity to examine the USSR's recent advances in aircraft construction, avionics, and armaments.

The Turks, however, refused to delay the return of the MIG–29 to the USSR, thereby denying the United States an intelligence goldmine. Although some Turkish examination of the aircraft did take place in the thirty hours it remained on Turkish soil, even a personal plea from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe, to his Turkish counterpart failed to change Ankara's position. Although later reports based on interviews with Turkish military officers suggest that a great deal of information useful to NATO *was* learned by metallurgical and electronic analysis, the absence of U.S. (or British) personnel made the Turkish examination much less helpful than it could have been.

At the Pentagon and in the corridors of other NATO ministries of defense, the Turkish action seemed, at best, ill-considered,

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given Turkey's keen desire to join a Europe that until now has held it at arm's length. At worst, it was a serious jolt to the expectations among NATO allies. Such a refusal to cooperate fully on a matter of security was, however, quite consistent with Prime Minister (now President) Turgut Ozal's earnest effort to avoid "international ramifications" with the USSR. Although the Turkish foreign ministry rationalized the MIG–29 decision by emphasizing its desire to lessen the tensions in Europe, the actual cause lay elsewhere. Treading softly vis-á-vis Moscow is based on assessments that imminent threats to Turkey have not originated in the USSR for some time. Turkish political, military, and academic elites have been readjusting threat assessments and their understanding of security in general for the past decade and a half. In chronological terms, this sea change dates principally from the U.S. arms embargo following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1975. But the motivation for Ankara's security reassessments has even deeper roots.

FOR TURKS, the immediate post-World War II situation evoked an ominous specter of Stalinist expansionism, with Soviet troops occupying northwestern Iran, the Red Army thoroughly in control in Bulgaria and Romania, and a communist insurgency in Greece. In such circumstances, Turkish and American interests coincided. Turkey was embraced by the United States as part of a strategy of containment, and became both a member of NATO (in 1952) and a founding member of the now-defunct CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). It became a forward-deployment location for American listening posts, air bases, and (in the late 1950s) our earliest intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

These U.S. bases are still critical to American security and NATO intelligence capabilities. Their modernization became a diplomatic and economic issue between Washington and Ankara during the mid–1980s. (Now, after a three-and-a-half year wait, the U.S. will be allowed to modernize operations at Pirinclik, Belbasi, and the airbase at Sinop.)

Turkey has become a critical anchor for NATO's Southern Command, one that contributes disproportionately to the alliance's total manpower. With the second largest military in NATO (roughly 800,000 in the active duty armed forces), with continuous and costly efforts to modernize forces (e.g., the assembly of 160 F–16s in Turkey), and with military expenditures as a proportion of GNP among the highest in the alliance (at 4.9 percent, behind only the U.S. and Greece), it is difficult for NATO councils to deny the substantial contribution Turkey makes to collective defense.

Not surprisingly, this contribution has led to Turkish expectations that they would be taken seriously and treated generously in their economic and political relations with Western Europe and the United States. In the Turkish view, appropriate recompense would include much greater access for Turkey's exports (textiles, fruits, and manufactured items) to Western markets in order to reduce Ankara's trade deficit with developed market economies, and larger amounts of aid (in the form of *grants*, not merely credits, loans, and technical assistance). American security assistance does in fact total well over half a billion dollars annually, placing Turkey behind only Israel, Egypt, and Pakistan as aid recipients. Nevertheless, Turkish expectations generally have not been met, and vociferous complaints are heard in Ankara and Istanbul that what Turkey has been given is far less than what it needs and is due.

Ankara's ties with the West have also been affected negatively by the enmity between Greece and Turkey. From the Turkish perspective, the Greek socialist government of Andreas Papandreou acted provocatively towards Turkey. Ankara cites as evidence various maritime incidents in the Aegean Sea, and confrontations in the airspace over the sea and its thousands of islands. Further, it points to the January 1985 announcement from Athens of a new military policy that identified Turkey as Greece's principal threat

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and redeployed Greek forces accordingly. A September 1986 Greek-Bulgarian Protocol of Friendship and Cooperation is also cited as a major step in heightening regional tensions, and military and government officials express indignation at the lack of NATO condemnation of that accord. Papandreou's electoral defeat in June 1989 may lead to some improvement in relations, but neither the Greek conservatives nor the Turks are likely to become less intransigent about Cyprus and other disputes.

Turkish leaders also note the contrast between their behavior and that of their Greek counterparts in cooperation with the U.S. on basing and intelligence gathering. Helinikon air base, outside Athens, is unlikely to remain an American facility, and discussions about major bases in Greece, such as Souda Bay, have been protracted. Turks complain bitterly about the fact that, despite this difference in performance, American military assistance to Turkey is tied to the level provided to Greece by the "infamous" 7:10 ratio laid down by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to maintain "the current balance of military strength" between the two countries. Although the U.S. arms embargo, imposed in 1975 after the Turks invaded Cyprus, was lifted long ago, officials in Ankara remain concerned that the "Greek lobby" could once again lead America to abandon Turkey in the event of a conflict with Greece.

TO HELP understand Turkey's sense of grievance it is useful to juxtapose its experience in the Greek dispute with its escalating friction with Bulgaria. The origins of the latter lie in the disastrous policy of forced assimilation of ethnic Turks adopted in the 1980s by former Bulgarian Communist party leader Todor Zhivkov. As late as March 1989, Turks accounted for between 10 and 12 percent of Bulgaria's 9.4 million people. In 1984, Zhivkov began to implement policies that insisted on the use of Bulgarian surnames, prohibit the use of the Turkish language for instruction or media broadcasts, restrict Turkish-language publications, and impede the practice of Islam by closing mosques. Several hundred thousand ethnic Bulgarian Moslems have faced many of the same denials of personal liberties.

Bulgaria's effort to create by force a "single socialist nation" was bound to fail. During 1984 and 1985, a number of violent incidents including the bombing of trains and train stations were reported, and violent encounters between Turkish/Moslem protestors and security police or militia units are alleged (by Turkish sources) to have resulted in one thousand deaths. This violence led to a temporary respite in regions where ethnic Turks have a sizable presence—along the southern border of Bulgaria with Greece and Turkey and in the northeast. But in 1988 and 1989 there were renewed outbreaks of demonstrations, strikes, and violent encounters between Turks and the authorities. More than 300,000 people, mostly ethnic Turks, fled or were deported by the Zhivkov regime in 1989.

For Turkey, the treatment of their ethnic counterparts in Bulgaria and the enormous refugee burden resulting from it are issues of national honor (as well as matters useful in domestic and international politics). President Ozal, Foreign Minister Yilmaz, and General Turumtay (chief of the Turkish general staff) saw Moscow as the only power that could engender some modification of Bulgarian policy. The Turks requested Soviet intervention, and the Soviets responded by initiating discussions with Bulgarian foreign minister (now party leader) Petar Mladenov. Although the content of these consultations is not known, there appears to have been a willingness on the part of the Soviets to "lean" on the longtime sycophants in Sofia. For many Turks, the contrast between the response of its Western allies to the Turkish-Greek dispute and the Soviet response over the Bulgarian problem has been instructive.

The distances between the positions of Moscow and Ankara have also diminished in other matters involving Turkish security. Islamic fundamentalism is of no small concern to Turkey's urban elites. Already the secular

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heritage that Turkey's first president, Kemal Atatürk, established for twentieth-century Turkey has run headlong into Islamic traditions such as head-coverings for female students at universities. Turkish law prohibits such religious displays, while Islamic fundamentalists demand that their religious law be followed. Indeed, relations between Iran and Turkey have been disrupted far more by this issue than by the nine years of the Gulf War.

The Turkish civilian and military leadership has begun to recognize a kind of secular alliance among states on the periphery of Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism. Although Moslems within the USSR compose less than 20 percent of the total population, Central Asia and republics such as Azerbaijan are predominantly Islamic and are experiencing rapid population growth rates. Both political systems will try to strike their own bargains with Iran and domestic Islamic fundamentalists, but in the 1980s an element of shared concern arose between Turkey and the Soviet Union that did not exist before.

The strong nationalism of Kurds and Armenians, and violent attacks by both Kurdish and Armenian separatists in Eastern Anatolia, is another issue that pushes Ankara away from NATO and toward the Soviets. The prevailing Western European view is that the Armenians and Kurds are oppressed minorities subject to forced assimilation in much the same way as ethnic Turks are in Bulgaria. The Turks were not pleased, for example, by the omission of Kurdish groups committed to violence (the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic party and the Kurdistan Workers' party) from a 1988 U.S. Department of Defense/State Department publication on terrorist organizations. On the other hand, the Soviets, now confronting a growing list of independence-minded national fronts and heightened levels of nationalistic violence, can be expected to appreciate the Turkish perception of the problem.

In Ankara no military or security planner could afford to forget that Iraq has acquired substantial battle-tested chemical warfare and missile-firing capabilities, and continues to put in place the infrastructure required for producing nuclear weapons. Although Turkey managed to remain on relatively good terms with Baghdad during the Gulf War—allowing the shipment of Iraqi oil to Turkish ports—no one on the Turkish general staff is sanguine about the border with Iraq or Iran. And to the south sits a heavily armed Syria, likely to become highly unstable when President Assad departs from the political scene.

Only the USSR can now claim to have substantial political, military, and economic influence with these states on Turkey's eastern and southern borders. In the event of serious trouble from these parts, Ankara can expect no significant intervention from the West. In any case, U.S. support for Turkey vis-á-vis the Arab world would be, in all likelihood, counterproductive.

AGAINST THIS background, it should not be surprising that when Turkey made security-related choices in the last half of the 1980s, care was taken to open lines of communication and commerce with the USSR, and to avoid controversy. A significant example is the 1986 Turkish-Soviet agreement for the supply of Soviet oil and gas to Turkey. In late 1989, the large (65,000-ton) Soviet aircraft carrier *Tbilisi* began sea trials, and will eventually use the Bosporus to egress from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. When it does, it is highly unlikely that Turkey will insist on a careful reading of the Montreux Convention, which would certainly prohibit the passage of such a warship. In the absence of some serious rupture in relations with Moscow in the meantime, the Turks will ignore the convention.

Turkey's original reasons for becoming a member of NATO were complex. They involved not only concern about Stalin's intentions but also Turkey's desire to gain political recognition, enhance economic potential, and (for some Turks) integrate into the European Community. After almost thirty-eight years, however, the prospect of clear and tangible economic and political advantages is outweighed by a vague but powerful sense that

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Turkey has been "used" by the West and subjected to harsh tests.

While the Ozal government and most urban elites still want entry into the European Community, Turkish opinion is increasingly divided over the wisdom of Europeanization. In any case, other obstacles preclude rapid progress towards such a goal. Some EC members—Denmark, for example—raise human rights concerns whenever Turkey's association with the West is discussed. The preoccupation of some Americans with furthering an allegedly global "democratic revolution" presents further problems. No doubt were Turkey to acknowledge the massacre of Armenians by Turks seventy years ago, and to make a commitment to end brutality and torture in prisons, Western European opinion would be affected positively. And if the Kurds were no longer denied unhindered outlets for language and cultural expression, the human rights issue would also be diminished. In general, Western European unease about Turkey's "civility" is linked to cultural distances between an Islamic nation and the quite different heritage of Western Europe. But there is also a more practical concern: Western Europe's (and especially West Germany's) fear of a further influx of Turks if the open frontiers policy of the EC were to be applied to Turkey. With 1.4 million Turks already in Germany, the prospect of an unstoppable flow of hundreds of thousands more is likely to override all other considerations.

The Soviet Union makes no such demands on Turkey. Turks have not only been pushed away from NATO, but a common bond exists between the Soviets and the Turks in that both are subjected to Western European and North American scolding about human rights, and both have had difficulty entering a "European house."

Turkey's sense of exclusion is heightened by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations now underway in Vienna. As Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush trade proposals for reduced force levels in these Atlantic-Ural discussions, the Turkish general staff and foreign ministry see the clear potential for an accord seriously disadvantageous to their interests. No amount of American assurances that any accord will have to make military sense for the entire NATO alliance placates Turkish suspicion. Placed in the "Southern Zone" of the negotiations, Turks fear that, for the sake of major cuts in the central region (especially in Germany), the Soviets will be allowed to redeploy more resources in theaters of military operations directly relevant to Turkey.

Though Turkish analysts and military planners assess the Soviets as a diminished threat, they continue to believe that Soviet capabilities are ominous and will not wither due to economically-motivated force cutbacks or to reductions imposed by a CFE accord. If force levels in the central region are cut to 50 percent of current NATO levels, the Turks may see NATO as far less capable of providing aid in the event that aggressive Soviet moves recur. And they may well ask whether a West Germany so infatuated with Mikhail Gorbachev would ever disrupt budding relations with Moscow to assist (diplomatically or economically, much less militarily) a Turkey threatened with Soviet military might.

These are the powerful reasons—positive and negative—driving Turkey to reassess its relations with the Soviet Union. A Moscow increasingly concerned about instability in the Caucasus, the problem of Moslem fundamentalism, and its loosened grip on Eastern Europe may well be receptive to such a reassessment, for Turkey is relevant to all these problems. And for Moscow, there is, of course, the enticing prospect of the disintegration of NATO's southern flank. On the other hand, Russians and Turks share a history of virtually unbroken distrust and warfare. That, too, is powerful, though as the reconciliation between France and Germany since 1945 demonstrates, history is not always victorious. Certainly the time when American policymakers could take Turkey for granted is now well and truly over.

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The Limits of "International Law"

An article by Robert Bork in the Winter 1989/90 issue of *The National Interest* denies that "International Law" is "law" at all and argues that it should therefore be disregarded as a factor in American foreign affairs. Of course, many factors that are not "law" are important to foreign affairs, so the conclusion seems at least overstated.

The overt premise for Bork's confusion is the adoption of a criminal law paradigm for all law. International law is not "law," he argues, because, faced with violations, "No police force goes into action, no grand jury indicts, no verdict is announced by a court. . ." (p. 4). In the criminal law field in the United States, do police "arrest" corporations? Are police used to enforce tort law, contract law, property law, corporation law? Did a police force make President Nixon resign? Are tort, contract, property, corporation, and constitutional law not "law"?

Bork's narrative of the case brought by Nicaragua against the United States in 1984 (decided against us in substance in 1986 by the ICJ) is incorrect in fact and law. The United States was bound to the Court's determination of jurisdiction regardless of our disagreeing with it because we are parties to a treaty, the Statute of the Court, under which we formally agree to accept the Court's decision in such matters (Article 36.6). If treaties like this are not binding, then what holds our alliances together? If not "law" but only policy, what are our "rights" to military bases in Panama, the Philippines, or elsewhere? How can we defend our "rights" if we have no "right"?

Bork makes a point of the Court's rejecting El Salvador's petition to intervene legally in the case. But El Salvador's petition to "intervene" was a brief to support the United States position on jurisdiction. El Salvador did not seek to become a party to the case and there is no legal procedure to force a reluctant state to become such a party. In case of doubt, the decision whether to allow such an intervention is, by treaty, for the Court alone to make (Article 62.2).

In fact, I believe the Court was wrong to hear the case. In the past, it did turn down one case on the grounds that there was no process to bring a "necessary party" before it (the Monetary Gold Case, *Italy v. France, U.K. and U.S.*, 1954); more recently it had taken to accepting jurisdiction, apparently in the hope of influencing the parties to settle, then, when it became clear that taking jurisdiction had exacerbated the situation, finding reasons to avoid deciding the substantive issue. That is what happened in the South West Africa Case (*Ethiopia and Liberia v. South Africa*, 1962, 1966), the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Case (*Belgium v. Spain*, 1961, 1970), and, most notably, the French Nuclear Tests Cases (*Australia/New Zealand v. France*, 1974). Indeed, after the last of these I recommended that the U.S. withdraw its general submission because the Court had begun playing games with the law (*American Journal of International Law* 71:1, 1977, at 29–30). The fact that our officials were not alert to this evolution is not a fault in the law but in our officials who thought the law of the Court was unimportant to American policy.

Bork finds that customary international law does not exist because the rules are frequently violated and the principles are hotly disputed by scholars (p. 6). But the same is true of economics and even military science, not to belabor constitutional, tort, and contract law. The evidence for unwritten rules of public international law comes from purported violations, protested and then discussed in diplomatic correspondence like that between the United States and Iran following the *Vincennes* incident. Correspondence frequently results in a settlement even if one party asserts itself to be acting *ex gratia* rather than under legal compulsion. Expensive potential law suits are frequently settled the

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same way in our domestic system. And more frequently than Bork seems aware, questions of international law are decided by international tribunals and various pressures exist equivalent to those that encourage the settlement on the basis of law of domestic disputes among unequal parties.

Bork complains that the ICJ presumed to consider a dispute "legal" which in the United States would be called "political" (p. 7). But the distribution of authority contained in our Constitution relegates some disputes to the political arms of government as a matter of constitutional law; the distribution of authority in international law is different. Even in the United States, the question of which issues are "political" is resolved by our Supreme Court as a legal matter: an interpretation of the Constitution. It is very hard to understand why such a legal interpretation by our national judiciary should be considered determinative for the international legal order.

Moreover, the constitutional law in the United States is much more complex than Bork implies. Very few would dispute our Congress's constitutional authority to make or refuse to make appropriations as suits its policy judgment. Equally few would dispute the authority of an American court to decide a claim legally obliging the government as a whole to pay (perhaps for expropriated property, requiring "just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment). It seems illogical to argue that because the power of the Court does not extend to the political question of whether the appropriation should be made, that therefore the Court should not pronounce on the law which might affect that political judgment.

As to Grenada, Bork seems to confuse popularity with morality; positive morality with value-based morality; and all three with legality (p. 8). They are a common confusion. Indeed, I think we could have managed our activities in Grenada legally, and that fact has diminished the political penalties we have been paying for them. But to say that the muted response means that a politically desirable action can be taken without regard for the legalities oversimplifies reality. The most obvious analogy to the simpler domestic order is to a neighbor trespassing to stop child abuse next door. What the trespasser calls abuse the actor calls rigid discipline. Both agree in principle on the sanctity of the family. In Grenada the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States clearly acted beyond its authority and so did the U.S. in changing the constitution of Grenada. The survivors of the Grenada "family" seem glad we did. But everybody must remain apprehensive that we will decide to rescue from the international equivalent of child abuse other people who are simply organized by their own choice in a pattern we don't like and therefore call abusive. Does the concomitant loss of our ability to influence events without using force mean nothing?

The criticism of Senator Moynihan seems unjust (p. 9). Bork sees a contradiction between the reality of "law" and the failure of the OAS member states to live up to their commitments. The Charter of the OAS, he says, "requires of members 'the effective exercises of representative democracy.' " The Charter actually says: "The American States reaffirm the following principles: . . . (d) The Solidarity of the American States and the High aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercises of representative democracy." The United States Constitution, also a treaty, has similar general language importing context for interpretation rather than immediate obligations, for example the Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia being necessary for the security of a free State." Moynihan's point in context is that there is a distinction between true facts and such statements of principle presented as if fact or legally binding aspirations. Is there any disagreement? Does anybody expect the law that makes treaties binding among states with different constitutions, value systems and languages to be simpler and less subtle than American contract and constitutional law?

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Bork sums up: ". . . international law actually makes moral action appear immoral" (p. 10). But what is Bork's authority to determine for anybody else what is "moral"? As a people, we can certainly determine what is moral for ourselves, but in international affairs we interact with others who may weigh things differently for themselves. To impose our values on them by force is to legitimize the use of force to impose values. To argue that other people's uses of force are wrong but ours are moral and therefore right is to march to Armageddon on Dover Beach, where ignorant armies clash by night each believing itself infallibly righteous. It is very hard to accept this approach on moral or political grounds.

Bork believes that "The Soviets and other nations have no such problem." I suppose that is why, with all our faults, after forty years of communism in China the ideal of democracy was symbolized at Tiananmen Square by our own Statue of Liberty modified in form to suit local sensibilities. We shall see how long Soviet moral influence and monuments to the Red Army outlast the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe.

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Bork Responds

Much of Professor Rubin's letter seems to me to consist of debater's points that, even were they correct, would not alter the conclusion of my article. His one serious objection comes at the end and relates to my argument that what is important about the use of force internationally is its morality rather than its status under a body of "law" which is largely unobserved even when it is not indeterminate. Professor Rubin appears to think that the fact of disagreement between nations about the morality of particular actions leads to the conclusion that the United States should not act on its moral view. That, of course, is merely our old friend moral equivalence once more.

Our actions in Grenada and Panama provide test cases. Vital interests of the United States were involved and the actions, being limited, were not likely to lead to "Armageddon." In each case, the foreign population overwhelmingly (by over 90 percent) welcomed our action. If that is not enough to justify our use of force, then no amount of legalisms can. This nation is founded upon the principle that democracy and liberty are vastly morally superior to their opposites. A body of "law" that denies that proposition is at war with the reason for our being as a nation.

Robert Bork
Washington, D.C.

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The Seventy-Year Detour

Mary Eberstadt

IF SOMETHING like the *Zeitgeist* didn't exist, editors everywhere would have to invent it. Nothing else explains how it is that certain arguments incubate and hatch independently, then flock into magazine offices en masse.

A few months ago, in the wake of our "End of History?" series, the desks of *The National Interest* were awash in clippings and general commentary about "ideology" and "historicism." Though many of these essays had been prompted by Francis Fukuyama's article alone, a number of others had plainly been in the works for months, sometimes years, before his thesis became a *cause célèbre*. A good many analysts of American foreign policy, it suddenly appeared, had been toiling over German idealism all along.

Three months later, and once again from independent quarters, two altogether different themes emerge in the daily reading—both of long endurance in debates over American foreign policy, but both made more immediate by events that have rocked the global status quo to its core. One of these themes is a new and distinctly virile form of what is usually called "isolationism." But isolationism, as anyone can see, isn't what it used to be. Unlike the left-wing version that took root in the 1960s, the new isolationism does not reject foreign entanglements on the theory that America taints what it touches. Nor, however—unlike traditional right-wing isolationism—does it reject entanglements on the theory that what we touch taints us.[1] What is new about this latest incarnation is its emphasis on unilateralism—on the idea that the necessarily *global* interests of the United states must not be compromised by its bilateral or multilateral alliances.

Such themes are surely familiar to readers of *The National Interest*, which from its first issue has provided a home of sorts to writers charged by their critics with "isolationism." Coeditor Robert Tucker, for one, has cautioned in these pages and elsewhere against the dissipation of American strength through unnecessary involvements and crusades. Our publisher, Irving Kristol, has for years advocated disengagement from NATO, the UN, and a host of "multilateralist" associations that he views as constraints on our global freedom of action. Various of our other authors have sounded similar notes: Robert Shepard, who has made a case for disengagement from South Africa on grounds independent of moralism; Alan Tonelson, who has urged the Democratic party to repudiate liberal internationalism in the name of a distinctly unilateralist "new nationalism"; and Christopher Layne, who has advocated American withdrawal from NATO

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[1]See, for example, Patrick Buchanan's "America First—and Second, and Third" in this issue.

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as a means of seizing the diplomatic initiative from Gorbachev.

Those arguments have not changed with the times. What *has* changed is that, for the first time in the postwar era, the new isolationism stands to win many new converts to its ranks, and perhaps even to extend its influence to American policy overall. In the mid–1980s, the idea of just such an outcome caused considerable anxiety among self-described "internationalists." Charles Krauthammer contended with the isolationist spectre in these pages and elsewhere; Secretary of State George Shultz and other officials decried protectionist legislation and attacks on the foreign aid budget as "isolationist"; and advocates of various foreign involvements, Left and Right, warned against a return to "Fortress America." Yet all such apprehensions were then premature, for the Cold War remained a heated one. So long as the postwar "order" in Europe remained the same and the Berlin Wall told all we needed to know about Soviet intentions toward the West, attempts to loosen the United States from its allies or presumed allies could claim minority allegiance at best.

BUT NOW THE Eastern Europeans themselves are ending what American policy-makers have long called the "unnatural and illegal" divisions of the continent. The wall itself has fallen; the barbed wire in Hungary and elsewhere has been removed. With every such change, yesterday's internationalism and the foreign involvements it has entailed are being scrutinized as never before in the postwar period. Piece by piece, in a process that is only beginning, this country's overseas commitments are being held to a different light and found wanting by a variety of critics.

As Robert Kagan notes in his essay on Panama, the transformation of Europe is already beginning to echo in Latin America. Mark Falcoff, for years the most astute observer of the region, has now become the first to wonder publicly about its importance to the United States apart from the Cold War. That question is beginning to loom over other involvements as well. And it is that question, albeit in covert form, that lies at the heart of the debate over Senator Dole's proposal for a revision in American foreign aid.

Support for the new governments of Eastern Europe, the senator has suggested, might be financed by reductions in the sums allotted to Israel, Egypt, Turkey, the Philippines, and Pakistan—countries that currently receive the lion's share of aid. Following that proposal, the battle lines of public debate have been clearly drawn. Two new genres of essays are being born—one explaining why traditional friend X remains vital to American interests; the other urging that we dispense at last with unsavory (if also traditional) friend Y. Both arguments, it seems clear, will become even more prominent in the months to come.

Not all of this commentary has proceeded in the best of faith. Some who have never believed in the Cold War, much less in its "demise," now make solemn cases against friends and allies they would happily have sent packing long ago. A certain insincerity is also evident in the ongoing scramble for a "peace dividend," a phrase that usually translates as "ever-larger welfare state." Through the fog, however, one fact remains plain: The era in which one foreign involvement after another could be justified by reference to the Soviet threat alone is at an end.

If that fact is only beginning to be weighed here, it has scarcely been lost on other interested parties. Advocates of aid to Africa, who have long suspected that American interests there have been "merely" geostrategic, now fear that the United States will close its purse to the continent. The Philippine ambassador has registered his own dismay over the debate in the pages of the *Washington Post*. The *Wall Street Journal* has reported similar apprehensions among the various champions of aid to Greece and Turkey. Proposals for increasing aid to one country by cutting it from another have proliferated. To unilateralists and others who have long believed that American foreign aid has

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escaped the scrutiny it deserves, the cacophony of recent weeks must be sweet music indeed.

If the revolutionary events of 1989 and early 1990 have encouraged the new isolationists, they have also armed an opposing camp of what might be called "democratists." "Democratism" springs from an established body of thought—in this case, liberal internationalism—but is not co-terminus with that tradition. Yesterday's internationalists, too, sought government by popular consent; but their understanding of "free government" was not absolute. The "free world," in the decades following the war, was construed broadly enough to encompass, at different times, such distinct forms of government as the federalism of West Germany, the parliamentarianism of Japan, the once hardly-democratic system of South Korea, and the one-party rule that prevailed in Taiwan until a few years ago and still prevails in Mexico.

Today's democratists depart from that tradition on an important point: they replace relative assessments of "free government" with the considerably narrower standard of "democracy." The National Endowment for Democracy, an institution born of such ideas, has now issued a journal which illustrates that feature of the democratist trend. Called the *Journal of Democracy* (not, for example, of "free government," "constitutionalism," or "republicanism"), it is quite specifically dedicated to "advanc[ing] understanding of the broader conditions and strategies for instituting, consolidating, and maintaining democratic government."

Like those of the neo-isolationists, the voices of democratism have found a willing forum in *The National Interest;* one thinks, for example, of authors like Elliott Abrams, Charles Krauthammer, and, in this issue, Carl Gershman and Robert Kagan. These advocates have also had their critics here, in particular coeditor Owen Harries.[2] Unlike neo-isolationism, however, the democratist view has long found favor in the highest reaches of government, and indeed has become a staple of official rhetoric.

This is particularly evident in the case of Latin America, though not only there. During the Reagan years, every important initiative in the region—from arming the *contras* to providing economic support for governments like Alfonsín's in Argentina or Garcia's in Peru—was justified by an appeal to building, encouraging, or restoring "democracy." The administration of George Bush has slipped easily into the same rhetoric. The two most recent exercises of American military power—the air support provided to the Aquino government against an attempted coup a few months ago, and the invasion of Panama last December—were both explained as examples of "restoring" or "defending" democracy. This is true even though anyone can see that the chief objective of "Operation Just Cause" was the ousting and capture of General Noriega, and that democratic rule—though in fact restored to that country—could very well have suffered equally at the hands of some other Panamanian dictator. Whether the Bush administration would have invaded in *that* event is at least an open question.

AMERICAN ANALYSTS and policy-makers are not alone in making more of "democracy" than of "freedom" these days. A similar switch in emphasis is underway in much of the world. "Democracy" was the word on the banners of Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest last year; it was the "goddess of democracy" that was marched through Tiananmen Square. These are, true to the Greek root of the word, *democratic* movements. Like those of the 1980s that brought elected governments to power in El Salvador, the Philippines, and several South American states, they are marked by unexpected masses of people rising up, often at great risk, in the hopes of winning a new order. As the triumphal tours of an Aquino or a Walesa show, these are movements to which Americans give their hearts.

[2]See, for example, his "Exporting Democracy—and Getting it Wrong," *The National Interest*, no. 13 (Fall 1988).

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But a democratic movement is one thing; the form of government that issues from it, quite another. The turmoil that Amitai Etzioni predicts elsewhere in these pages for Eastern Europe is already evident in the Philippines, where the popularity garnered by Aquino in 1986–87 has neither protected her government from coup attempts nor appreciably improved the lives of ordinary Filipinos. A country cannot live on "people power" alone. The United States itself was born of a democratic revolution, but it was thirteen years before that revolution could be translated into an enduring form of government. Nor was that government simply or fully democratic. If there is a sword hanging over the democratist school today, it is the one that divides the democratic *process* of ousting dictators from the *institutions* adopted consequent to that act. And though distinctions like these may seem academic today, they will surely become flesh and blood in the Eastern European governments—among others—of tomorrow.

The new isolationists, for their part, face an altogether different struggle if they are to influence policy for the better. The nation they want unbound depends for its prosperity, and probably its very survival, on global commerce. If the American presence abroad is so far diminished that our present friends and allies fall prey to attack, the United States will not suffer lightly. What do we gain if, after cutting our ties to NATO, a war in Central Europe draws in Germany or France? Or if the Philippines or some other outpost is cut loose, only to dissolve into ungovernable chaos? If the alternative to dependency is Lebanon, then dependency—despite its own familiar risks—may yet be the better bargain.

Seventy years ago, a famous opponent of the League of Nations treaty argued against "all schemes, all plans, however ambitious and fascinating they seem in their proposal, which would embarrass or entangle and impede or shackle [America's] sovereign will." There may be more of Senator William Borah in the new isolationists than they, or their critics, realize. Similarly, the creed and ambitions of democratism owe more to Woodrow Wilson than to the pragmatists of yesterday who rebuilt Germany and Japan and developed the idea of containment. It is as if, after a detour of some seven decades, the debate over American foreign policy has come home.

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

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

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